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# Daily Report

# East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-024
Monday
6 February 1995

# Daily Report
## East Europe

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**NOTICE TO READERS:** All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

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## Croats, Bosnians Adopt Plan To 'Save' Federation

*AU0502151095 Paris AFP in English 1440 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Munich, Germany, Feb 5 (AFP)—Leaders of Croatia and Bosnia adopted a nine-point plan here Sunday to save their Moslem-Croatian federation from breaking apart, talks chairman and U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke said.

The U.S.-brokered plan provides for the nomination of an international mediator to solve differences at the heart of the federation, created last March.

The five-power "contact group" on the Bosnian conflict was also meeting in parallel in Munich on Sunday to try to breathe new life into general Bosnian peace efforts.

Croatian and Bosnian representatives agreed to abide by the decisions of an appointed mediator who is to be nominated by a person chosen by common accord between the parties, said Holbrooke, who spoke of an "excellent" meeting.

In addition, a standing committee will be created in Sarajevo to supervise the state of the federation.

Meanwhile, the two sides will provide experts in constitutional law to shore up the federation's institutions and mediation sub-groups will be detailed to iron out differences between "specific communities" with a view to extending cooperation with the European Union.

## Croatian, Bosnian Heads Comment on Munich Meeting

*LD0502193395 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[Quotation marks denote recorded passages]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Good evening, dear viewers. Members of the Contact Group for Bosnia-Hercegovina met in the Hilton Hotel in Munich today to discuss the revival of the peace process. This was followed by a U.S.-sponsored meeting between top officials of the Republic of Croatia and leaders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation. The topic of discussion was the implementation of the Washington agreement and current issues and problems of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation. Damir Matkovic has a report from Munich:

[Matkovic] [Passage omitted] Here is what Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic stated following the meeting:

[Granic] "Maybe it is necessary to stress here that the Bosniaks and Croats shared views in connection with the implementation of the Washington agreement and mechanisms for its implementation. Our stances at this meeting were so close that we did not have a single important problem to resolve during the entire meeting."

[Ganic] "The meeting today is very important because we managed to draw up certain methods and instruments for controlling the processes of implementation. In that way we will clearly detect hurdles and identify those who are laying them."

[Matkovic] Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak had a meeting with General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry:

[Susak] "We analyzed steps that we will have to take together after UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] leaves and before UNPROFOR goes from Croatia, what NATO and the United States could do in this regard. I am satisfied with the discussion, regardless of the fact that they expressed a view that in a way differs from ours—that this is not an opportune moment for the decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate." [passage omitted]

## Defense Officials on PFP, Joint Exercises

*AU0402215795*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana TVSh Television Network in Albanian at 1830 GMT on 4 February carries a 30-minute live relay of a studio discussion by Defense Minister Safet Zhulali, Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova, and Sheme Kosova, chief of the Army General Staff, regarding Albanian membership in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative.

Zhulali opens the discussion by commenting that his meetings and discussions with U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye during Nye's visit to Albania were "successful." He then states that the Albanian side's goal was "to ask for assistance from the United States." Zhulali is "confident that U.S. assistance for the Albanian Army will increase."

Zhulali says that one of the most important elements of the bilateral talks was cooperation in exercises. He praises U.S. Army officers involved in the Sarex-95 joint exercise and "welcomes any other joint exercise with the U.S. Army," adding that "we will be open to other NATO partners" but "on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty."

Not caring to articulate "the superlatives with which the Americans praised us," Zhulali goes on to commend the military's qualifications. He states that even NATO armies "have something to learn from our Army."

Deputy Foreign Minister Starova describes the situation in the Balkans as "very dangerous." He then describes the Brussels meeting with NATO officials, praising cooperation with NATO and applauding NATO's drafting of an "individual program for PFP." Starova summarizes the Albanian delegation's meetings and talks with Willy Claes. He stresses that "Albania wants to be integrated into the NATO structures." Starova considers the program to be "an important step for Albania," noting that "we support NATO's program of individual partnership" as a program that "brings Albania closer to NATO."

Reviewing his speech in Brussels, Starova says: "Albania considers NATO to be a stability factor" and "Albania welcomes and is ready to cooperate with NATO." He illustrates the point citing cooperation in the Adriatic and the recent U.S.-Albanian joint exercise, Sarex-95. He adds: "We support the program of individual partnership."

Taking the floor, Chief of Staff Kosova reviews Sarex-95, dwelling on exercise themes and praising them as "very useful." He says our military felt "equal" to the U.S. military.

Concluding the discussion, Zhulali welcomes the joint exercises as constituting "a great achievement for the Albanian Army" and welcomes "new cooperation" and "active participation in peacekeeping activities" even if "pledged to face challenges in the region."

## Commentary Criticizes Arbnori Visit to Russia

*AU0302101795 Tirana E DJATHTA in Albanian 27 Jan 95 pp 1, 6*

[Unattributed commentary: "Why Should Arbnori Visit Russia Now?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When the Pitkin days were being celebrated in Albania [reference to British comic actor's visit to Albania], the speaker of the Albanian parliament left the humor in Albania and set off on a trip to Russia to get better acquainted with the Kremlin's and Yeltsin's policy. While preoccupied with their destructive war in Chechnya, the Russian politicians managed to find time to receive the Albanian deputies and brief them on what is going on in their country.

The Albanian delegation's visit to Russia had been scheduled to take place a long time ago, but at that time Grachev's and Yeltsin's guns set the Russian parliament on fire, while this time Russian guns, tanks, and military aircraft are setting the entire town of Groznyy on fire. Groznyy is a long way from Moscow however, and it was not a problem for Arbnori and his delegation to hold talks in peaceful surroundings under Moscow's winter skies.

Nevertheless, since an act of genocide is being carried out against a small and peaceful people in Chechnya, the Albanian deputies had every justification for not going to Moscow. It could have been even better if they had not tried to find any justification at all but had simply sincerely stated that as long as Russia was waging a war of annihilation in Chechya the visit would serve no purpose.

However, Arbnori and his delegation did pay their visit. We congratulate Mr. Arbnori on expressing to his Russian hosts his dissatisfaction with Russia's vote against the UN resolution on human rights in Kosovo. As for the other issues discussed, we can say nothing, because we do not have any information, but the reply that his Russian interlocutors gave Arbnori sounds unpleasant to us. However, the war Russia is waging in Chechnya is in itself a better explanation of why Russia is against honoring the Albanian nation's rights in Kosovo than even the answers given to Arbnori.

### Germans Offer Aid To Offset Embargo Losses

*AU0302214795 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The German Government is ready to assist Bulgaria with a view to providing compensation for the losses resulting from the Yugoslav embargo, by supporting individual infrastructure projects, providing favorable import-export terms, and expanding the formation of German-Bulgarian joint enterprises. German Ambassador Christel Steffler stated this at her meeting today with Rumen Gechev, deputy prime minister and minister of economic development, according to a Government Press Center report.

According to Ambassador Steffler, the European Union appreciates the price that Bulgaria is paying for the Yugo embargo.

The cabinet's macroeconomic policy was the main topic discussed at the meeting. Rumen Gechev briefed Ms. Steffler on the government's intentions with regard to coordinating the work of the economic ministries and departments, foreign investments, and accelerating privatization. He stressed that in creating the structure of the new Ministry of Economic Development, the government will draw on the experience gained by a number of European countries, especially Germany.

### Economic Development Minister on Tasks, Budget

*AU0302145895 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 31 Jan 95 p 5*

[Interview with Rumen Gechev, deputy prime minister and minister of economic development, by Boyka Bashlieva; place and date not given: "First Economic Change Will Be Effected Through Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Bashlieva] Mr. Gechev, what necessitated the establishment of the Ministry of Economic Development?

[Gechev] This ministry is the objective result of the new philosophy in economic policy that we are proposing. The regulated market transition requires a governmental institution to coordinate the activities of the branch ministries, work out and elaborate the national priorities and industrial policy together with the branch ministries, and monitor and facilitate the implementation of this policy.

The new ministry will deal with economic forecasting and with analyzing the structure and possibilities of the inherited economic potential over the short, medium, and long term. Solutions will be proposed in the Council of Ministers after consultations with the other ministries.

As far as national priorities are concerned, they should be adopted by parliament, as is the practice in the developed countries. [passage omitted]

[Bashlieva] What are your first tasks?

[Gechev] The first task is to form the ministry's cadre potential. Most of the appointments will be done on the basis of a competition. I hope that things will start "rolling" within a month. During this period I will work on the economic priorities and will join the work on developing the strategy of the budget, which must be ready within two months. The first economic change will be effected through the budget.

[Bashlieva] Precisely how will you do this?

[Gechev] We must activate the State Reconstruction and Development Fund, which is almost unused. The Fund controls $400 million and 1 billion leva, which could be used in our economy. With the Ministry of Finance, we will decide which of the national priorities could be implemented in the short term. The change in economy must take place this year and in 1996, and, for that purpose, we must determine what production has a market potential so that we can direct funds toward it. [passage omitted]

[Bashlieva] You plan to increase the Gross National Product by 1.5-2 percent before 1996. What could prevent this goal from being reached?

[Gechev] The state debt is the most serious problem. We will seek possibilities to refinance our foreign debt. [passage omitted]

[Bashlieva] Do you think this cabinet will complete its mandate?

[Gechev] I think the cabinet will complete its mandate. This means that we will also win the next elections.

### Assembly Deputies Sworn in To Replace Ministers

*AU0602121595 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 2 Feb 95 p 3*

[FBIS Translated Text] In the National Assembly yesterday, eight deputies took the oath to serve the nation's interests. By decision of the Central Electoral Commission, they took the seats of those elected as ministers in Zhan Videnov's cabinet. Kolyo Kolev replaced Lyubomir Nachev [in Burgas Electoral District]; Rumyana Shubekova replaced Doncho Konakchiev [Veliko Turnovo]; Emiliya Tomova, Mimi Vitkova [Vidin]; Zavarin Marev, Svetoslav Shivarov [Pazardzhik]; Mariyana Khristova, Rumen Gechev [Pleven]; Petko Ganev, Mincho Koralski [Razgrad]; Chavdar Dobrev, Zhan Videnov [Sofia II Electoral District]; and Sashka Karakasheva replaced Georgi Pirinski [Sofia II].

### Videnov Cabinet Called Gorbachev Dream Come True

*AU0202134595 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 30 Jan 95 p 6*

[Article by Boyan Obretenov: "The Only Loyal Daughter of Gorbachev and Perestroyka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If we ignore the last five years, which already seem like a minute (or a dream), and attach the present to 1989, the change in Bulgaria's leadership would look something like this: The Zhivkovite leader would be over 50, unintelligent and uneducated. He would have social complexes; would be greedy for privileges rather than property, would be a weak professional who confuses ideology and business, lacking any initiative, having the attitude of a servant—small before the big guys and cruel toward those smaller than himself, clutching at the party like a rider grips a horse that is jumping over obstacles.

A different face looks out at us from the group photograph of the new cabinet. Today's leader is approximately 40 years old. He has had a normal and civilized life. He is highly educated and knows two foreign languages. He is well versed in his area of specialization and has advanced through its entire structure. He has traveled abroad and views himself as a citizen of the world. His relations with the party (he could also be a nonparty member related to the party) cannot be reduced to primitive loyalty. Indeed, his loyalty is part of his pragmatic outlook on the world and serves as a catalyst in his career, which actually is not political but professional. He opposes ideological factors and likes to talk about macroeconomic and macrosocial approaches.

This is the script that Gorbachev used to see in his dreams as the apex of perestroyka. This script could comfortably replace the ideological woodcutters in a state system described as "socialism," a concept that became rather flexible toward its end. However, the party that one way or another produced, reared, and trained Gorbachev loves cataclysms, which it calls revolutions. The present cabinet will enter history as a revolutionary achievement of its changing thought. This is so despite the fact that the members of the present cabinet were already active in the winter of 1992, when the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] mocked an entire nation by proposing the candidacy of Petur Boyadzhiev.

However, the BSP wanted our people to eat all the frogs it could produce—in order to reach, today, the stage the party could have embarked upon five years ago. A government such as Videnov's should have been a historical memory by now, a beginning rather than a final stage in the process of democratizing Bulgaria, and a period of substantial rather than cosmetic changes.

Now, after the tragically wasted period, the cabinet formed by the BSP is freezing the changes and placing them within the framework of perestroyka. It was, precisely, for perestroyka that 2.5 million people voted, and now it is being presented to all Bulgarians as the only lifesaving model.

The new ministers will not be faceless experts, but rather, first of all, people with a political responsibilityj, the leaders of BSP and coalition declare. They openly explain that this means responsibility to the party that brought them to power. Translated into everyday language, which all of us know very well, this means to preserve the party as a filter through which all processes in economic, internal, and foreign policy, culture, and education will be strained. The filter no longer comprises elementary red dogmas but rather the much more risky macroeconomic and macrosocial approaches that the new Socialists love so much. Carefully and ostensibly placing the party behind the scene, they turn the state into the driving force, leader, and comptroller of economic, political, and cultural life. The form of the inevitable market economy still does not mean everything. Tightly controlled by the state, which will open the locks only according to its own considerations, Bulgaria's market economy will remain far from the real and holy private initiative.

The most dangerous element is the fact that the modern leftist ministers have been reared on the foundation of collective thinking. Brought to power through the vote of a massive majority of voters, they cannot see this majority in any way other than as a faceless collective that must be guided and prompted. Norms controlling every area are necessary, from the extent to which people are allowed to get rich to the education of children.

The BSP program is not only a public statement regarding its best intentions and grave responsibilities; it will act and be applied as a model that molds every sphere of life in Bulgaria. The notorious "guiding role" is much more than a nagging political formulation. It is an attitude, second nature to even most democratically thinking Socialists. A fundamental change—the establishment of a state system that has severed itself genetically from socialism—is out of question.

It was Gorbachev's dream to rejuvenate socialism's already stinking body without affecting its main organs. He wanted to replace the face without affecting the heart, create new reflexes without touching the nervous system, and make it more vital without exchanging its old blood. Only in Bulgaria is this experiment being repeated. Zhan Videnov's cabinet and the constituency that supports it want to resurrect a half-dead organism and breath longevity into it. Personally, I think the stench will come first.

## State Railroad Board Appoints New Chief

*AU0302190895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Angel Dimitrov is the new chief of Bulgarian State Railroads. The company's Board of Directors voted unanimously to appoint him to the post today.

Dimitrov was previously chief of the Coordination and Control Department of Bulgarian State Railroads. He replaces Stamen Stamenov, who was released from the post following his appointment as transportation minister.

## FM Views Importance of EU Associate Membership

*AU0502220195 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 1 Feb 95 pp 1, 21*

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs [FM] Josef Zieleniec by Peter Nemec; place and date not given: "The Date for Filing an Application To Join the European Union Is Not Important, Says Minister Josef Zieleniec"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Agreement on the Czech Republic's Association with the European Union [EU], which goes into effect today, opens another phase in our country's preparation for integration into the EU. In this context, HOSPODARSKE NOVINY asked Minister of Foreign Affairs Josef Zieleniec for an interview.

[Nemec] What will change on 1 February 1995 regarding relations between the Czech Republic and the EU when the so-called association agreement goes into effect?

[Zieleniec] I would like to emphasize, first and foremost, the symbolic significance of the European Agreement. It is a document that marks a very distinct step in the process of our republic's integration into the EU. This is not a half-open door. It is an irreversible process, an expression of our country's desire to be part of integrated Europe. The European Agreement foresees the establishment of joint EU-Czech Republic bodies. The Association Council is a joint body at the level of the prime minister and ministers, serving as a platform for regular discussions on matters arising from the European Agreement and related problems. Other, also joint, executive bodies of the Association Council will also be set up, as well as a parliamentary committee. We have prepared institutions that will serve as an umbrella for the entire process. The entire state administration of the Czech Republic will coordinate its work with the appropriate European bodies. This is a very important change, one that will be of great significance also to our internal development. It concerns, for instance, the harmonization of the legal system. This is just one sentence, but it embodies the immense efforts of all state administration bodies, parliament, and many other institutions.

[Nemec] But the European Agreement is simultaneously a challenge for our economy....

[Zieleniec] We have agreed with the EU to create clear rules for a competitive environment. This involves issues such as an unambiguous trade policy, rules of state support, and legislation on economic competition. On the other hand, comparable competitive conditions grant to Czech exporters equal conditions of access to the single market and strengthen confidence in the ability of our products to compete. When we speak about the compatibility of the competitive environment in the EU and the Czech Republic, we should add to it some regulations on antidumping proceedings.

We have agreed on the preparation of rules for the cumulative [kumulace] origin of goods. Essentially, this concerns the determination of the origin of a product composed of several parts, some of domestic and some of foreign origin. This is important for reexports and for the implementation of export and import quotas.

Other issues at stake are the free movement of capital and labor, access to public orders organized in EU countries, and the like.

[Nemec] At the very least in the media of the CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association] countries, there is a certain rivalry and competition over which will be the first to file an application and be admitted to the EU.

[Zieleniec] You have observed yourself, quite correctly, that this primarily concerns the media. Speaking of rivalry or competition is nonsense. This would perhaps make sense if the admission of one member excluded the admission of someone else. But this is not how matters stand. No formal steps can substitute for specific prointegration work. We must strive for this by adapting our entire economic system, by means of political stability, and the like. We deliberately do not want to create the impression that the process of integration lies in the speed with which one files an application. This was one of the things that made us decide to file an application only when we are certain that it will be seriously considered. Incidentally, there are countries that filed their applications many years ago, such as Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey, and they have all been overtaken by Austria, Finland, and Sweden. I said before that we would file our application prior to the start of next year's EU intergovernmental conference. The conference will have to set conditions for the union's expansion. Once we know them, we will start the process of negotiations with the EU. The issue date is therefore irrelevant and unimportant.

[Nemec] Yet voices from EU headquarters warn that, if the EU intergovernmental conference does not succeed in adapting the union's institutions for a greater number of member countries, the admission of Central and Eastern European countries could be delayed.

[Zieleniec] I am an optimist on this count. Of course, the EU cannot exist according to the same rules and with the same institutions as were created for the original six countries. Today there are 15 member countries, due to which there are some formidable problems. But we must not forget that the EU is not just an expression of the desire to integrate economically. Those who came up with the idea of an integrated Europe had in mind also the building of political pillars. The purpose was, and is, obvious. Europe has for centuries been plagued by national wars. Ancient human experience dictates that the more you do together, the more you communicate, and the less you wage wars. As for the EU expansion to the east: Europe would not be complete; with the nonacceptance of the reforming countries it would lose much of its quintessence, much of the foundation from which it evolved, and much of the reason for which it evolved.

I am convinced that the political will that manages to overcome any technical obstacles, exists. As the saying goes: Where there is a will, there is a way. This is why I am an optimist.

### Havel: State Lacks Clear Idea of Power Industry

*LD0502172995 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1315 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[Interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by correspondent Vladimir Pavrovsky; date not given; from the "Conversations at Lany" program—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Pavrovsky] Mr. President, you toured the Dukovany nuclear power station in South Moravia last week. [passage omitted] What is your stance on the Dukovany power station and on our concept of the nuclear power industry in general?

[Havel] I think that we need a clear, easily understandable, and transparent long-term concept of the power industry. I am not sure that our state has formulated such a concept.

Of course, there are a number of various documents adopted by the government on the attenuation of coal-fired power industry, on reasons in favor of the Temelin power station, etc.

However, I am really not sure that we have a clear, transparent concept. Moreover, I think that my conviction has been proved right, that it is not possible to base such a concept merely on one ministry's considerations. It is not possible to outline power industry policy without having a basic idea about our ecology policy, without taking into account many strategic considerations concerning the future of our country, the character of our economy and its probable developments, the geographical position of our country, and the structure of its resources, etc.

As regards the power industry, we have one completed and functioning nuclear power station, and work on completing the other one is under way. One would hardly consider pulling these nuclear power stations down. This is the reality; we have taken steps similar to those taken by the majority of Western countries. Looking for nuclear powers stations on the map of Europe, you can see that nuclear power stations are located in the majority of states, the exception is Austria where a nuclear power industry was rejected by a referendum.

The important thing is what to do next. In my view we should, above all, get rid of a stereotyped assumption that an increase of production and gross domestic product needs to be necessarily accompanied by an increase in energy consumption. This was how they reasoned under the Communist regime. [passage omitted]

Those two nuclear power stations, together with our other power stations, will, in my view, be sufficient for us over the next 30 years at least. [passage omitted]

The other important thing is to diversify and decentralize sources of energy, to support small power stations that used to exist in our country, to support alternative sources of energy. Decentralization is important—the situation when the switch to all electrical energy in our state is controlled by one set of hands is not really a good thing.

As regards the Dukovany power station, my impression was entirely good. I think it is true what I was told there—that this power station enjoys the highest possible level of safety for a nuclear power station of this type. [passage omitted]

The important thing is that at present this power station supplies about one quarter of all energy currently consumed in our republic. The important thing is that it seems to be really a safe one. [passage omitted]

[Pavrovsky] Deputies of the Civic Democratic Party attempt to bring into existence a law forbidding, for instance, CTK, to shorten statements by political officials. Do you not think that this would in a way constitute an intervention in the freedom of information? Are there any grounds for such a law?

[Havel] Look, I do often myself mind when CTK reports merely two sentences of a statement I made somewhere, moreover messing with them and putting their own commentary between them. It even happens sometimes that the main thing I wanted to say is omitted by them. I simply got used to this and respect it. It has its reasons, all agencies throughout the world are doing it. I do not think that what they do is so bad after all. [passage omitted]

I do not think that adopting a law on something like this is a good thing, we would make ourselves look a bit ridiculous. [passage omitted]

## Kovac Denies Parliament Charge of Harming Country

*LD0302205395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The editorial board of this program, Radiozurnal, was given today the full text of President Michal Kovac's statement on the National Council's resolution concerning his reply to a letter by William Orme, director of the U.S. Committee for the Protection of Journalists.

Let me remind you that the deputies approved the resolution on 25 January and that it was the sixth point on the agenda of the fourth parliamentary session. The resolution was handed to Michal Kovac personally by Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council, this Monday [30 January]. The president also asked for the minutes of the parliamentary debate in order to be able to study them.

You can hear now the full text of President Michal Kovac's statement on the resolution of the National Council.

[Announcer] Something unusual happened in the National Council of the Slovak Republic on 25 January.

While discussing in the National Council of the Slovak Republic the content of my letter to William Orme, executive director of the Committee for the Protection of Journalists, some deputies attacked the head of their own state accusing him of harming Slovakia's interests by his claim that the very foundations of democracy are threatened in our country. They also accused him of many other sins.

I did not take part in this session. The main reason was that I did not wish that the already relatively troubled political atmosphere in our country be stirred up even more. I wanted to avoid the situation whereby this strange debate would result in harm done to Slovakia's good name abroad. Last but not least, I did not take part in this session because the Constitution does not bind me to accept such invitation.

Holding parliament in esteem, I personally explained to the chairman of the National Council and to the representatives of the three coalition clubs everything in connection with my reply to the letter of the executive director of the Committee for the Protection of Journalists before the parliamentary session.

I categorically and entirely reject accusations voiced by some deputies, according to which I questioned the democratic principles of our country in my letter.

Anyone who read the letter unbiased and with good intention understood that at the end of November and the beginning of December—that is, before the coalition government was appointed—I had only expressed legitimate concerns for the possible developments in the sphere of radio and television. I honestly confessed then that we were having in this sphere some problems which were also perceived by a visible part of our public. At the same time I pointed out that solid foundations of independence, democracy, and plurality had been laid in Slovakia.

This is why I deem the statements made by some deputies as a deliberate insinuation of meanings which the letter does not contain. All my moves and steps following the elections prove sufficiently and visibly that I am deeply interested in the stability of our political life. I am interested in politics that do not divert public's attention to marginal or even fabricated questions but focus on real and vitally important problems. It is a generally known fact that I have accepted the coalition government proposed by the chairman of the movement that had obtained the largest number of votes in the elections. In my New Year address, I clearly and honestly expressed my determination to continue my nonpartisan and nonconfrontational style of policy which is my own and which is in accord with our constitution. I appealed to citizens to support the government. I am genuinely sorry to see that a group of deputies is bringing the spirit of confrontation and irreconcilable struggles onto our political scene again. I am interested in fair cooperation with all political groups, especially with the coalition, based on the principles of constitutionality, understanding, and mutual respect.

I absolutely repudiate any attempt and any statement aimed at discrediting the head of the state or other high constitutional officials. Assuming we do not want to disintegrate the state, which we are building as a free home for all inhabitants of this country, we have to trust each other and, by the same token, recognize that cohesion despite difference of opinions is a prerequisite to every success and progress.

[Newsreader] Esteemed listeners, you have heard the text of President Michal Kovac's statement on the resolution of the National Council of Slovakia that was made available to our editorial board today, 3 February. A similar letter was also sent today by the president to Parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic with the request to brief the deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on its content

## Parties React to President's Letter to Gasparovic

*LD0402215195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Several political parties have reacted to President Michal Kovac's open letter to Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council. [passage omitted]

In its statement adopted at a meeting in Bratislava, the central council of the Slovak National Party [SNS] says that in the talks between the SNS representatives and the president the latter explained the facts quoted in his letter to William Orme [executive director of the U.S.

Committee for the Protection of Journalists] in a very unsatisfactory way. We assumed that the president's absence during the parliamentary debate on this issue would contribute to the destabilization of the social climate and this proved to be true, goes on the SNS statement quoted by the Slovak Republic News Agency [TASR].

According to Miroslav Kocnar, deputy chairman of the Association of Workers in Slovakia, the president's response to parliament's resolution was unnecessary. In an interview with TASR Kocnar said that this affair should be shelved and more effort should be channeled into enhancing Slovakia's credit abroad.

According to Milan Ftacnik, deputy chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, President Kovac's statement could become the final act in the affair linked to the president's reply to the letter from William Orme. He added though that this would not mean an end to the problems since the relations of the government coalition deputies to the president, who was very moderate in his stance, were unlikely to change.

The Democratic Union of Slovakia [DU] fully agrees with the president's stance. DU Chairman Jozef Moravcik told TASR that the party fully understood reasons quoted by the president in his letter and the DU would therefore fully support the head of state.

Similar stances have been taken by the representatives of the Christian Democratic Movement, the National Democratic Party-New Alternative, and the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia.

Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement said that the president, as the head of the state, had responded to the resolution of the National Council democratically and in line with the Constitution. Bugar said however that he was under the impression that the president was apologizing for his letter to Mr. Orme.

## Meciar Interviewed on Minority Rights Issues

*LD0302173195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by correspondent Lydia Mrazova in Bratislava on 3 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Mrazova] One of this week's important events is the signing of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. What is your view, Prime Minister, of the Strasbourg document?

[Meciar] The positive thing is that our neighbors adopted and signed this document. It was signed by the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Romania. The other positive thing is that the standards concerning minorities are being harmonized, and this will prevent individual interpretations and definitions being put on their range.

[Mrazova] Some observers say that Slovakia has more or less already complied with the convention, that any other demands above the European standard put forward by representatives of the Hungarian minority might destabilize our region. On the other hand, the Hungarian National Community in the Slovak Republic [Madarske narodne spolocenstvo v Slovenske republike] has objected to the government's policy statement about the standing of minorities in our country. What will be your response to them?

[Meciar] The adopted European standard is in harmony with the rights recognized by democratic states and with democratic principles in general. It is a matter for each individual state whether it updates them above the norm; and we have already surpassed the norm.

Providing I am to deal with these issues in future, and I will have to, I would like to say that Slovakia recognizes three principles: First, it adopts the European norms without reservations; second, it accepts the control powers of the Council of Europe; third, should Europe adopt a higher standard sometime in the future, we will adopt this higher standard as well.

However, we do not want to create a precedent which would assume the form of an avalanche sweeping through Europe, reaching other states and having a negative impact. We bear a responsibility not only for what is taking place in our country but also in the sphere of international relations. [passage omitted]

[Mrazova] Are you confident, Prime Minister, that both the treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic and the convention on national minorities will be signed by 21 March?

[Meciar] There are no objective obstacles preventing us from achieving this. There might be subjective obstacles if attempts are made to interpret regulations in the sense surpassing the internationally adopted agreements.

The date of 21 March is important both for us and for Hungary, because on this date the Stability Pact will hold its session. All would welcome an opportunity to show there that there is no focus of tension in Central Europe. This is why we feel it important to adjust relations with the Romanian Republic as well. This is why it is important that we initial or sign this treaty by 21 March. Anyway, it will need to be subsequently ratified by parliaments.

Naturally, this represents a turn in our policy—and a very important one—as well as in that of the Hungarian Republic. However, both sides will gain by taking this turn. They have already begun to gain trust in the sphere of international relations, and this is an achievement in itself.

## On Political Issues

*LD0302221895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Lydia Mrazova in Bratislava; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mrazova] Mikulas Dzurinda's statements have been very bold, describing everything linked to the work of the parliamentary commission as a humbug and an attempt to hide somebody's urge to become president. Prime Minister—please do not get offended—do you want to become president?

[Meciar] I refused when they offered me the post of federal president, and I refused when they offered me the post of the president of the republic; I had no such ambitions on this occasion, either. I did not even want to become prime minister.

[Mrazova] We have mentioned the opposition; the opposition holds it against you that on 31 January you abolished the liberalization of the rents on apartments while proposing a new law on apartment ownership. You are said to have rejected a concept prepared during your government.

[Meciar] This is not true. When Mr. Dzurinda put these issues to the approval of the government, the Ministry of Finance pointed out that the whole of the program was not realistic and that it was impossible to implement it. At that time nobody listened, but then, it was necessary to present something bombastic for the upcoming elections.

The bomb actually means raising apartment rents threefold or fourfold. Who can afford it today? If I look at the vast majority of people, they cannot afford it. They can hardly pay the price they are paying nowadays and they cannot be thrown out to the streets. If we switched to the system of profit-making apartment rents, we would have rents ten times higher than people are paying nowadays.

So, if such antisocial laws were prepared and if the today's opposition expects us to materialize them, then I have to say that we were elected through the will of another group of people and we have to serve these people. Naturally, we have to serve all citizens, reasonably and fairly, therefore we look for the solutions by means of selling the apartments but not by means of the prices of the rents on apartments.

[Mrazova] This week, Jaroslav Volf [chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia] again mentioned parliamentary night of 3 November [first round-the-clock session of parliament which overturned many rulings of the previous government]. He called it an offense to human dignity. I know it is quite a hypothetical kind of question, but if you could take back this night would you change any proposals or rulings?

[Meciar] We would go much further. This night only meant that certain decisions, which were fully within the power of parliament, were carried out democratically, according to the law of this country and in quick succession. Everybody who takes offense on behalf of democracy should know that a similar night took place in the American Congress and Senate although it lasted a shorter time. However, when the Republicans won, they made changes to the decisionmaking bodies.

When some people lost the elections and did not want to be in the government and did not want agree on the posts in the supreme organs of the National Council [parliament], then they defeated themselves. So, how come, then, they do not know how to behave, if defeated, until the next democratic elections? Naturally, these gentlemen will comment on anything. [passage omitted]

[Mrazova] Your coalition partner Jan Slota [chairman of the Slovak National Party] has indicated in a televised debate that the opposition was preparing some actions for the end of February, intending to create tension in society. He stressed that he had certain indicative proofs. Do you have any proofs, Prime Minister?

[Meciar] You have to ask Mr. Slota. [passage omitted] Considering the timing, we shall see what happens. The government coalition cannot be passive about it. It has to concentrate on a positive resolution of the problems. The government came into existence in order to move the development positively forward. This is where our energies go. So, we have not time for any intrigue.

[Mrazova] This week Jan Luptak [chairman of the Association of Workers in Slovakia, ZRS] met the representatives of the National Democratic Party [NDS]. According to [NDS chairman] Ludovit Cernak, the ZRS wants to obey the law when in comes to the issue of the petition lists of the Democratic Union of Slovakia [DU], intending to resist strong pressures from the coalition partners [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, HZDS, and the Slovak National Party, SNS]. Do you think, Prime Minister, that the ZRS will be the party which will seek ways of reducing tension between the opposition and the coalition?

[Meciar] Everybody is seeking it. I am, for instance, seeking it too, and that is why I have held talks with Mr. Carnogursky [chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, KDH]. So, we all look for less tension.

Considering the meeting, Mr. Luptak told me that Mr. Cernak proposed a meeting which would be also attended by Moravcik. With the DU [words indistinct] it is the same. The DU is nowadays a moral problem of the society. If they could cheat their way into parliament, then what difference is there between cheating in politics and cheating in finances? [passage omitted]

I hope that this issue will be solved so that no moral traumas occur that concern many decent citizens.

[Mrazova] Prime Minister, you mentioned traumas. This week there were more rumors that there would be more personnel changes. This time it would have been a gossip but Milan Ftacnik [deputy chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, SDL] [words indistinct] said that he had seen a list of 26 officials of one district signed by the representatives of the coalition parties who were to indicate whether they approved a proposed candidate or not. According to Ftacnik, the current personnel policy is heading for disaster. These words, Prime Minister, must concern even those people who are not interested in politics.

[Meciar] Let Mr. Ftacnik prove his words. I have never seen anything like what he has seen. I cannot comment on what he has seen.

When it comes to considering certain changes then, every body of the state administration is being assessed, from the central ones to regional and district ones on, and so on. This assessment is being carried out in order to find out whether the output satisfies the citizens or not, whether there is a room for improvement, or what proposals can be made.

When it comes to changes you could have noticed that several functionaries of the HZDS have left their posts, too. However honest they were, they could not cope with the demands of their jobs. So, when such an attitude is applied in the future it will be to the benefit to all structures and organs.

Even if the coalition parties have a right to put forward their views on individual posts, every single decision is not in the hands of these parties. It is in the hands of an appropriate minister and an appropriate selection committee. So, the initiative and [word indistinct] and the view on every person is granted to every citizen and every political party. The decision is somewhere else, and that is where Mr. Ftacnik does not look. [passage omitted]

## PM Horn Says Personal Health 'Fully Adequate'

*AU0602095895 Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 31 Jan 95 pp 6-8*

[Interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Akos Mester; place and date not given: "I Accept the Confrontation"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mester] How is your health today, Mr Horn?

[Horn] Medical tests were held in December 1994 and the X-ray shows that there are no problems with my vertebrae, and the plaque and the screws were removed from my broken wrist a few weeks ago. As far as I know, some kind of medical report was issued according to which the state of my health is fully adequate. In short, I am all right, as far as a politician can be all right....

## Committee for Reform of Public Finances Created

*LD0302194195 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] A committee for the reform of public finances has been set up in the Finance Ministry with the participation of Laszlo Bekesi. The body's task is to work out measures that are to radically reduce the budget deficit of several hundreds of billions [currency not specified].

[Correspondent] The task of the 30-member committee—which consists of leading economists, government officials, and politicians—will be to reduce the state's role in the extraction and distribution of incomes. [passage omitted]

The reform will first and foremost cover the review of the welfare benefit systems and the tax system. [passage omitted]

## Horn Calls for Change in Cooperation Style

*LD0402211795 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] According to Gyula Horn, the style of cooperation between the coalition parties [Hungarian Socialist Party, HSP, and Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ] has to be changed and improved. The prime minister said this to journalists after a session of the HSP national executive. The executive assessed the government's work to date and the situation within the coalition.

[Correspondent] [Passage omitted] Horn said the comments made at the meeting were worth considering. He confirmed they want to maintain the coalition. However, he called for a change in the style of the cooperation.

[Horn] "It was not raised that we do not want to cooperate with the coalition partner in the future. We already confirmed yesterday that we want to cooperate with the SZDSZ. But of course certain issues of cooperation and style have to be improved and changed."

[Correspondent] According to the prime minister, not only government but also criticism has to have a common base.

[Horn] "I would like the coalition partner to feel that they are inside the coalition all the time. This implies a certain responsibility for both sides. The government work may be criticized, but it would be good if this criticism remained within the government. That is: This criticism should be made in the spirit of joint responsibility. They should not assume an oppositional nature."

[Correspondent] Horn promised the executive that in the future the competent HSP bodies could air their opinion before strategic decisions.

## Kovacs Addresses NATO Defense Forum in Munich

*LD0402152295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, security and stability are inconceivable in East Europe if the countries of the region cannot join the Western integration organizations. Kovacs believes that this applies particularly to Hungary, which is bordering two crisis zones.

At a security policy forum in Munich Kovacs confirmed that Hungary's intention to join NATO and the European Union was not directed against any other states, and was aimed at preventing the strengthening of extremist political forces in Hungary.

## HSP Presidium Supports Abandoning Contract

*LD0302162995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] Presidium has assured the government of its support for the decision yesterday that there is no chance of signing the socioeconomic contract in its present form. However, the Presidium, which met this morning, resolved that negotiations on the social pact should continue. Judit Laszlo reports:

[Laszlo] After hearing the account given by Labor Minister Kosa, nee Magda Kovacs, the Presidium decided to support the government's position that the socioeconomic contract cannot be signed in its present form. Thus said HSP Executive Deputy Chairman Sandor Csintalan. [passage omitted]

Csintalan stressed the importance of continuing negotiations with the government's social partners. Mrs. Kosa echoed this, adding that the government remains ready to discuss with its social partners the three-year modernization program the preparation of which is under way. [passage omitted]

Csintalan said that the Presidium did not discuss the filling of vacant government posts because this would have interfered with the rights of the persons involved.

## MDF Leader Views Domestic Political Issues

*AU0302154095 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 2 Feb 95 pp 1, 9*

[Interview with Ivan Szabo, executive chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Tibor J. Keri; place and date not given: "Ivan Szabo Detests Leaders"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Keri] What are your views on the resignation of your successor, Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi?

[Szabo] Whether they admit it or not, his resignation means the failure of the economic policy that wanted to turn away, 180 degrees, from the previous period's economic policy. I believe that the economy has become independent and simply does not obey orders from above. For society, the restrictive measures of the past eight months have meant sacrifices that had to be made for an unknown and unachievable goal. [passage omitted]

[Keri] Regarding foreign capital investments, what are your views on the prime minister's suggestion that a position of privatization minister should be created? What are your views on the HungarHotels issue and the government's privatization bill?

[Szabo] In my view, the HungarHotels scandal draws attention to the government's structural weaknesses. The prime minister did not have direct information on this issue because a government commissioner answerable to the finance minister was responsible for it. In this way, the prime minister was only able to learn about the concrete issues afterwards, and could only take late measures. The problem was that he could only intervene after the decision was made. Because of the implications, a privatization minister responsible to the prime minister and questionable in parliament may be the solution. [passage omitted]

[Keri] The Hungarian Democratic Forum's eighth national meeting—where you were elected executive chairman—decided that the party is to devote a special role to maintaining relations with the trade unions. Does this also include the biggest trade union group, namely the national Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ] led by Sandor Nagy?

[Szabo] I cannot complain about any of the trade unions, especially not about my relationship with the MSZOSZ and its chairman because, even as finance minister, I considered this to be very constructive, meaningful, and professional. [passage omitted]

[Keri] You lead the committee that is to draw up the Hungarian Democratic Forum's [MDF] long-term program. What direction should the MDF take?

[Szabo] Enhancing and fostering our relationship with society will be the most important part of our program. This includes the social groups, the civic organizations, churches, and movements. We want to make it clear that the MDF is embedded in the whole society. On the other hand, we will organize political training for the membership that will include social sciences, economic policy, and the programs of other parties. We also consider our relations with the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] and the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] an important issue and this might materialize in a joint government program by 1998.

[Keri] It seems that this civic alliance of three parties is breaking up. The KDNP's honorary chairman has recently criticized the MDF a number of times because, as he said, the MDF has assigned a minor role to the KDNP in the past four years. In addition to this, Gyorgy Giczy, the new chairman, said that the new alliance is vague and "it is difficult to get onto a moving cart."

[Szabo] There is no moving cart, a dialogue has been started on cooperation. During our talks with the FIDESZ, no such decisions were made, that would close any doors to the KDNP. We agreed on one point: that this is a dialogue of completely equal parties. I do not believe this would damage the KDNP's interests. I honestly hope that, after internal discussions, the KDNP will return to the cooperation that undoubtedly created a qualitative change in favor of the opposition in the local government elections. At the same time, it is an undoubted fact that the unity of the civic alliance runs counter to the coalition's interests. Therefore, making use of credulity, they can induce external and internal tensions directed at bbreaking up the unity.

I have to say it brutally: At the time the alliance is getting stronger, certain statements are being made in certain parties that are frightening if they carry a true message. A Wachsler case was also started at this time in the FIDESZ; and I would include here the debate on electing the president of the Republic that divides the opposition parties. However, the Smallholders' claim that the liberal bloc is facing the national side on this issue is false. However, the Smallholders' claim that the liberal bloc is facing the national side on this issue is false. How can we then assess the fact that the Hungarian Justice and Life Party led by Istvan Csurka is also against direct presidential elections? Does this mean that Csurka is also a liberal now? Someone who, ignoring the civic alliance, likes to make a big noise with an 8 to 10 percent parliamentary representation does not make me particularly enthusiastic.

[Keri] Do you believe that outside forces are behind the disagreements within the opposition?

[Szabo] This can never be excluded. [Former Prime Minister] Jozsef Antall also often mentioned that the

Western European right-wing extremists are financed by the left because society can be kept frightened while an extreme right exists. Therefore, if we notice the coincidence of events, it becomes obvious: When unity is created, why does diversity appear all of a sudden? Well-meaning people unintentionally become the tools of a bigger game.

[Keri] Do you agree with the views that [Independent Smallholders Party chairman] Jozsef Torgyan is the only obstacle to a four-party cooperation of the opposition?

[Szabo] In my experience, the Smallholder crowd has the same views on fundamental issues as the membership of the other three parties. Therefore, cooperation works locally. A number of county and local Smallholder leaders have indicated that it is difficult to make the next step until the issue of the leader is clarified. This suggestion always refers to one person. However, it is not certain that we now have to elect a leader; it is even less certain that this leader can only be Jozsef Torgyan. We do have problems here. We reject the kind of leadership that prescribes what we have to think about various issues.

[Keri] Some MDF members have also suggested that this party should be the leader of the civic alliance....

[Szabo] Leadership is not the point. We had to take the initiative, but not in order to make us rulers of it. We must be leaders of the initiative rather than of the alliance. It would be totally wrong for one party to try to impose its own views on the others.

[Keri] The UJ DEMOKRATA newspaper that is ideologically close to your party has criticized you a number of times, and Gyorgy Schamschula is supposed to be behind these attacks.

[Szabo] I have nothing to say about any struggle for power and positions in the MDF. It is an undoubted fact that certain people think differently. A few days ago, Schamschula said in a newspaper that a leader like Torgyan would also be good for the MDF. Well, some people think in terms of leaders. I think in terms of democratic leading bodies. This country has had so many leaders who destroyed the lives of millions of people; therefore, I detest leaders and one-man leadership.

## UJ MAGYARORSZAG Manager on Kordax Policy

*AU0602110795 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 3 Feb 95 p 14*

[Interview with Istvan Nagy Igloi, media director of Kordax Inc., by Lajos Kovacs; place and date not given: "There Is a Need for Conservative Newspapers—The Media Director of UJ MAGYARORSZAG's New Owner Argues"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The articles implicating Kordax Inc., accused of oil and tax manipulations, were published when it became certain that the big capital-rich enterprise is planning to create its own media empire and buy UJ MAGYARORSZAG, claims Istvan Nagy Igloi, media director of Kordax Inc. He told NEPSZABADSAG that the "campaign launched in certain newspapers" would probably not have been started had Kordax remained in commerce.

[Kovacs] What made Kordax buy UJ MAGYARORSZAG, a political daily, after acquiring 30 percent of the RESPUBLIKA weekly newspaper and the daily NEMZETI SPORT [National Sports]?

[Igloi] We are not haphazardly reaching for newspapers that can be bought. We are trying to buy newspapers on the basis of a carefully worked out concept. We believe that it is much easier to organize advertising by publishing a number of newspapers together, and the costs can also be best reduced if an organization is used for more than one newspaper.

[Kovacs] When Kordax resuscitated the KOZTARSASAG weekly newspaper under the name RESPUBLIKA, many people believed that the company's only goal was tax avoidance. According to these beliefs, it would rather finance the newspaper's losses from the extra profit than pay this money into the budget in the form of taxes. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that UJ MAGYARORSZAG was also on the brink of bankruptcy when Kordax bought it.

[Igloi] This is not the point. We would also buy NEPSZABADSAG or another profitable newspaper if they were for sale. In the case of UJ MAGYARORSZAG, we started from the premise—which no one disputes—that a daily newspaper representing a high standard of civic values is missing from the Hungarian newspaper palette. The next question is whether such a newspaper is viable in Hungary. It is also a question of whether Hungary has a journalistic team that is able to perform this task. I am convinced that a group will sooner or later appear—even among the young ones—that will be able to write a civic newspaper with a moderate tone day after day. It is necessary for this to happen because in all countries in which, similarly to Hungary, a right and a left wing, a socialist and a conservative party, exist, a conservative press corresponding to the latter also exists.

Naturally, the newspaper has to formulate its ideas in a civilized way and must not vulgarly slander the left-wing government that happens to be in power. In the same way, if the conservative forces win at the elections, it must not approach all the measures of its favorite government with unconditional loyalty.

[Kovacs] Apart from a few exceptions, Hungarian newspapers are mostly loss-makers.

[Igloi] A daily on its own certainly cannot be profitable. However, in our project of "one publisher, many papers," this is not a foregone conclusion. At the same time, the kind of press it has is important for a big economic enterprise like Kordax, which has interests in more than 120 ventures. This might even be worth some money. However, the Kordax newspapers will sooner or later have to become self-sufficient.

[Kovacs] If I understand you correctly, the media empire that is to be set up should represent Kordax's particular economic interests. Can this also be an acknowledged goal even of UJ MAGYARORSZAG?

[Igloi] Yes. Why not?

[Kovacs] How free is this interest from politics?

[Igloi] In developed countries, the economy tends to direct politics rather than the other way round. In Hungary, the latter is still true to some extent. Hopefully, this will not be so for long. However, this should not be interpreted in such a way that Ivan Kelemen, founder and owner of Kordax, wishes to be a Hungarian Berlusconi. A company that has an annual 15 billion forint turnover can have interests that are worth lobbying for in various places, even in its own newspapers.

[Kovacs] Various information has emerged about Kordax. At first, we were told that it had a Socialist tendency, but the fact that it wishes to preserve UJ MAGYARORSZAG as a conservative newspaper does not fit into this image. What is the truth?

[Igloi] Many things have been said. I have even heard that the owner is a Hungarian Democratic Forum man. Kelemen has also been said to be an Alliance of Free Democrats and a Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] supporter. He has been said to be associated with almost all political parties. The simple truth is that he is a rational businessman.

[Kovacs] Does this also include the fact that Kordax supported the election campaign of a Hungarian Socialist Party and a KDNP politician at the same time?

[Igloi] Kelemen gave support to two politicians through his personal connections.

[Kovacs] Do you mean to say that Kordax is not committed to any of Hungary's political tendencies?

[Igloi] The people who run the company probably do have some inner commitment. However, this commitment can only exist as an internal motivation. To the outside, behavior that indicates this cannot characterize Kordax. Kordax must act act according to its business interests.

[Kovacs] In your view, what would the Kordax media empire consist of? Or, if you like, which media would belong to Kordax?

[Igloi] We would definitely like to get a television channel. Kordax has applied for the A7 microchannel and the results will soon be announced, but we are also looking in other directions. We consider a radio channel to be too risky; we are planning to publish more newspapers in addition to having a television channel. In the case of RESPUBLIKA, we have targeted 25,000 copies per issue. We could reach at least 150,000 copies and a much higher advertising revenue with NEMZETI SPORT. However, with a 30-percent share, we cannot implement the changes that we could achieve with a majority share. For this reason, we would like to acquire a majority share. We are also applying for SZABAD FOLD [Free Land]. Its 400,000-copy circulation shows that we could achieve good results with minor changes and rejuvenation. Despite its relatively high circulation, the MAI NAP afternoon daily attracts few ads. This could be improved through better organization. In my view, if the property manager offers MAI NAP, SZABAD FOLD, and REFORM together, then we will apply for them. Our newspapers would also have sideshoots. We are toying with the idea of publishing HETI MAGYARORSZAG [Weekly Hungary] as a Saturday supplement of UJ MAGYARORSZAG.

[Kovacs] Of the aforementioned newspapers, profitable ones are the exception. According to our information, RESPUBLIKA, which has been published for nine months, swallows up many tens of millions of forints each week. UJ MAGYARORSZAG's losses are on top of this. Kordax appears to have unlimited financial resources. What amount of losses can it bear?

[Igloi] I am in no way saying that Kordax has money to throw away. The newspapers can be made profitable with frugal management and by targeting the appropriate group of consumers. In the case of UJ MAGYARORSZAG, it is enough to remember that the opposition won in those districts where well-off people live—and this is where the newspaper's readers are. This presumably attracts advertisers—assuming, of course, that the newspaper will indeed be able to strike a truly conservative tone that is free from extremes. At the same time, Kordax is not willing to pump millions into its newspapers until the end of time. UJ MAGYARORSZAG has roughly one year to prove its worth. RESPUBLIKA does not have so much time left. By spring, we will clearly see how much demand there is for this newspaper.

[Kovacs] At the purchase of UJ MAGYARORSZAG, people who are known to be with the opposition were given free shares. This is one of the reasons many people believe this investment to be a political enterprise.

[Igloi] I cannot talk about their shares because this is a business secret. However, I can tell you that Kordax agreed to do this because these were the conditions it managed to achieve at the negotiations. The goal was that it should only be possible to appoint the chief editor with consensus. At the same time, it has to be known—and the history of the Hungarian press, the recent past, also proves this—that the dominance of economic power is decisive. Of course, this does not mean that Kordax wishes to dismiss the chief editor, but it does mean that the appointment of a new chief editor will be unavoidable if the current one is unable to produce a marketable newspaper.

It also has to be mentioned here that the newspaper cannot allow itself another "mistake" such as the Tibor Franka article on the alleged resettling of Ukrainian Jews to Hungary.

[Kovacs] This means that Kordax wishes to maintain conservative newspapers.

[Igloi] I have spoken about making one of the newspapers profitable. Kordax's decisions were guided by business considerations in this case, too. The company never buys newspapers on the basis of political sympathies or other political considerations. The Kordax papers will sooner or later produce a profit. As I have already indicated, politics only plays a role to the extent that, through the newspapers, Kordax admittedly wants to influence the economic decisions that direct the country.

### Walesa: Aim Achieved; Kwasniewski More Effective

*LD0502174995 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1717 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Gdansk, 5 Feb—"I have achieved my aim but it still needs a punch line. If that punch line goes the way I have in mind—and it seems it will do—this will mean that I have proved myself as president yet again," President Lech Walesa told journalists in Gdansk on 5 February before leaving for Warsaw.

When asked whether in the circumstances he will give up his intention to dissolve the Sejm, the president replied that he cannot give such an understanding. The president said he would not oppose the setting up of a government headed by Aleksander Kwasniewski. He said that Kwasniewski is "more effective" but that "he may be very unpopular with many people."

The president also said that in Gdansk he has been working on a speech he is to deliver tomorrow.

### Addresses Council of Elders

*LD0602131295 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1100 GMT 6 Feb 95*

[Speech by President Lech Walesa to the Council of Elders in Warsaw on 6 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] As we have already said, a meeting between President Lech Walesa and the Council of Elders has started. Polish television is broadcasting it live.

[Walesa] Recent Sejm meetings were, not only in my opinion, disgraceful shows. Under the cover of the alleged protection of democracy under threat or the so-called Drawsko affair—I do not know, it is a nasty word—you want to finish the president off and you want to tear my reputation as a human being to shreds. Not to mention that you insult the president's honor. This is being done by volunteers who want to take over the president's office, including, I am sorry to say, the present Sejm speaker. All tricks at any time and in any place are allowed. Deputies and public opinion are being manipulated, using emotions and insinuations.

Mr. Speaker, I am allowed to ask about the possibility of dissolution of the Sejm any day and I must say that I will do it. Of course, I will not do it every day because it would not be serious, but once a month. I have the right to have doubts and ask questions. Having the right and means, well, gentlemen you also have the right and and opportunities and means, but nobody accuses you of lawlessness. So please do not accuse me of lawlessness.

Mr. Speaker, you suggested on Friday [3 February], or maybe on Saturday, that we meet. I have my schedule. This suggestions took me by surprise, so I said, Mr. Speaker we have made an appointment and all topics—please be quiet—all topics will be discussed. You publicly expressed your disgust and insults against the president.

Mr. Speaker, this is rude and tasteless to say the least. I did not imagine that this could be done by Mr. Speaker. At the same time, you publicly present yourself as the defender of democracy and savior. I know this is a part of the election game, but Mr. Speaker, from a different angle. How many years have we known each other? I know what a grand democrat you are and how you fought for democracy, because I was visiting you when your were responsible for contacts with the trade unions in the Communist government. I can prove to you that after I left, the secret service followed me and it was doing what it usually did. So, I know what a democrat you are and you should know what a democrat I am.

Now back to the matters you have just mentioned. You passed, the Sejm did, the statement that condemned me for asking about the possibility of dissolution. You also decided in the Sejm that the budget was formally and irreversibly passed. Well, there were many voices that supported your, or rather, the Sejm's decision.

May it please the Council! I still can, today or in the next several hours, veto and I could beg the parliamentary opposition, which can see that it is not able to do anything in this parliament, and in three years time, if this situation continues and you do not change or influence the style of government, if this situation continues, then in three years time, I am convinced, at the end of this term, many of you will not come to this Sejm, because they will be ashamed of what was done. I want to appeal and draw your attention to the fact that there is an opportunity—it is not good that the budget is used—but there is an opportunity, seeing what is going on, to bring a positive development to Poland.

[Announcer] This was the president's speech at the meeting with the Council of Elders. The meeting continues and is being broadcast live by Polish television. We will continue to inform you about it in our next bulletins.

### Hopes Pawlak Will Resign

*LD0602134095 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1300 GMT 6 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] During a morning meeting with the prime minister, the president expressed hope that the prime minister would resign, our corresondent said. The meeting lasted for a quarter of an hour. The president did not exclude future cooperation with the Polish Peasants' Party leader. According to the government press office, the president said he had already decided on the candidate for foreign minister, but was still considering candidates for minister of defense presented by the head of the government.

### Pawlak Not To Propose Szeremietiew for Ministership

*LD0302171795 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1600 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] [Presenter Hanna Smoktunowicz] Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak said after his return from the United States that he had not presented the candidacy of Romuald Szeremietiew for the post of head of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] to President Lech Walesa.

[Corresponent] This kind of declaration by Prime Minister Pawlak allows the preservation of the coalition. Aleksander Kwasniewski and Jerzy Szmajdzinski met Pawlak at the airport just after his return from the United States. The prime minister gave the assurance that he would today ask the president to appoint the new ministers. True, the president is in Gdansk, but as the prime minister said, we have means of communication. Pawlak did not reveal the names of the candidates. He said that Lech Walesa would be the first to know them, and journalists not until after that.

### Refuses To Appoint Ziolkowski

*LD0402082795 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0251 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 4 Feb—The government press office said on 4 February that Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak did not countersign the president's decision to appoint Janusz Ziolkowski to the post of foreign minister. Thus, J. Ziolkowski has not been appointed as minister of foreign affairs.

### Further on Ziolkowski

*LD0402100495 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0800 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak confirmed last night that he put forward to the president candidates for the posts of national defense minister and foreign affairs. The prime minister did not answer the question as to what the president's reaction was. Presidential spokesman Leszek Spalinski said the prime minister presented the following candidates: for the post of foreign minister—Eugeniusz Wyzner and Janusz Ziolkowski; and for defense minister—Stanislaw Dobrzanski and Jerzy Milewski. President Lech Walesa accepted the candidacy of Ziolkowski but rejected both candidates for defense minister.

Last night, the government press office said that Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak did not countersign the president's decision appointing Janusz Ziolkowski to the post of foreign minister. This means that Ziolkowski was not appointed as the minister.

Lech Falandysz, deputy head of the Presidential Chancellery, told Polish radio today that the president never said when he would possibly dissolve the parliament.

[Begin recording] [Falandysz] I know nothing about changes of the decision; the president did not change his decision. But he never said directly that he would dissolve the parliament and he didn't say when. The request for an opinion [from Sejm and Senate speakers] was just an initial step, something that is a preparation and clarification of this matter. [end recording]

### Addresses Sejm

*LD0402122195 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0925 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[Address by Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak to the Sejm in Warsaw—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Sejm Speaker, Mr. Senate Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen!

Our young democracy is only five years old, but it goes through similar difficulties as it did five years after the war with the Soviets was over, when memorable events took place in 1926. Does it have to end, today, in 1995, as it had done at that time? I believe it doesn't have to. We are enriched by those experiences, enriched by our five-year-long experience.

Ladies and gentlemen! Some of you are told that it is enough to recall the prime minister, others that it's enough to destroy the Polish Peasants' Party [PSL], and others that the coalition is to be blamed for everything. But what is the truth and who really takes part in this game?

When one Sejm commission finds really corrupted people, it is enough to replace its chairman. When many commissions do that, the Sejm has to be replaced. It does not matter if the next Sejm will be politically better or worse, because it would have to start from the scratch. When the government starts to be in control of the economic situation and begins to introduce honest and clear, competitive rules, it would have to be replaced, despite whether this is Pawlak's or Suchocka's government.

May it please the house! I don't want to say, as mass media do, that there are only corrupted people in Poland. Also honest people can be turned into corrupted. The state of law is not the one where everyone can accuse and everyone can immediately pass the verdict.

Ladies and gentlemen! We participated in various events in this chamber, getting into trouble but also gaining experience. Personally, I know that I was both a subject as well as an object of those events. But we all have learned something since then. That is why I ask you in earnest not to believe that if you sacrifice the government or just one party you change this mechanism. Let's not be mislead, and overtaken by emotions and let's not insult each other because this is not about the parliament, government and coalition. Today, the fate of our future is at stake. It may go along the line where frequent changes of a government are the condition of the mafia rule. It may go along the line of the Sanacja, when for many years one party had monopoly when all democratic mechanisms where suspended. It may go along the lines followed by the democratic European states.

That is a road of real social order and dialogue we were building together in 1994. It is not society but another war at the top that impairs this order.

This last year was not some sort of a black hole. We could list for a quite a while what we have done together, the parliament, government and each of us personally. Things we have done for retired and old age pensioners. Was a real increase of the lowest old age and disability pensions noticed? Were decisions to move family allowances towards the poorest positive ones? Economic balance, smaller deficit, agreements with London [private banks Poland's creditors] and Paris [Poland's governmental creditors] Clubs, which reduced our debt, do they mean anything at all? Nobody questions this and this is the success of the past five years.

Do decisions on the debt reduction of the national health or education mean anything? Does the fact that unemployment was reduced in 1994, which means about 200,000 new jobs, mean anything? Does the fact that in 1995 we started work on changing the health system so that resources were used efficiently, so that we have better service for the same money, mean anything? The social security and mechanism from the previous system still in operation there require changes so that it targets those on the lowest income.

Yesterday, in this building,I was told that talking about this is diverging from the subject in the present situation. Maybe this is true because being overwhelmed by this atmosphere and mood of the past few days, we are beginning to apologise for our very presence in this chamber.

Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen! It is your wisdom that will determine if people who bend the law and reach for insinuations and slander, or if people for whom the most important is to create conditions for all to be active, for success of those who are honestly the best, will be ruling Poland.

Poland has an opportunity which it did not have for the past few centuries. It has allies who are like us interested in taking advantage of this opportunity. It is up to us if we do it. If there are some obstacles on this road we can remove and solve them in accordance with the Constitution. I personally and all members of the government would conform to a decision. But we will not succumb to the atmosphere of anxiety and scandals because we were sworn in during a solemn ceremony and we pledged to obey by the Constitution that the good of the homeland and the welfare of citizens will be the highest command for us. Thank you.

## Comments on Kwasniewski

*LD0402132295 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] During a break in the Sejm debate, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak told journalists that as far as the work of the government and coalition are concerned, there are two possibilities: either the government is to be controlled from outside or Aleksander Kwasniewski should participate in it and directly influence the government and take responsibility for it.

[Begin Pawlak recording] So you would use this address in the Sejm and I think that the main idea of the present situation was presented there. This is not about the parliament or government or individuals.

As far as the work of the coalition government is concerned, I think we should answer this question: What structure are we going to accept? Is this a structure in which the government is controlled from outside, or will politicians, leaders, or, more precisely, [Democratic Left Alliance, SLD] Chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski agree to take part, as a holder of an important state post, and thus have direct influence over the government's work and take responsibility for this work? [end recording]

SLD leader Kwasniewski said that if the Polish Peasants' Party [PSL] does not agree to hold a vote of no-confidence in Prime Minister Pawlak during the planned meeting of the coalition parliamentary floor groups, the meeting will be cancelled.

The SLD asked the PSL members for a meeting of both groups last night. The SLD wants not only to discuss the present situation in the country but also vote on the motion of no-confidence in Prime Minister Pawlak. However, the PSL does not want to agree to that.

## Offers Kwasniewski Ministry

*LD0402153995 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1506 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 4 Feb—Janusz Piechocinski of the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] told journalists that during the Saturday [4 February] meeting of the top leadership of the ruling coalition Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak renewed his offer given to Aleksander Kwasniewski four months ago: the office of deputy prime minister and foreign affairs minister. According to Piechocinski, this restructuring of the government would take place in a few months' time.

It follows from unofficial statements by SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] representatives that this offer would be insufficient for their leader.

## Kwasniewski Would Accept Post of Prime Minister

*LD0402140795 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1135 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[Quotation marks as received]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 4 Feb—Asked by a PAP journalist if he would agree to accept the post of prime minister, SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] leader Aleksander Kwasniewski replied that he is ready if there is a need.

"If a situation when it is possible to act within efficient government, I obviously would not refuse; I have an immodest conviction that I possess both sufficient experience and qualifications; and I have proved more than once in my political career that I can restrain my very personal ambitions and submit them to other goals," Kwasniewski said.

You often accuse the prime minister of changing and not standing by earlier decisions. At the same time you stress that there is no alternative for the coalition. Can a conclusion be drawn from this that you would accept someone else from the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] as prime minister?

We can talk about everything. Poland is inhabited by 40 million people, able enough to be ministers or prime ministers; this is not the problem. The problem is for the cooperation to be efficient. I think that this coalition has a great chance because this is a majority coalition. Thanks to this, it can be efficient. Unfortunately, as the result of many actions or inaction by the prime minister, it gets unnecessarily involved in disputes which should not have taken place.

Asked what the coalition is going to propose to the president if there is a meeting on Monday [6 February], Kwasniewski replied:

"First we will demand of the president to abide by the law and to act in accordance with the constitution, as he announced in his program and as the presidential oath requires." Kwasniewski added that the coalition members were obviously ready to listen to the president's opinion concerning his assessment of political situation and a possibility for cooperation, and that 1995 would not become a year of the "war at the top" but the year of using opportunities for Poland.

The SLD leader announced a meeting of the coalition on Monday [6 February].

## Sejm Deputies Critical of Walesa's Actions

*LD0402120995 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 0900 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The debate on a draft statement on the current political situation in the country continues at the Sejm. The draft, presented by Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, reads that the conflict between the president and the Sejm and the government poses a threat to the normal functioning of the supreme authorities of the republic and to the Polish economy. It emphasizes that the budget has been passed in accordance with the Constitution and any attempt by the president to dissolve parliament would be illegal.

SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] Leader Aleksander Kwasniewski has supported the statement. He proposed the adoption of a necessary programmatic minimum which would allow to come out of the present crisis.

[Kwasniewski] "This crisis is an event that, in my deepest conviction, should not have taken place and for which there have been no rational, political, substantive, or constitutional premises.

"Taking an oath after his election, which ended with words 'so help me God,' President Lech Walesa pledged his loyalty to the Constitution. Today, the SLD wants to believe that the president, mindful of his duties and pledges, will turn back from a dangerous road of destabilizing the state and violating the constitution.

"We want to state with full force that a decision, taken with a glaring violation of the law, even the one taken by the highest dignitary of the state is invalid by the virtue of the law itself. The SLD considers today the defense of the foundations of the state of law the superior issue. I want to stress, this is not a dispute between Lech Walesa and the SLD, this is not a dispute between Lech Walesa and the ruling coalition, this is the president coming out against the principle of the state of law and against parliamentary system. This has to be met with protest by the entire House."

[Announcer] Concluding his speech, Aleksander Kwasniewski suggested an agreement above party politics, lasting until the next presidential election, making further reforms in the state possible.

Deputy Janusz Dobrosz, speaking on behalf of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], has expressed opinion that an average citizen understands very little of a legal dispute going on at the highest levels of power.

[Dobrosz] "Interpretation of the Small [Interim] Constitution by Minister Falandysz [deputy head of Presidential Chancellery] is bordering on the theater of absurd. In practice, it gives the Sejm two weeks for going through an entire legislative procedure on the most complex and important bill such as the budget. This ill-will and the lack of elementary respect for the legal procedure is simply unprecedented, making any substantial reasoning impossible.

"The PSL parliamentary floor group states unequivocally that the state budget for 1995 was passed, in procedure and in time, in accordance with the Constitution.

"If parliament will allow today the unconstitutional steps being taken by the president, let us ask ourselves a fundamental question: what is going to happen next with Polish democracy? Not guided by fear but in the name of the stability and security of the state we are urging the President of the Republic to renounce unlawful actions."

[Announcer] Bronislaw Geremek, head of the Union of Freedom [UW] parliamentary floor group has opined that President Lech Walesa is mostly to blame for the present crisis.

[Geremek] "Ladies and Gentlemen Deputies, this is not the right way. This is not right for you, ladies and gentlemen of the ruling coalition, to deal with your controversies here. The fate of the Republic is at stake. [applause] We want to say that on this issue we have to think about a common interest which is in danger. We, our parliamentary party, we have proposed a solution which would be consistent with the interest of the state and citizens and would be wise. And what? Nothing. This is a painful matter, when the UW parliamentary floor group tells the president of the republic that the law is the same for everybody and tells the president of the republic that a road he wants to enter is a no entry road. [applause] This is not the way to serve the interest of the republic and also the dignity of the president."

[Announcer] Ryszard Bugaj, leader of the Union of Labor [UP], announced that his party would not hesitate to use all legal means not to allow the escalation of the conflict.

Leszek Moczulski, leader of the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], proposed the self-dissolution of the Sejm on 29 March of this year.

## Walesa's Tactics, Sejm Dissolution Viewed

*WS0302133095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Feb 95 p 5*

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "To Be President at Any Cost?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dissolution of the Sejm is not the goal of Walesa's activities. He is not against the parliament, the coalition, or the government. If it were not for the upcoming presidential elections, Walesa might be cooperating very well with all of them. Let us bear in mind that right after this parliament started working, he really liked it: "It votes beautifully indeed," the president used to say. Let us also not forget that he extolled the "Strategy for Poland" before he became familiar with its contents. We should also remember how much the president liked the incumbent prime minister.

Lech Walesa wants to be reelected president. A couple of months ago, when he was just beginning the current political attack, the person who seemed to be an almost certain winner of the elections was Aleksander Kwasniewski. If not Kwasniewski, then Waldemar Pawlak. It became Walesa's goal to prevent their victory. This is what he wants to achieve.

Postsolidarity politicians have also decided that this is their chief task. Walesa could be certain that they would be prepared to do anything to prevent a representative of the Polish Peasant Party or the Democratic Left Alliance from taking over the office of the president. This is the most important issue; such issues as who should be supported in the postsolidarity camp were of secondary importance. He thought that if he played this game well, they would back him.

When he was beginning the attack, he planned that he would serve the government coalition to the Freedom Union [UW] and to the postsolidarity parties "on a platter." He agreed to do all the "menial jobs" and resigned himself to the following: the public will be most dissatisfied with him—as the person who provokes conflicts. He also thought that he had the right to expect that UW and some rightist parties would accept this present and support him in return.

However, Walesa did not notice that the other players were already playing a different game, even though they were playing it at the same playground. Walesa failed to take notice of what he himself started some time ago—that the solidarity camp had really broken up. He thought that he might still put it together for his own use. However, this camp was buried and what is done cannot be undone. The fact that there is no solidarity camp and there will not be any became clear to Walesa when it became evident to him that UW would not support him.

The president did not guess what the expectations of the postsolidarity politicians were.

Once again it became obvious that Walesa does not have competent advisers. To observers of the political scene it was clear a long time ago that UW and most rightist groupings would not back Walesa; however, it was not at all so clear to him.

Why does Lech Walesa not have competent advisers? Not only because the political world grew disappointed with him and turned its back on him. Whenever Walesa thought about creating a political base, a political party, he was attacked and accused of being authoritarian. Thus, Walesa always gave up, probably thinking that he would still have time for that. All in all, most of the times during his term he was ready to make concessions toward politicians, and the criticism which they "offered" was not lost on him. The time when he could create a strong political base is now over; when he was establishing the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR], it was already too late.

At that time it was clear that it was not possible for Solidarity groupings to run in the elections together with BBWR. However, Walesa was really counting on that. He ignored their refusal, which has been proven by recent events.

He made other miscalculations as well. As a result of his attack and the commotion which he raised, the popularity of Kwasniewski and Pawlak fell so radically that today they are no longer candidates who could easily win the presidential elections. Now that the danger has decreased, the postsolidarity parties do not feel so "forced" to group around one candidate, let alone Walesa.

It is nearly certain that unless Walesa dissolves the present parliament, he will not win the elections. This does not mean that if he dissolves the parliament, he is sure to win. However, in such a case he will have some chance. People may react quite variously to the dissolution of the parliament and to the events that follow. Then the president might be supported by many people.

Another thing that might help Walesa win the presidential elections is the constitutional referendum. He could count on benefiting from the campaign against the Constitution passed by the National Assembly. This campaign will probably create a leader of a movement of refusal. However, it is not very likely that people will accept Walesa in this role.

Walesa dissolves the parliament. The National Assembly, even though it has been dissolved, brings him before the State Tribunal. Walesa agrees to that. Then alone, not only in the world of political offices but also in the eyes of the people, he defends his arguments. He was already getting ready for such a role; it was when he was vetoing the amendments that liberalized the antiabortion regulations.

Should he dissolve the parliament, that is, fight for reelection, which, he believes, he is fully entitled to? Or should he not dissolve it, that is, admit that he will probably lose the presidential elections? This is a difficult decision for him because it is his profound conviction that he would lose them undeservedly.

This is his conviction and he has some arguments. Over the last years he has been the only real politician in Poland. He was a politician who did not sleep away the time—he attempted to do something. His fight was awkward, not very nice; however, he did fight. When Walesa leaves, the romantic Poland, the fighting Poland, will become a thing of the past. The other members of the same "wave"—Bujak, Frasyniuk, Rulewski, Borusewicz, Arkuszewski—have all lost their old energy.

It is Walesa who fought for special powers for a few governments; he fought for their right to issue decrees. Each of those governments, starting with Mazowiecki, was afraid to take on more responsibility.

It is Walesa who fought for privatization and was the only one who fought for reprivatization—he presented his always clever ideas. Solidarity governments had four years to implement those reforms. This has been done by Lithuania; it is being done by Ukraine. However, our governments, let alone the present one, have not done that.

Now Walesa is thinking about what he should do. He is alone. He has never been this alone so far. Will he admit that he will lose the presidential elections? Or does he want to be reelected president at any cost?

## Iliescu on Ties to Hungary, Ethnicity Issue

*AU0302132895 Bucharest DIMINEATA Supplement in Romanian 31 Jan 95 pp 2-4*

[Interview with Romanian President Ion Iliescu by Ricardo Estarriol, a reporter with the Spanish daily LA VANGUARDIA, in Bucharest on 20 January 1995]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted [Estarriol] You have a neighbor with which you have "very special" relations: Hungary. I observed Melescanu's visit to Budapest, since I too happened to be there for a short while. At that time both Kovacs and Melescanu voiced their optimism that the basic treaty will be concluded within a short time. This happened in September, I believe, and now it seems there is a new deadlock. What is the current situation?

[Iliescu] As far as our relations with Hungary are concerned, we have always displayed openness. This has been Romania's logical position following the revolution, to better relations with Hungary. I have said it in Budapest as well—namely, that, in our view, our relations with Hungary are normal. There is no conflict situation between Romania and Hungary.

Here I have to say that a certain image has been projected on the international plane, especially by the international mass media, to the effect that relations between Romania and Hungary are allegedly abnormal, conflictive, tense. The reality is entirely different. Actually our relations are normal, as befits two neighboring states: very active diplomatic relations and economic relations. Hungary currently ranks first among all our neighbors, as an economic partner of Romania's. We also have cultural and scientific ties and contacts among individuals. No one has any difficulty traveling freely, so a great number of Romanians visit or traverse Hungary and many Hungarians visit Romania. Therefore our relations with Hungary are good-neighborly relations.

Nevertheless, there are certain problems that are relics of our history and that, under the current circumstances of regional turmoil, extremist forces on both sides tend to agitate again.

As regards the [bilateral basic] treaty, there are two problems. One is the matter of our borders. Certain nostalgic people in Hungary sometimes express ideas to the effect that the Trianon [peace treaty following World War I] has created an unfavorable situation for Hungary, as Hungary has lost territory and one-third of Hungarians live outside the country's borders, and other such things. Now, this is something artificial, for they are stirring up problems that do not actually exist. The Hungarian national state was first born after World War I, which was followed by the peace treaty. Before that, there was only an Austrian empire, and later on an Austro-Hungarian empire. Transylvania did not belong to Hungary. Transylvania is a historic territory that the Romanian people created 2,000 years ago, at a time when the Hungarians were not in Europe. It is the cradle of the Romanian nation, which is a European nation, which has not come from some other place but was born here in this land. The Hungarians came 1,200 years ago and found the Romanians already here.

The Romanian provinces of Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia have experienced foreign domination. Wallachia and Moldavia were under Turkish occupation, while Bessarabia, which is a part of Moldavia, has been under Russian domination and occupation. Transylvania was under the domination and occupation of the Austrian empire, but by the end of the past century it was part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Therefore such nostalgia has deep roots.

Besides, there is also nostalgia for a situation that was not normal: namely, the situation during the Middle Ages, when the majority population in Transylvania did not have political rights. The Romanians, who used to be the majority, were not recognized as a nation. There was the principle of "unio trium nationum," according to which the only ones with political rights were the Hungarians, the Germans, and the Szeklers.

Now, after World War I, the general idea of the self-determination of peoples prevailed. On the basis of the self-determination principle, national states began to emerge. As a result of this, the Romanians, who used to be the majority in Transylvania, chose in favor of self-determination and reunification within a unitary national state with the other two Romanian provinces, back then the Romanian nation, which consisted of Wallachia and Moldavia. The Hungarians, too, have exerted their right to self-determination, setting up a national Hungarian state for the very first time in history.

Therefore, the Romanians' sensitivity whenever the Hungarians express territorial claims with respect to Transylvania, is understandable, as this is linked to a long history of struggle by the Romanians for national liberation. On the other hand, also understandable is the sensitivity of the Hungarians, as during their empire they were the dominating nation in that province but became an ethnic minority after World War I and the establishment of the Romanian national state.

Now, this was a psychological shock that has been experienced by every dominant nation as soon as it has become a minority—such as, currently, the Russians living in the Baltic countries or elsewhere. I mean: This is a psychological problem that emerges everywhere under similar circumstances.

As I said, there is matter of the borders, on the one hand; and on the other hand, the issue of the status of the ethnic minorities. This is an issue considered a problem by the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania—and not just those in Romania—and there are certain theses that say that the issue of the ethnic Hungarians is the capital, central, problem for European stability.

Now, this is an unrealistic claim also lacking in modesty. Why just the ethnic Hungarians? Generally speaking, in Europe there are no homogeneous states, from the national point of view. There is not a single state that does not have fellow nationals living on the territory of other states. It is not just the Hungarians that have one-third of their fellow nationals living outside Hungary's borders. More than one-third of Romanians, too, live outside Romania's borders, in the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania—everywhere; also in Russia, and so on.

Therefore in Europe in general, there is an ethnic minority issue, so that the only solution, the only realistic approach is to democratically solve the general organizational framework of the states, as this would also solve the ethnic minority problem.

After the revolution we introduced into our constitution the idea of the equality of all our citizens and of guaranteeing the rights of all minorities, be they national, ethnic, religious, or political, to express themselves, to have every possibility to assert their identity. To that purpose, efforts were made by our lawmakers, as well as in practical political activity, by means of the Local Autonomy Bill, to offer the minorities every possibility to express themselves. And in Romania it is especially the Hungarians who have a great many rights on the political plane: They are represented in parliament, in the local councils; they have education in their mother tongue, a thing that does not exist in Hungary for any of the Hungary's ethnic minorities. Because in Hungary too there are also ethnic minorities. There are ethnic Romanians as well. They have a single Romanian high school in which the single subject taught in Romanian is the Romanian language, all other subjects being taught in Hungarian...

[Estarriol] Mathematics is taught in Hungarian.

[Iliescu] Not just mathematics. Geography, history, and all the other subjects too. Thus, this is the angle from which the ethnic minority issue should be considered. They are banging on open doors, because on the political plane, on the general political plane, in Romania they have every possibility of expressing themselves.

Thus, there are these two issues: namely, the matter of our borders and the ethnic minority. And I believe that if they are approached in a realistic way, there can be no problems with Hungary. We talked very openly about these issues in Budapest, where we saluted the new, more realistic spirit of the new government. I held talks with Mr. Horn and Mr. Goncz; we are always open to discuss every possible problem and jointly find solutions. Because, generally speaking, the ethnic minority issue is not something pertaining to relations among states. It is an internal issue of each state's, and it lies within the competence of each state to solve the issue in the way it considers best.

For instance, we cannot impose the Romanian model as regards ethnic minorities on France. The French do not even accept the concept of ethnic minorities, or the concept of nationality either. Their sole principle is that of citizenship. That is: Everyone who is a French citizen is considered to be a Frenchman. They never even talk in terms of nationalitie—such as the Alsatians, Basques, Catalans, Bretons, Corsicans, Arabs, who have been living there for centuries, and others too. Even in Spain, these things are regarded differently.

In other words, each state has its own history, traditions, and political, economic, and social circumstances on the basis of which it approaches the ethnic minority issue.

We have our own history; and under our circumstances, we considered it proper to grant all minorities the possibility of expressing themselves. For instance, in Romania all ethnic minorities are represented in the Romanian parliament. There is a special parliamentary group that includes the representatives of 14 ethnic minorities. Regardless of the election results all ethnic minorities—even the very small ones, such as the Armenians—automatically receive parliamentary seats for their representatives. The Tartars have their representative there, and even the Italians have a representative in Romania's parliament....

[Estarriol] The Italians live in Banat, don't they?

[Iliescu] Not only there. They live all over the country. There are about 1,000-2,000 Italians, and they have their representative in parliament.

There is no such thing in other states. This is a Romanian experiment. Each state is entitled to find its own solutions to the ethnic minority issue. Nevertheless, there are generally valid European criteria as well. From this point of view, we do not find it at all difficult to fall into step with European norms. We included a stipulation in our Constitution that says that all regulations pertaining to international law and those international accords that Romania too has signed prevail over domestic legislation. We are always ready to adapt our legislation to international regulations, and as far as ethnic minorities are concerned we have always supported European regulations. And we are also prepared to sign the latest such regulation—namely, the Framework Convention on Ethnic Minorities.

Therefore I believe that, in principle, there are no difficulties in solving all the problems in order to achieve good-neighborly relations with Hungary; and I think that, currently, circumstances are more favorable. I had talks with President Goncz and Prime Minister Horn that were quite open and, I believe, friendly, and as you already mentioned, the two foreign ministers have also met. We are optimistic—even about the possibility of signing a treaty.

[Estorrial] But now there seems to be a little bit of a deadlock, because....

[Iliescu] There are certain problems related to the militant stance of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in

Romania [UDMR], which again began to stir up this issue up in a way that is even suspect, to prevent the finalizing of our negotiations with Hungary on the treaty. But this is a domestic problem of Romania's political forces.

And you have seen the reaction, in the past days, of all political forces in the country—and not just the ones supporting the government but also the ones in the opposition. These forces have rejected the claims of the UDMR, proclaimed by the UDMR as the principle of ethnic-territorial autonomy. They did so because the principle of local autonomy is included in both the Constitution and the Romanian law on local administration. Thus, there are all kinds of possibilities for achieving local autonomy: There are elections for the local councils, bodies that are fully autonomous on the local plane.

Nevertheless, they raise the idea of ethnic-territorial autonomy. I mean: What should be done in localities or counties with an ethnic Hungarian majority? Should we set up Bantustans? We said that what they are demanding is a kind of Bantustanization. That is: Should local administrations with an ethnic Hungarian majority be autonomous with respect to the central state bodies? This is not the European way to raise the issue. It runs counter to every European regulation and principle!

At a moment when we are talking about general European integration and the elimination of all barriers in relations among nations, they wish to introduce separatism within a state. This is a segregationist theory based on ethnic principles. In other words, its implementation would imply the setting up of Bantustans within our country's territory everywhere there is a majority of ethnic Hungarians, although inside such Bantustans there will also be micro-Bantustans of Romanians, Germans, Gypsies, and others, because the population is generally mixed.

[Estarriol] So this is the cause of this, let us say, difficulty?

[Iliescu] That is right.

[Estarriol] I am asking this because I talked to Foreign Minister Kovacs and he said to me: First, in connection with the basic treaty, there are no difficulties. We are ready to recognize the Trianon Treaty...

[Iliescu] The borders.

[Estarriol] Yes. Second: In connection with the opening of a consular office in the city of Cluj, he said: "Perhaps we will open a consular office in some other town. We do not wish to give up."

[Iliescu] Solutions can always be found.

[Estarriol] I think I understand now what the problem consists of. All right. Let us go on to another subject. [passage omitted]

## Pact Blamed for Deterioration in Relations

*AU0302144495 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 Jan 95 p 1*

[Editorial by Roxana Iordache: "Because of the Extremists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The tension between Hungary and Romania arose suddenly. It is an extremely serious situation, generated by artificial problems that could have been avoided if we had a competent and responsible government—that is, a government without extremists. Their ostrich-type policy prevents the leaders of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] from seeing the cause of the diplomatic crisis in relations with Hungary. In a superficial way, they prefer to blame the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] rather than accept that the cause of Hungary's sudden reaction can be found in the apprehension about the effects of the four-party pact in Romania [protocol signed recently between the PDSR; the Romanian National Unity Party, PUNR; the Greater Romania Party, PRM; and the Socialist Party of Labor, PSM].

We have not had to wait long to see these effects. The minister of justice, supported by the PUNR—since the Interior Ministry has been penetrated by the PRM—called for the UDMR to be outlawed. Instead of trying to normalize interethnic relations, those in power are stirring up feelings in the political hope of gaining votes in Transylvania, without counting the cost. However, the opposition does not make such mistakes. The CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] proposes to solve the problem through a civilized dialogue to ensure a normal life together. [President Ion] Iliescu and the PDSR do not care that the Hungarians' main claims might have been provoked by the simple fact that the PUNR and the PRM are allies in the government, which makes the Hungarian minority feel the need to declare its ethnic identity threatened and ask for self-administration. However, within the CDR, one would expect the UDMR to show a partner's fairness and agree to sign a protocol stipulating that the UDMR give up all claims of autonomy—declared circumstantial and considered without substance—if equal civic rights and the preservation of ethnic identity are guaranteed to Romanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. This would be a historical success similar to the Alba Iulia declaration [which on 1 December 1918 proclaimed the unification of Transylvania with Romania].

[PDSR executive president] Adrian Nastase vehemently assailed the CDR because the United Opposition had condemned the PDSR's pact with the extremist parties, which barely succeeded in achieving the minimum required votes. And now, these parties are co-opted into government and are conferred an image they do not have, a false image that even distorts the image of the Romanian people, who are at risk of being unfairly considered chauvinistic and xenophobic, mainly by Hungary. Instead of realizing the seriousness of the situation, the Iliescu regime justifies the pact with the extremists as a counterbalance to the alliance of the UDMR with the CDR. This is an irresponsible justification, that instigates government aversion to the Hungarian minority and virtually provokes a political civil war with its Romanian partners! In no way can such a government offer prospects for reconciliation and stability.

On the other hand, although the CDR's proposal for a Grand Coalition of Reform is older, it has been systematically rejected. Each time the condition set by Iliescu and the PDSR for accepting it was cooperation with the extremist parties. Thus, they ruined the essence of an alternative. Had they accepted the solution suggested by the opposition, Adrian Nastase would no longer be faced with the embarrassing situation of having a dispute with the PUNR on a domestic level—and what is even worse, with the parliamentary parties in Hungary on the foreign level—precisely because of the PUNR and other parties like it. This fact might jeopardize the treaty with Hungary, the only non-Slav country in our neighborhood, in the great Pan-Slav offensive that surrounds us.

The intelligent demarches of Teodor Melescanu, who heads our diplomacy; of the Army; and of the Opposition have been ruined in a split second. The extremist alliance of the ruling powers provoked a Romanian-Hungarian crisis, whereas Slovakia has easily succeeded in obtaining a treaty with Hungary under the same conditions desired by Romania as well, including the inviolability of borders, something that we cannot obtain because of Vadim [PRM president Corneliu Vadim Tudor] and Funar [PUNR president Gheorghe Funar] and only because Iliescu and the PDSR are afraid that without those two, they will lose power. This is a sign that Iliescu and the PDSR are not interested in anything else.

## SRI Disagrees With Funar Situation Assessment

*AU0302213395 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 1 Feb 95 p 1*

[MEDIAFAX report: "The SRI Does Not Believe Funar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the information gathered by the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI], it is certain that in the counties of Harghita, Covasna, and Mures there exists "no generalized intent to initiate separatist actions," which would be the sole justification for a state of emergency in those areas, authorized sources within the SRI exclusively told MEDIAFAX reporters. On 27 January Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party, called on the president to decree a state of emergency in these three counties as a response to the escalation of the actions allegedly orchestrated by the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] to dismember the country. The SRI sources cited assessed that Funar's request is "at least premature" and is based on the "obviously mistaken" evaluation of the situation on the spot. Nevertheless, the SRI believes that in the area in question, the activity of "certain persons with extremist ideas" continues "and therefore we will keep them under surveillance," the sources added.

## Presidency Reaffirms Unity, Examines Role

*LD0402173695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a statement from yesterday's session of the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which discussed, inter alia, the latest reports concerning the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the presidency's responsibility in the country's defense. In view of some unclear matters and controversial assessments that have made their way to the public, and in connection with the situation and relations within the presidency, the Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency has reached the following conclusions:

1. It is not a question of a personality clash or a power struggle. On the contrary, the presidency voiced full political unity regarding the fundamental questions of the internationally recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the struggle for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and its democratic and civic character.

Full support was also voiced for the liberation struggle by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, as well as for the orientation toward a just peace. Consequently, the presidency rejects as unfounded and malicious all speculations in this connection.

Taking into account the state of war, the presidency believes that a public debate on Army problems—although it is a sign of democracy and pluralism in our society—should in the future take place inside the state institutions.

2. The presidency acknowledges the specific responsibilities, which Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency has in the army's leadership as chairman of the military council. President Izetbegovic will brief the presidency at regular sessions and meetings on the work of the military council and the general staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. On this occasion the presidency will discuss and establish joint views of interest for the development of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the country's defense.

3. In the aim of strengthening the constitutional position and the president's constitutional prerogative, the presidency agrees to carry out a critical analysis of its [word indistinct] work for the purpose of strengthening collective work and responsibilities, arrange more regular meetings, ensure a more even distribution of duties and consolidate its functions in the capacity of head of state and supreme commander of the Armed Forces.

The members of the presidency are unanimous in their assessment that in these decisive historic times there can be no room for political rifts, and the existing criticism is largely aimed at the consolidation of [word indistinct] and the role of the presidency itself and of other state institutions.

You have just heard the statement from yesterday's session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency.

## Ganic Reportedly in Zenica Due to Situation

*LD0402013895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2351 GMT 3 Feb 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 3 (TANJUG)—Incoming reports say relations between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were deteriorating in the towns of Zenica and Tuzla, central Bosnia.

Srpska republic News Agency SRNA reported Friday that Muslim Presidency Vice President Ejup Ganic was compelled to travel to Zenica on this matter. Ganic is also vice president of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Ganic discussed with the representatives of local Croats the incidents in the Zenica suburb of Podrizje caused by members of the Muslim 'El Moudjahid' unit, made up of mercenaries from Arab countries.

A local Croat officials' statement said members of this Muslim unit looted Croat houses and physically assaulted Croats, something that created an atmosphere resembling that of the Muslim-Croat war a year ago.

Croat residents of Tuzla complained Friday about the status of the town in which ethnic cleansing of the Serbs has long been completed and from which Croats, too, began moving out.

A statement of the Croat 'Napredak' cultural society said the Croats in Tuzla had no right to use the Croatian language. SRNA, for its part, reported that Croat-Muslim relations continued strained also in the city of Mostar, southern Bosnia- Herzegovina.

The Muslim radio reported Friday from Mostar that the Croat side had again rejected the forming of a joint police force in the divided city administered by the European Union.

The radio said the crossing of civilians from Mostar's Muslim city section was still restricted and that the Croat authorities have rejected all requests by the Muslims to return to their houses and apartments in the Croat city section, from which they had been expelled in the spring of 1993.

The radio said the Muslims have also been banned from returning to Stolac, a town south of Mostar, where they were the majority population before the Muslim-Croat war.

## Croats Protest to Ganic About Abuses by Troops

*LD0302224495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] At the request of the Croat nation, Ejup Ganic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation deputy president, spoke in Zenica today about frequent incidents caused in the Zenica suburb of Podbrezje by the (Al-Mujahid) unit.

The problems facing citizens of this suburb are: forceable seizure of Croat houses; confiscation of other property; searches and maltreatment of the population. Such behavior creates an atmosphere of insecurity among the Croat population in this area which could prompt the Croat population to leave.

The Federation deputy president expressed his indignation at the mentioned brigade's behavior and promised that he will take measures to overcome this situation.

A statement issued today by the Croat Civic Party of Bosnia- Herzegovina and the Zenica branch of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina says that on behalf of the Croat people, the talks were attended by Fra Stipan Radic, Josip Pojavnik, Miroslav Andric, Zeljko Peric, and Dragutin Zvonimir-Cicak.

## HVO Brigadier Satisfied With B-H Cooperation

*AU0302184895 Paris AFP in English 1756 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[Report by Nathaniel Harrison]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Feb 3 (AFP)—Officials from Bosnia and Croatia are to meet in Germany over the weekend for talks aimed at preserving a fledgeling Bosnian Moslem-Croat Federation plagued by distrust between the two parties.

Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic will confer in Munich with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke. [passage omitted]

The Federation guidelines call for a joint army and police force, as well as a central bank. But nearly a year after the alliance was proclaimed, there is a common general staff but no joint command.

"Certainly it takes time for the restoration of confidence between the two sides," said Brigadier Zivko Budimir, a Croat member of the general staff, "but I am personally satisified with the cooperation between the HVO (the Croat army) [Croatian Defense Force] and the Bosnian Army because I know how intense the conflict was.

"The greatest achievement so far is that the conflict has been stopped. As far as ex-confrontation lines are concerned, they have been completely separated."

Budimir specifically cited a Moslem-Croat thrust last November that captured the southwestern town of Kupres from Serb forces. "This was the only joint action so far but it does not mean it will remain the only one." [passage omitted]

## Federation Justice Minister on Constitution

*95BA0112E Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jan 95 p 14*

[Interview with Mato Tadic, minister of justice in the Federation Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Ivan Sabic; place and date not given: "The Constitution Guarantees Croats the Right to Property in Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The time since the Washington Agreement has been marked in Bosnia-Herzegovina by an extremely large output of laws, and also by an intertwining of the jurisdictions of the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We talked about some of the problems arising in that process and about possible ways of overcoming them with Mato Tadic, minister of justice in the Federation Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.*

[Sabic] I propose that we begin this interview with your comment on the present role of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina because of the changes in its membership and the documents that "covered" those changes.

[Tadic] It is important to know that the Presidency is a part of the executive branch, while the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the legislative branch. Toward the end of 1991 the time came for the first "rotation" at the head of the Presidency, but an agreement was reached that Alija Izetbegovic would remain primus inter pares for yet another term. When the war occurred, when Bosnia-Herzegovina separated from the former Yugoslavia, and when it was given international recognition, the Presidency was dissolved, but documents adopted immediately before the war and after it broke out created the legal prerequisites to replenish its membership by a very simple procedure. It was provided that additional elections would be scheduled to fill the empty positions. The constitutional amendments, however, stated that there would not be additional elections, but rather the election would be made by the Assembly, and then this was additionally derogated in that certain enactments, mostly adopted early in the war, transferred the powers of the Assembly to the Presidency. This created the possibility, then, for the Presidency to choose its own members.

[Sabic] The Presidency composed in that way is adopting decrees that have legal force. Has that practice been ended now that sessions of the parliament have begun to be held?

[Tadic] The Presidency so reconstructed, in which only three of the members elected in the 1990 elections are members today, has been operating the entire time of the war and has been making decisions of extreme importance by summary procedure, so that the possibility of abuse here is great. Those decrees occasionally come before the Assembly, but verification usually takes place without discussion or without undergoing essential amendment, which is certainly an abbreviation of democratic procedure. However, there are considerable pressures to discontinue that practice, and I hope that that comes about.

### Position of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

[Sabic] Following adoption of the Constitution of the Federation in the Constitutional Assembly, two legal state entities arose in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their powers have not been clearly delineated. What actually should be the position of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina vis-a-vis the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Tadic] I am convinced that this problem will be studied for a long time in legal theory and indeed in political practice. That is, we have two intertwined entities—the internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose territorial integrity de jure is not in dispute, and the Federation, a new state in which the highest legal enactments have been adopted and which has the international community behind it. The Constitution of the Federation states that the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to operate until a final peace agreement is attained. At the same time, that same document states that the Federation shall have its own parliament, government, president, and vice president, with all the powers the Constitution accords them. Their powers include representation of the Federation, the naming of ambassadors and consuls, appointment of officers in the Army, accepting the credentials of foreign diplomatic representatives.... Everything, then, that is normal for a state. Nowhere does the Constitution of the Federation state that those functions will not take on life and will not be implemented even though the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be operative, but there have been great difficulties in practical implementation.

[Sabic] The decision whereby the government plays two roles at the same time is especially interesting.

[Tadic] Although the Constitution does not say this, the law on the government states that the reconstructed Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina shall perform the role of the government of the Federation. I think that a big mistake was made here: Instead of a separately composed government of the Federation, which would work to set up the government, the economic system, the financial and monetary system, and defense system, a duality was brought about that has been creating considerable difficulties in the work effort. The relationship between the Presidency of the Republic and the president and vice president of the Federation is also so intertwined that in essence the president and vice president of the Federation, who have explicit powers precisely specified by the Constitution, are unable in practice to perform that constitutional role of theirs, because the Presidency is taking over a portion of their powers, more than 90 percent of them. These include foreign representation of the Federation, certain defense matters, and so forth.

### No One Disputes the Constitution

[Sabic] No one is going to say that the Federation is not an entity under international law.

[Tadic] That is true, but I must point out that the international community stands behind the Federation. We should not forget how the Constitution of the Federation was written, where it was signed, and all those in the world who accepted the Federation as a fact. I do not know any politically relevant factor in the world that has disputed the Constitution of the Federation, that is, that has not supported the Washington Agreement. I agree that until a final peace agreement the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina also has a large role with respect to preserving territorial integrity and international subjectivity, but that does not mean that the bodies of government at the level of the Federation cannot represent the Federation abroad, while the Presidency of the Republic would represent even that remainder of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina whose status is to be defined with a third party. The right of the Serbs to live in Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be disputed either, because they are also a constituent nationality.

[Sabic] In all that confusion, there came the Muslim proposal for "rotation" at the head of the Federation, with which the Croatian side, it was said, could not agree for political reasons. How do matters stand from the legal standpoint?

[Tadic] We have never disputed that the Vienna Agreement called for "rotation" after six months. But not in terms of individuals; rather, the agreement was that the president of the Federation would be a Muslim. I emphasize that we are talking about the agreement. That is why even now, when the Croatian side is proposing to the Muslim side that we agree, as we agreed in Vienna, that Muslim representatives not fill all three posts in the Federation and all four in the Republic, it is quite timely to do so. I think that our partners here in the Federation were a bit hasty in posing "rotation" as a purely technical matter, because even if we consented to it, the election of the new people could not get through procedure. This does not mean that the present president would necessarily become vice president, and the vice president president, because the confidence envisaged by the Constitution must be accorded them by the parliament.

We are not insisting that Zubak become president of the Federation, but that one of the key places be filled by a Croat, and that we determine by agreement whether that will be the post of president of the Federation or prime minister. Or perhaps some combination with "rotation" in the Presidency and at the head of the Foreign Ministry. After all, those are four posts that represent Bosnia-Herzegovina abroad. I feel that this is a completely legitimate demand on the part of Croatian representatives.

### The Cantons as Republics

[Sabic] Elections to the Assembly of the Federation and then also election of new leaders of the Federation were supposed to come before the transitional period was over. Although the conditions for this have not matured by any means, the election law has been in preparation for a long time. When will it finally be adopted?

[Tadic] The Constitution has provided that the opstina councils be formed immediately, that the canton bodies of government be formed within 30 days, and that elections finally be held. There are many reasons why all of this has not been done. That aside, the deadlines set were too short; even in a most peaceful time we would not have been able to organize the cantons in a period of 30 days. The cantons are for all practical purposes states with their own constitutions and bodies of government, they are the equivalent of the former Yugoslav republics.

As for the elections, it is provided that we have two chambers at the level of the Federation, the House of Representatives, whose members are elected on the basis of party slates, and the Chamber of Nationalities, which is to consist of an equal number of Muslim and Croatian delegates. The draft of the law on elections has already been completed, but it contains nothing particularly new. We have taken advantage of the achievements of neighboring countries, Croatia and Slovenia, as well as those that exist in the West, and we have also had multiparty elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are certain minor problems, but it is too early to go into them at this time.

[Sabic] During this war a great number of people have been forced to leave their houses and apartments. In the case of territory that has been defended against Serbian aggression, the Croats are those who have left their homes in the greatest number. The question is how that property is to be treated in the future, and a particularly interesting question is how socially owned housing units will be dealt with when those who had the right of occupancy had to leave, and afterward other people moved into them?

[Tadic] That subject matter does not lie altogether in the jurisdiction of my ministry, but lies in part in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Land Use Planning, and it is supposed to present a law on housing.

The Constitution of the Federation guarantees the right of ownership and the right of all displaced persons to return to their homes, the right to recovery of property, and if recovery is impossible because of destruction, the right to fair compensation. As for social ownership, that is a big problem, and you have pointed it up very nicely with your question. The Ministry of Industry and Energy has offered a proposal for transforming social ownership into state ownership. I personally have not studied this much because of a number of other obligations, but that solution does not seem suitable to me, because we know what happened in countries that favored state ownership. As for socially owned housing units, some of them belong to a known firm, and their status is a matter for transformation in those firms.

An additional problem is the status of Croats in the various cities that they left, forcibly or otherwise, and then afterward other people moved into their apartments, having acquired certain rights to them under existing statutes. In part, this will probably be solved in the law on housing relations. We will insist that certain things in this area be incorporated into the law. In any case, this issue will raise many problems. If we do not protect people's rights, then there is no point in even thinking about their return, regardless of whom you are talking about, the Croats or the Bosnian Muslims. Unless there is legal security, everything is illusory.

### Izetbegovic Discusses Cairo Visit, Arms Embargo

*NC0402215095 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1635 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 4 Feb (MENA)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic has stated that his visit to Cairo last week was designed to brief the Egyptian leaders, notably President Husni Mubarak, on the latest developments in the Bosnian crisis and the Serbian attempts to thwart all prospects that might lead to a peaceful solution.

In remarks to MENA, Izetbegovic said: I did not have to make a strenuous effort to convey what I wanted to President Mubarak because he was properly acquainted with the dimensions of the issue, not merely within the limited arena of Bosnia-Herzegovina but in the larger context of the former Yugoslavia.

The Bosnian president said he hopes that through President Mubarak, who enjoys extensive relations with Arab, African, and international leaders and has their trust, the international position toward Bosnia-Herzegovina will change and turn into a form of positive backing for the Bosnian people's wish to maintain their independence and territorial integrity within a peace agreement that does justice to all the warring parties.

Izetbegovic added that he had informed President Mubarak of Europe's stubborn refusal to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government even though the Serbs continue to reject the international peace plan which the Muslims have accepted despite their strong reservations about it.

Izetbegovic asserted that the Bosnian Serbs continue to obtain all the military hardware they need both from the Belgrade government, and by other means, with the help of Krajina's Serbs in Croatia.

The Bosnian president reiterated his request that Egypt and President Mubarak play an effective role at the United Nations to exert pressure to lift the military embargo on the Bosnian people.

He said: We are seeking peace, and the international community must either achieve that for us, thus fulfilling its commitments or, proceeding from moral considerations, give us a chance to obtain weapons. When we have that, we will be able to solve our problem.

## UN: Illegal Helicopter Movement Over Serb Area

*AU0402170395 Paris AFP in English 1616 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 4 (AFP)—Fifteen to 20 helicopters, which UN officials suspect were piloted by Bosnian Serbs, have flown over parts of eastern Bosnia in violation of a Security Council-imposed no-fly zone in the country, a UN spokesman disclosed here Saturday.

Alexander Ivanko said Dutch UN peacekeepers near Srebrenica spotted the aircraft around 6.40 p.m. (1740 GMT) on Friday flying over Serb-held territory from the northeast to the southwest. He said the helicopters appeared to be transport aircraft, adding that it was assumed—but not confirmed—that they belonged to Serb forces.

UN officials have raised the incident with Serb officers at "a technical level," Ivanko said. The no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina was imposed by the UN Security Council in late 1992 and applies to both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Since then, according to Ivanko, there have been around 4,000 violations.

The latest violation occurred in the midst of a four-month cessation of hostilities signed December 31 by the Moslem-led government and Serb authorities.

## Delic: Army-UNPROFOR Relations Very Good

*LD0302221795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Army General Rasim Delic, commander in chief of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, received Erik Pierre, Sweden's ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Visoko today.

They discussed relations between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] Nordic units, particularly in the light of a decision made by General Michael Rose, former UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, to allow an aggressor officer to stay and perform his duties at Tuzla airport. This decision caused indignation among the local population and led to the blockade of UNPROFOR troops. It was concluded that relations between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and Nordic units have so far been very good and that they will continue to be so in the future.

## UN Human Rights Report Blames 'Mainly' Serbs

*AU0302155495 Paris AFP in English 0052 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Feb 3 (AFP)—The Bosnian and Croatian Serbs were mainly but not wholly responsible for the latest incidents of human rights violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a UN official said in a report just published here.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, United Nations rapporteur on human rights in the former Yugoslavia, mentioned torture, the rape and murder of civilians and forced labour in Bosnia, and ethnic discrimination in Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia.

The report, Mazowiecki's 10th since mid-1992, was released here Thursday [2 February] ahead of its submission later this month to the UN human rights commission currently meeting in Geneva.

Quoting eyewitnesses, it singled out the roundup of Croats by Serbs holding the town of Banja Luka in Bosnia for forced labour at the war front, and the use of Moslem prisoners by Serbs from the Croatian enclave of Krajina to dispose of mines in the Bihac pocket.

The assault by Serbs and renegade Moslems on Bihac was being carried out with no obvious concern for the safety of civilians, the report said. Homes had been destroyed and civilians detained, tortured and killed.

The report said unconfirmed reports spoke of a prison near Velika Kladusa in the Bihac enclave where Moslem women were subject to regular sexual abuse.

On the government side, Bosnian Serbs were subject to human rightsviolations, Mazowiecki said, including being prosecuted as draft evaders and jailed when they tried to rejoin family on the other side of the battle-lines.

The reports said that despite the agreement by Moslems and Croats in Bosnia to form a federation, there were many instances of ethnic discrimination by one side or the other, including restrictions on freedom of movement and education, forced labour and beatings.

In Mostar, for example, Croat police were refusing to investigate crimes perpetrated against Moslems or to carry out joint patrols with their Moslem counterparts.

In Sarajevo the report laid the blame for continued clashes mainly on the government side for provoking the besieging Serbs with sniper and artillery fire. Mazowiecki again condemned persistent interference with humanitarian aid convoys, largely by the Serbs, which meant that vital supplies failed to get through.

In Croatia, the report spoke of discrimination against minority Serbs by the courts and in matters of housing and education, though it added that some progress had been made. In the rump Yugoslavia of Serbia and Montenegro, Mazowiecki said the situation was particularly bad in the Albanian-populated Serbian province of Kosovo, where the population lived in fear of night raids, killings and torture by paramilitary groups.

## Serbs Fire Mortars as UN General Visits

*AU0302195895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] General Bertrand de Lapresle, commander of the UN Forces for former Yugoslavia, visited Srebrenica yesterday. Here is a report by Nino Cani from the Srebrenica Press Center:

[Begin recording] De Lapresle held talks with Mr. Naser Moric on the implementation of the agreement on the demilitarized zone. The talks also touched upon the latest cease-fire agreement and the solution to the incident concerning the (Bandijera) Elevation located within the Srebrenica protected zone, which was seized by the Serbo-chetnik aggressor on 10 January.

It was agreed at the meeting that the United Nations would reach a top-level agreement with the Serbian side to have it withdraw from the occupied territory.

As a response to Gen. de Lapresle's arrival in Srebrenica, Karadzic's Serbs today fired 11 mortar bombs from the said (Bandijera) Elevation, which fell around the village of Podgaj. This was another confirmation of what the Bosniaks have already seen, that is, that the Pale Serbs have no intention of respecting any agreements. [end recording]

## Krajisnik Denies 'Clash' in Pale Leadership

*AU0302171395 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Feb 95 p 3 (tentative)*

[BETA-attributed report: "We Will Accept Talks, but Not the Plan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale—Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the parliament of the Srpska republic (RS), told BETA yesterday that the Serbian side accepts the continuation of negotiations on the final settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of the Contact Group peace plan, but that it is not prepared to accept the peace plan itself. He explained that the Serbian side is willing to say in a statement that is being demanded of it that it is prepared to negotiate peace on the basis of the Contact Group plan, but that is not willing to say in a statement that it is prepared to accept the plan as the basis for negotiations.

"We are asked to state that we accept the plan as the basis. If we do that, this could be interpreted as if we had accepted the plan. They are trying to force us to do this by playing with words," Krajisnik said, adding that this involved not a semantic, but an essential difference. He said that the international community was not asking the Bosnian Serbs to sign the peace plan and that it had never demanded that.

"However, as soon as we say that we accept the plan, all the corrections that should follow after no longer mean anything. The exchange of territories is a matter of goodwill of the two sides and they are yet to agree on this," Krajisnik said.

Krajisnik denied claims about a clash in the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs and reports that Manojlo Milovanovic, chief of the general staff of the Serb armed forces, has resigned.

"There is no rift whatsoever in the RS civilian or military leadership," Krajisnik said.

He expressed the belief that no rift would occur in the Pale parliament, saying that the founding of an independent group of seven deputies did not represent a rift.

"I understand that there are some political activities aimed at causing a rift in the parliament, but I hope that the deputies will not succumb to these attempts and that they will recognize the path that they need to pursue to the end and to create a common Serbian state," he said.

Krajisnik said that the delegation of businessmen that visited Belgrade yesterday [1 February] and met Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic went there with the "approval" of the RS leadership.

"It was agreed that economic problems should be the main reason for the visit there. I was surprised that the talks mainly focused on political issues. We expect the businessmen soon to offer us the answers to the economic questions that were the reason for their trip to Belgrade," he said.

Commenting on the call made by the Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic to the international community to prevent Serbian attacks on in the Bihac region, Krajisnik said that Izetbegovic has a "rebellion in his Presidency" and that he is being opposed by "people who want peace with the Serbian side."

"Izetbegovic needs the war to continue and new elements to put him in the focus. He now wants to protect his position in Sarajevo with this invented conflict," Krajisnik said.

## Milovanovic Denies Resigning Over Dispute

*LD0302183195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1712 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 3 Feb [no agency given as received]—General Manojlo Milovanovic, the Srpska republic army chief of general staff, today denied articles that were published in some Yugoslav papers and carried by foreign agencies that he had resigned due to an alleged dispute with the political leadership.

This sort of misinformation is part of a special war against the Serbs and is aimed at creating a wrong picture in the public about alleged disagreements between the Srpska republic political and military leaderships, Gen. Milovanovic says in a statement to SRNA.

The news on the alleged resignation by Gen. Milovanovic was launched by MONITOR weekly in Podgorica, a paper close to the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro.

According to this paper, which was quoted by several foreign news agencies, Gen. Milovanovic resigned after a quarrel with Radovan Karadzic, president of [passage omitted]

### Paper Views 'Controversy'

*AU0302161295 Belgrade NASA BORBA (tentative) in Serbo-Croatian 3 Feb 95 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Controversy Over Gen. Milovanovic's Dismissal"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Belgrade weekly BLIC in its first issue on Tuesday [31 January] carried an item on the dismissal of Colonel-General Manojlo Milovanovic, chief of the general staff of the Srpska republic army, while the Podgorica weekly MONITOR in its latest issue claims that Gen. Milovanovic resigned. BLIC claims that Radovan Karadzic made the decision with Gen. Mladic's blessing, and mentions as the direct cause the loss of 110 troops of the 15th Bihac Serbian Brigade and substantial amounts of infantry and artillery weapons during the conflict with the forces of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps in the Bihac area. MONITOR claims that Milovanovic, at a meeting held toward the end of January, "demonstratively ripped off his epaulets" and refused to remain in the Srpska republic army. [passage omitted]

We were told by the official Srpska republic news agency SRNA in Pale that "they have not received any official information on Gen. Milovanovic."

Sources close to the Bosnian Serb leaders confirmed for the BETA agency that the Pale leadership had a dispute and that "one member of the highest military command" tendered his resignation.

The same sources refused to name the officer in question, but they did not deny the claims published in the latest issue of the Podgorica weekly MONITOR that Gen. Manojlo Milovanovic had resigned.

However, the BETA agency later reported Srpska republic assembly chairman Momcilo Krajisnik's statement, which in a way refutes all the rumors.

### Delic Stresses Army Training, Combat Readiness

*LD0502163395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Army General Rasim Delic, chief of staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, speaks about some activities that are being carried out in the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in order to maintain its full its combat preparedness.

[Begin Delic recording] Some people expected that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army would indulge in passivity in the wake of the cease-fire and the agreement on the cessation of hostilities we signed. This is probably what the aggressor expected and is perhaps one of the reasons why they insist on this agreement, hoping that its combat preparedness would deteriorate. On the contrary, following the signing of the agreement, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is buzzing with training activity and all other activities geared to improvements in combat preparedness. You were able to witness the exercise that was performed as part of the symposium on defense and training matters in units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. At the moment, however, all the units of the army and their commanding bodies are carrying out intense training programs, involving soldiers as well as units and commanding bodies, ranging from the level of general staff, where a training program has been organized for officers of specific profiles, to the level of basic units. The aim of this training program is to redress certain problems, certain shortcomings, as well as to address the objective fact that we have had no opportunity within these past three years of war to continuously train our units since they came into being and grew, as you know, through combat. Hence, combat was their training. This is why [words indistinct] something that was characteristic in the course of the symposium, we believe that this process, this truce—if it lasts for as long as envisaged under the agreement—will make us far stronger and far better equipped, at least, as far as every unit of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is concerned. This also applies to the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole.

To sum up, apart from all the activities in the sphere of training and educating the army as a whole and its officers, commands and, units, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to maintain and even raise its high level of combat preparedness. Above all, we could mention our concept of transformation which should [words indistinct] with the end of this cease-fire as well as with our activities [words indistinct] better organization, overall security [words indistinct] in units of the the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, creating material and other reserves.

Well, I should say that there is a great deal of activity going on in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and that in the context of all these changes in conjunction with the organs [words indistinct] and other organs, the government and Bosnia-Herzegovina's internal affairs. We are taking mesaures in order to further improve and consolidate today's degree of combat preparedness, aiming, of course—if need be, if during these four months, in fact there are only three months left, no political solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina is found—to secure such a solution by its combat prepredness and involvement on Bosnia-Herzegovina's battlefields. [end recording]

### HSS Secretary Discusses Party Program

*95BA0112D Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jan 95 p 8*

[Interview with Dubravko Lovrenovic, M.A., general secretary of the Croatian Peasant Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Ivan Sabic in Zagreb; date not given: "The Fight for Survival Precludes Conventional Political Programs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *We talked with Dubravko Lovrenovic, M.A., a lecturer in the School of Philosophy of Sarajevo University before the war and the newly elected* *general secretary of the HSS [Croatian Peasant Party] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, during a brief meeting that occurred on his trip from Sarajevo to Berlin. The first topic, then, his view of the situation in Sarajevo, was therefore inevitable.*

[Lovrenovic] It is now 1,000 days since the siege of Sarajevo began. This is today a city outside this planet and outside this civilization; people there are deprived of the dignity of living, they are literally death candidates at every moment. There is no food, water, electricity, gas.... The position of the Croats today is neither better nor worse than the position of the city's other inhabitants. They are sharing the fate of the city. One must conclude from everything happening in Sarajevo that as far as human relations are concerned, there is no systematic resistance to the Croats. Perhaps there was some earlier, during the period when I was abroad, but there really is none today.

Many of the Croats are gathered around the Croatian cultural society Napredak [Progress], which since the war began has done quite a bit to repair the difficult situation, especially in the humanitarian and cultural field; it organized operation of the Vrhbosna radio station, and it issues a monthly publication. In general, the Croats are quite a bit in evidence, especially in cultural events in the city. Celebration of the 750th anniversary of St. Peter's Cathedral highlighted the week in which it occurred not only in Sarajevo, but largely throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Catholic Educational Center was recently opened, so that Croats in Sarajevo, if the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is satisfactorily resolved, will have a future.

### Half a Million People Away From Their Homes

[Sabic] After you returned from abroad, you became involved in politics. How did you decide on that, and why was it you chose the HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Lovrenovic] I wanted to make my contribution to the policy to which I had committed myself from the very beginning of these events, a policy aimed at working out the position of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina on certain other premises than the premises of territorialization of the Croats, a policy which favored those achievements indicated 145 years ago in the well-known pro memoriam of the Franciscan Ivan Franjo Jukic, a policy making Bosnia-Herzegovina a normal democratic state in which the Croats, old settlers in this country, would feel at home. It is logical, then, that at this moment I should officially join that party that even now can be said to have done certain things that can be regarded as historical.

[Sabic] As far as I know, this is your first political involvement. How is it that you did not become involved in political events earlier, at the time, say, when the multiparty system took on life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when this was done by a great many people who had not been previously involved in politics?

[Lovrenovic] I do not consider even my present involvement in the HSS to be conventional political activity. At the time when the era of the multiparty system began, I was not officially in the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], the strongest Croatian party, but I was on one of that party's councils that met occasionally and occasionally offered its opinion to the party's leadership at that time. Given my inclinations, I thought that was quite sufficient. Today, however, something altogether different is involved. My position is that for Bosnian Croats there are no longer any politics or conventional political programs. It is simply a question of fighting for survival. It is sufficient to recall that nearly half a million Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are today away from their homes. We can and must talk about the tragedy of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The reason why I joined the HSS under those circumstances was that I wanted to be with people whom I hold in high esteem, who established a party at an extremely critical moment, and who by their work made a decisive contribution to the signing of the Washington Agreement.

[Sabic] The General Assembly of the HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held just before Christmas; this certainly was an occasion to draw the bottom line and render some kind of accounting. How satisfied are you with that?

[Lovrenovic] Although I previously was not directly involved in the party's work, I did follow what it did through the media and contacts with friends who were members of the party. The party was updated in April 1993, at a time when it was realized that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be offered an alternative Croatian policy, but also a Bosnia-Herzegovina policy, because it was evident even at that moment that the conflicts between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] were inevitable. From its founding until the summer of last year, the work of the party was mainly limited to Sarajevo, which is because of communications difficulties and other troubles. During that period, the party oriented its effort through the Croatian Coordinating Committee and the Croatian National Council. Following the Washington Agreement the party achieved an essentially new position. The assessment was that it should broaden its effort to other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So far, we have managed to form canton committees for the Tuzla-Drina Canton and Zenica Canton and an opstina organization in Vares, and we are preparing the establishment of committees in certain other opstinas as well. During the last half-year, the party has been joined by several well-known Croatian intellectuals, but our objective was not to build a large party. Under the last system, we had a party with 2 million members, and we saw how it ended.

### A Program With a Croatian Orientation

[Sabic] What are the basic programmatic propositions of the HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Lovrenovic] The annual assembly produced a program that has a Croatian orientation, but at the same time it is a Bosnia-Herzegovina program. Its premises are the internationally recognized and integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, arranged on the cantonal principle, a modern state, a state in which Croats will live in dignity and stand up straight.

[Sabic] Did the annual assembly signify some change of direction with respect to the program, or did it represent continuity?

[Lovrenovic] There have been no very essential changes in the program. It certainly has been updated, and all the changes have been honored, especially those that have to do with the internal arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that have occurred since the founding assembly, when the first program of the HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina was adopted. The party is still committed to the fundamental principles, and in that sense we can talk of continuity.

The war for territory is still going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we are trying to awaken in people a different way of thinking. Germany and Japan experienced military defeats in the conventional sense, but today they are leading world economic powers. Accordingly, however the war turns out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this will not essentially determine the future of the peoples, but rather that will be determined by the ability to preserve traditional values and the ability to become part of world developments.

[Sabic] In view of the party membership of members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the balance of power in the Assembly, where would you draw the line that separates the opposition parties from the parties in power?

[Lovrenovic] Circumstances are such that two parties, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the SDA [Democratic Action Party], have been unnaturally promoted as representatives of entire nationalities and owners of the state, and for all practical purposes no political opposition exists. The opposition as it is today has no great prospects. What we see is actually a corrupt concentration on petty tactics, waiting for something to happen outside and resolve this situation of ours, instead of the opposition drawing up a joint program, operating aggressively through the media, and assuring those two parties that one party cannot represent an entire nationality. And as for the Presidency, many think that it has power, although it is a body that merely represents the state.

### The Exodus Has Not Been Halted

[Sabic] In early December the six-month transitional period in the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, during which elections were supposed to be held and a democratically elected government installed, expired. What is your comment on everything that has (or has not) occurred in that time?

[Lovrenovic] Someone has said that the so-called transitional periods have lasted the longest in history. As for breathing life into the Federation, two important phases have been successfully completed (I hope): cessation of hostilities and the opening of roads for delivery of humanitarian aid. Now comes the third phase—establishment of constitutional and legal order on the territory of the Federation, and here we must bear in mind that even that territory has not been precisely defined, and that at the present only some 30 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina can work to establish order, because the remainder is under Serbian occupation. I personally am not happy with what has been done on that 30 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The actual situation can best be measured with respect to the return of the refugees; no one any longer has any grounds for talking about "your refugees" and "our refugees." Refugees are human beings, nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they should all be allowed to return regardless of where their homes are. After all, unless this process is brought to an end, the Federation remains a pure illusion, and the trend of emigration will continue; it may sound paradoxical, but it has been strengthened since the Washington Agreement.

[Sabic] What are the reasons that have brought that about, and what are the obstacles to the return of those who have left?

[Lovrenovic] I have spent recently quite a bit of time in the field, and I have noted that in certain places the process of emigration—I am speaking only about the Croats, but that trend is also evident with the Bosnian Muslims—has speeded up. There are numerous reasons for this. In most cases, there is the lack of any future. Young people in Travnik, Zenica, or Tuzla obviously no longer see any opportunity for them there. The land is devastated, the economy has come to a halt, so that people have nothing on which to base their future. Those who are responsible for running the Federation—again I am referring here to the two incumbent parties—are also the most responsible, because there is no agreement concerning the Washington Agreement.

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## MBO Protests 'Manifestations' of Religion in Army

*AU0302185295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[Report by Samir Huseinovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At a news conference held today, Mujo Kafedzic, deputy chairman of the Main Committee of the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO], presented the party's view that the announcement of some members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not in the least surprised people in the know as regards our Presidency, as the Constitution of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being violated, procedural rules are not being respected, and the platform on the Presidency's activity in wartime has been abandoned.

As a party fighting for honest and democratic relations in our society, the MBO deems the reaction of the Presidency members to be a protest against this situation. We support these people's stand on the need for the Presidency to regain its authority and reaffirm its collective (?spirit).

The MBO's position is that the cause of this reaction were some phenomena linked with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. The army is a state body and one of the basic pillars of power. The organizers of life and religious [word indistinct] must beware of onesidedness and ensure full respect for the intimate feelings and personal beliefs of every individual. Manifestations of religion in army units, if they are organized, must be dignified and tactful lest they provoke suspicion among those who are not (?religious) for any reason. [passage omitted]

### Convoys Refused Entry Into Bihac Region

*AU0302162695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The war games around Bihac and its entire district are continuing with unabated ferocity. Attacks have been raging on all fronts, even though agreements on the cessation of hostilities have been signed. Deadly shells fired by the joint [Serbian] aggressors have been falling on Bihac, Bosanska Krupa, and many villages and districts. [word indistinct] everywhere, on streets, apartments, family houses, at the front, and on schools. Apart from the shells and the killing of innocent civilians, the aggressor also included humanitarian aid in the war on the Bihac territory. Such aid has not arrived in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina for almost a year, owing to the blackmail and obstruction of Knin and the leaders of the so-called Bosnia Autonomous Province, who have unfortunately joined in this dirty and inhuman game of attrition against almost 300,000 citizens of the Bihac region. This was repeated today: Two food convoys destined for Bihac were sent from the Bosnia-Herzegovina border back to Zagreb. One convoy carrying humanitarian aid for the hungry and weakened children of this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina was sent back from Velika Kladusa. It also included food for Buzim school children, particularly the 15-year-olds who were seriously wounded by the aggressor's shells today: Butmir Hrasnovic, Enes Dedic, Jasmin Buzic, Elvir Dulic, and Suad Kovacevic, whose lives doctors are fighting to save at this moment.

The second convoy with humanitarian aid was turned back from Licko Petrovo Selo, about 15 km from Bihac. More than 100 metric tons of food was intended for a Bihac soup kitchen left without food and which has been producing only bread [words indistinct] to refugees for two months.

As I report, distant explosions can be heard. The enemy is torching the last Bosniak houses in the old Bihac district of Sokolac. Shells fired by the aggressor's tanks are exploding in Zegar and destroying this Croatian place. The war rages on in the Bihac region.

### Government Troops Inflict Heavy Losses on Serbs

*LD0502130695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Let us first hear our correspondent Muhamed Muric's latest report from Bihac, where the allied aggressors continue to launch artillery and infantry attacks.

[Muric] The allied aggressors, including paramilitary formations of the so-called autonomous province of Western Bosnia, relaunched their heavy offensive early this morning along the entire front line around Velika Kladusa. Along the whole section between Johovica and [word indistinct], the defense lines of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are being pounded as heavy artillery and infantry attacks continue unabated, even as I file this report.

The fighters of the 5th Corps are repelling the chetniks' assaults on the defense lines and their attempts to penetrate the free territory of the Bihac region. The enemy forces are suffering heavy losses, and there has been no change in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's positions.

Other front lines have been somewhat quieter—only sporadic provocations with small-arms fire, except the area of Bosanska Krupa, where the aggressor stepped up artillery and sniper fire, using also antiaircraft machine-guns and Wasp and Zolja anti-tank missiles. [passage omitted]

### FRY General Leads Bihac Offensive Preparations

*AU0602084695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 6 Feb 95*

[Report by Nada al-Isa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A powerful tank and mortar attack on (?Vrnograd), Velika Kladusa, and Mala Kladusa has started early this morning. The information from the field says that one shell is falling on Kladusa every second and that the shelling is unprecedented in intensity. This is the information from the 5th Corps on the front. The civilian targets are shelled the most, but also the 5th Corps positions.

There is a great concentration of aggressor's army around Bihac. Since the early morning, they have been arriving from Lika, Petrovac, and [word indistinct]. There are also plenty of soldiers from the so-called Yugoslavia.

According to the information of the 5th Corps, the aggressor has already started tightening the noose around

Bihac, preparing a new major offensive, which has already begun with the shelling of Kladusa.

The aggressor is bringing manpower and military hardware to around Bihac by helicopter from the so-called Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, the so-called Serbian Republic, and the so-called Yugoslavia.

The shelling of Kladusa and the preparations for the offensive on Bihac are commanded by General Momcilo Perisic, one of the commanders of the aggressor's army, that is, the army of the so- called Yugoslavia, directly from Belgrade. [passage omitted]

### 'El Mojahedin' Unit Said Terrorizing Croats

*LD0502180495 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The El Mojahedin unit of the Muslim army has been terrorizing the Croats from Podbrezje near Zenica over a long period of time. This problem has been discussed at a meeting held in Sarajevo between the leaders of the Zenica Croat Democratic Community and the Croat Civic Party and Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and Bosniak Presidency member.

Ganic expressed his indignation over the behavior of the members of the unit and he promised that measures would be carried out during the day in order to resolve the problem. [passage omitted]

### TANJUG: Reports on 'Inter-Muslim' Fighting

*LD0502150895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1440 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 5 (TANJUG)—Muslim Sarajevo Radio Sunday said heavy inter-Muslim battles resumed in west Bosnia, while west Bosnian Radio Velkaton said the town of Velika Kladusa was being rebuilt.

Sarajevo Radio, controlled by the government of Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, said that inter-Muslim fighting continued 'unabated' in the region of Velika Kladusa and that the troops of moderate Muslim leader Fikret Abdic had 'suffered heavy losses.'

Sarajevo Radio did not say who had initiated the fighting but said that the 'front lines had remained in place.'

West Bosnian Radio Velkaton, controlled by Izetbegovic's political opponent Abdic, did not mention the battles close to Velika Kladusa but said that life in this town was returning to normal.

Velkaton said that the overhead power transmission lines and the waterworks were under reconstruction and that plans were being made for reviving production in the remaining facilities of the Agrokomerc agricultural complex. After a referendum in September 1993, Muslims in western Bosnia, headed by Abdic, declared the autonomous province of West Bosnia in protest against the war policy of the Sarajevo central government.

The Sarajevo government army overran the province in August 1993, but Abdic's troops launched a counteroffensive in mid-October, managing to regain a big part of the province by mid-December.

### Sarajevo Siege 'Eased' as Access Roads Reopen

*AU0602104595 Paris AFP in English 0956 GMT 6 Feb 95*

[by Nathaniel Harrison]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 6 (AFP)—The siege of Sarajevo eased Monday as mainly Moslem residents of the war-weary capital took advantage of a newly reopened airport crossing road to make contact with the outside world.

Civilian motorists set off across the route, which is in range of Serb guns and runs south to link the suburb of Dobrinja with Butmir and the rest of government-controlled Bosnia, shortly after 1000 GMT thanks to a UN-brokered agreement between Sarajevo and rebel Serb authorities.

Another road connecting the Serb-held suburbs of Ilidza and Lukavica reopened to Serb civilians at 0800 GMT.

A commitment to restore traffic on the two airport crossings, closed since July, was a key humanitarian provision of a four-month cessation of hostilities agreement signed by the government and rebel Serbs on December 31.

For Sarajevans, trapped by the war and dependent on international humanitarian aid, access to the airport crossing had been anxiously awaited. For UN negotiators trying to consolidate the truce a reopened road was seen as another tangible gain from the pact.

Under a UN-brokered understanding the roads reopened February 1 exclusively to eight UN-related relief agencies. UN efforts to include civilians in the deal fell apart when an acrimonious row erupted between the parties on the pace of prisoners releases and exchanges, which are also called for under the truce.

But UN Civil Affairs Coordinator Enrique Aguilar met separately last week with senior government and Serb officials and won agreement on civilian use starting Monday.

Aguilar said he would meet the parties again on Wednesday to expand usage even further to five local non-governmental aid agencies. But UN sources warned that unless an understanding were reached on the pace of prisoner releases or exchanges, there would likely be problems including the local bodies.

"They're trying to take short steps," explained one source. "And not try to do everything all at once." The

Bosnian Government has also been pushing for commercial trucks to be authorized to travel on the routes.

"If all goes well during the week, the parties might soon afterwards begin informal discussions on commercial traffic," according to Aguilar.

For Sarajevo the road is not only as an escape route but a means of driving down food prices in the market.

At present, food entering the capital from sources other than international agencies has to be backpacked through a pedestrian tunnel under part of the airport—a difficult procedure that forces up retail prices.

Civilians using the road can be expected to carry in extra food and other items, boosting supplies and lowering prices.

The routes were first reopened under an agreement in March. But the Serbs cancelled the deal in July, charging that it had been used by the government for arms smuggling.

## Akashi: Armed Forces Prepare for Wider Conflict

*AU0302171995 Paris AFP in English 1647 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb 3 (AFP)—New diplomatic initiatives and political negotiations are needed to shore up the fragile ceasefire in Bosnia, which is at risk in the northwest pocket of Bihac, special UN envoy Yasushi Akashi said Friday [3 February].

"Armed forces are continuing their preparations for wider conflict," Akashi warned in a statement published here. "Despite the achievements of the last month, the ceasefire remains fragile."

As result of a four-month comprehensive agreement on a cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia, the situation on the ground has stabilised except in Bihac, where separatist Croatian Serbs have joined the fighting between Moslems, rebel Moslems and Bosnian Serbs.

Croatian Serbs were not party to the January 1 ceasefire accord between the Bosnian Government, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croat forces.

Serb and Bosnian government gunners have been trading shellfire in intense artillery duels for the past two days in Bihac, Bosnian Serb television reported Thursday.

"All involved must now make a concerted effort to solve the conflict in Bihac," Akashi said after Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic warned that prolonged fighting in Bihac could threaten the ceasefire in other Bosnian regions.

## UNPROFOR Spokesman: Tudjman Not Bluffing

*AU0302184995 Paris AFP in English 1814 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 3 (AFP)—UN officials are "urgently planning" to pull UN peacekeepers out of Croatia once their mandate expires on March 31, even though renewed fighting could well result, UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman Michael Williams said here Friday [3 February].

President Franjo Tudjman has given the 15,000 UN troops three months to leave after the end of the mandate, and that ultimatum "is not a matter of bluff," Williams said. "We have to plan now and make assessments on the basis that UNPROFOR would not have a mandate after midnight on March 31."

However concern at UNPROFOR headquarters is "very, very deep" that a three-year truce between Croatian Government forces and separatist Serbs in their self-declared republic of Krajina will break down once interposing UN forces withdraw, Williams said. "The situation is grave, seriously deadlocked. ... It's a profound worry," he said.

Western leaders have voiced concern at the UN withdrawal ordered by Tudjman on the grounds that the peacekeepers had failed to fulfil their mandate of disarming the Serbs in Serb-occupied areas of the country, and fear the pullout of the 15,000 UN troops could spark a new outbreak of fighting.

On Monday Serb leaders refused to consider a peace plan drawn up by UN and European Union officials that would have granted them a high degree of autonomy within present Croatian borders.

Without the UN interposition forces, Williams said, the situation in Croatia "would be like living in a town of wooden houses without a fire brigade." He deplored the Serb rejection of the peace plan which, he said, "would offer an extraordinary degree of autonomy, almost unprecedented, to the Krajina" region, where the Serbs have proclaimed their own republic, backed by Belgrade.

He warned also that "if UNPROFOR was to leave Croatia, it would have an enormous impact elsewhere, first of all in Bosnia-Herzegovina but perhaps on a wider scale."

Analysts believe a resurgence of the conflict between Zagreb and Krajina Serbs could rapidly draw in Serbian forces and Serb forces from Bosnia, with a possible extension of the conflict to other regions in former Yugoslavia.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic pledged last month to rally his troops to the Krajina cause if Croatia attacked. A constitutional expert who advises Tudjman meanwhile said the peace plan for Croatia was "unacceptable both in form and conception."

Stressing that he was speaking as a jurist rather than as a presidential advisor, Smiljko Sokol said the plan envisaged "the creation of a state within the state, which is unacceptable."

## Krajina Serbs Prolong Hospitality to Blue Helmets

*95P20449 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 16 Jan 95 p 5*

[Article by P.M. "We Will Defend Krajina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Tudjman has the right to do that, just as we have the right to offer prolonged hospitality to the forces of UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) on the territory of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK]." This was the answer provided by Dr. Rade Tanjga, minister of defense of the RSK, when he was asked what he thought of Tudjman's and the Croatian leadership's intention to deny hospitality to the blue helmets in Croatia.

In a statement for Radio Kragujevac, Dr. Tanjga noted that Krajina Serbs never lived within Croatia. They simply did not feel disturbed by Croatia, because they considered themselves as residents and citizens of Yugoslavia.

"We are another state; everyone who fails to recognize this reality will have to confront the will of the people. We can and are trying to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the problem. I believe that our Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic has made a great contribution to this process," Dr. Tanjga stressed.

"What will happen if Tudjman's threats prove to be real and Croatia attacks RSK?"

"We have no other homeland. This is our land. We have no spare homeland to go to if they attack us. We will defend ourselves with all means available. This is clear to every one of our fighters, to our every man, to our every child. Minister Tanjga pointed out that RSK has made great efforts to achieve peace through negotiations and to avoid hurting the interests of either side. However, Croatia most likely received some kind of a hint from outside. Tudjman never does anything without such hints. Now he is trying to break the peace negotiations, realizing he has a lot to lose because RSK is now appearing on the international scene as a mature political factor contributing to peace.

"To what extent will the situation in Krajina deteriorate due to the stricter sanctions, particularly due to the more difficult transit of goods for RSK through the the Srpska republic?

"My answer will be consistent with the function I fulfill. We must survive. We will find a way to survive," RSK Defense Minister Dr. Tanjga replied curtly.

## Granic on UN Withdrawal, Krajina Independence

*BR0302141295 Copenhagen POLITIKEN in Danish 3 Feb 95 p 10*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Henrik Kaufholz in Zagreb; no date given: "Croatia Playing for High Stakes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—Croatia is playing for high stakes, and it could end in war. "But that is not what we want and we are hoping for a peaceful solution," Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic said.

POLITIKEN met the 47-year-old professor and diabetes specialist at the Foreign Ministry's newly restored palace in the middle of Zagreb. Prior to Croatian independence was the building was the headquarters of the secret police in the state that formed part of Yugoslavia. Mate Granic was deputy prime minister in the first Croatian Government and became foreign minister in 1993.

[Kaufholz] Croatia has refused to extend the mandate of the UN force in Krajina, the Serb-controlled part of the country, if there are no improvements. Do you think that the UN force will withdraw?

[Granic] Our decision is final. As things stand now the mandate will not be extended. But at the same time we are ready to negotiate with the local Serbs, to intensify contacts, and to discuss all peace initiatives.

[Kaufholz] Why is Croatia so dissatisfied with the UN force?

[Granic] The United Nations helped us in the first phase after New Year 1992. The United Nations helped to stop the war, stop the Serb aggression, and get the Yugoslav Army to withdraw.

But in the next phase things went wrong. No displaced Croats have returned to their homes in the UN zone, the United Nations is not in control of our borders. Just think of the bombardment of Bihac from Serb-controlled Croatian territory, despite the United Nations the local Serbs have received supplies from Serbia, and the United Nations is not in control of weapons.

Despite the UN presence the Serbs have completed their ethnic cleansing: 12,000 Croats have been displaced and 600 killed. That is the reality. In practice the United Nations is freezing the illegal occupation. The UN zone has even been integrated economically with Serbia.

In addition, we do not want to be the hostage of developments in Bosnia and of (Serbian leader Slobodan—POLITIKEN editor's note) Milosevic who does not want to recognize Croatia.

We want to solve Croatia's problems, and that is why we have given notice of the end of the UN mandate.

[Kaufholz] The United Nations takes a slightly different view. Secretary General Butrus-Ghali takes the view that a withdrawal from Krajina would also put an end to operations in Bosnia, because the United Nations is being supplied through Croatia.

[Granic] Completely wrong. We have told the United Nations that there will be unhampered access for supplies to Bosnia through the port in Split, and that the headquarters can remain in Zagreb.

[Kaufholz] But the United Nations must withdraw from Krajina?

[Granic] Definitely. And you must take into consideration the fact that we have had the best results in the implementation of our agreements with the local Serbs since the announcement that we would not be extending the UN mandate. The freeway is open, a pipeline has been opened, and we are hoping for the stretches of railroad between Zagreb and Belgrade and between Zagreb and Split (through the main Serb town of Knin—POLITIKEN editor's note). The railroad to Belgrade is the easiest to repair. We intend to continue these negotiations.

[Kaufholz] Is war one of the possibilities you are expecting in the event of a withdrawal of the UN force?

[Granic] Our option is for a peaceful solution—a democratic Croatia that is integrated into Europe. Our option is also for international guarantees both for the rights of minorities and for human rights in the country.

[Kaufholz] Is it not playing for high stakes when the Serbs have said no so clearly?

[Granic] There is a risk of a new war, but that is not what we are putting our money on.

[Kaufholz] On the one hand the leadership in Krajina is insisting very strongly on an independent state and on the other hand the Croatian Government is inflexible in its stance that Krajina is part of Croatia. Have you a model which could satisfy both sides?

[Granic] First, the UN zone is Croatian territory. Before the 1991-92 war the Serbs amounted to around half of the population in the area, and they were in the majority in 11 local government areas. Here we are prepared to give them very far-reaching regional self-government, and we have looked in particular at the model used in South Tyrol (where there is a German-speaking minority—POLITIKEN editor's note). Other models, the Faeroes, are possible.

[Kaufholz] Are there any signs at all of a willingness to negotiate in Knin?

[Granic] We have no clear signal that they are ready to negotiate.

## UNHCR Will Not Depart With UNPROFOR

*LD0302221595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2145 GMT 3 Feb 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 3 (TANJUG)—Possible U.N. forces' pullout from Croatia would not entail departure of U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office.

UNHCR Special Envoy for the former Yugoslavia Anne Willem Bijleveld also told a press conference Friday that future developments could not be predicted but that if the conflict escalated safety of the UNHCR mission would be threatened.

Croatia's decision to deny hospitality to UNPROFOR after its current six-month mandate expired on March 31 invited concern in the world community over the possibility of a renewed conflict between Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina.

U.N. forces were deployed in Croatia and in the republic of Serb Krajina in the spring of 1992 after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslav Federation. Their mandate was to separate the warring sides until a political settlement was found.

Bijleveld also said the UNHCR set aside 28.5 million dollars for relief aid to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the first six months of 1995, but warned that the interest of donators in the Yugoslav crisis waned as new flashpoints—in Rwanda, Chechnya and other countries—emerged.

Bijleveld stated satisfaction with the way the commissariat for refugees of Serbia cared for the refugees from the areas of former Yugoslavia and noted that overall cooperation with Serbia's commissariat was very good.

Bijleveld said international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia burdened the work of the UNHCR with numerous problems as the agency was for the first time in a position to help someone under a comprehensive and binding blockade.

## Zagreb 'Calling for War' on Krajina Serbs

*LD0502141395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1355 GMT 5 Feb 95*

["Croatia is Increasingly Calling for War Against Krajina Serbs"—TANJUG headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 5 (TANJUG)—Although Zagreb is telling the world it is for a peaceful solution to the Serb Krajina issue, at home it is increasingly threatening to use force against the Krajina Serbs.

Zagreb daily VECERNJI LIST on Sunday quoted Ante Djapic, the leader of the Croatian Party of Law, the third parliamentary party in Croatia, as saying he was totally opposed to the 'peaceful reintegration' of Serb Krajina into Croatia.

Djapic however said that the 'return of the occupied territories' was 'very close' because the Croatian people were 'ready for anything.'

Under 'occupied territories' Croatia means the republic of Serb Krajina which was proclaimed by the local Serbs in 1991 after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Croatia tried four times to forcefully establish its powers in Krajina territory, although it was proclaimed a United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) in 1992.

Djapic said that the police chief in Knin, administrative centre of Serb Krajina, should be a Croat to show 'our sovereignty.' He was alluding to some articles of the draft plan for a peaceful solution to the Zagreb-Knin dispute proposed by the mini contact group, also called the Zagreb-Four (Z-4) group.

The Z-4 group (made up of the representatives of the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations) proposed a high degree of autonomy for the Krajina Serbs, but only within Croatia.

Zagreb accepted the draft plan only as a basis for negotiations, while the Krajina leaders refused to receive the document until they received guarantees about the destiny of the U.N. troops in the UNPAs.

Croatia on Jan. 12 refused to extend the current six-month mandate of the U.N. peacekeepers which expires on March 31. VECERNJI LIST quoted Djapic as saying the Croats were 'ready for talks' and 'democratic negotiation' but only after the 'chetnik gang is disarmed' and after Zagreb 'takes full control' over Krajina.

### Martic Says Political Talks Are Third Stage

*LD0402150695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1451 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 4 (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina President Milan Martic told the Sunday issue of Belgrade daily BORBA that no peace plan could be implemented without the presence of the U.N. peacekeepers.

Martic said that 'only after we receive guarantees that the U.N. peacekeepers will remain in this territory, will the plan (proposed by the group of international mediators known as 'Zagreb four' [Z-4]) be considered to see whether it is acceptable to us or not.'

Serb Krajina leaders on Monday refused to consider the 'Z-4' draft plan on political relations between Serb Krajina and Croatia.

Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian constitution. The territory of Serb Krajina was placed under U.N. protection in March 1992. Croatia in mid-January decided to deny further hospitality to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] after its current six-month mandate expires on March 31.

The U.N. Protection Force has been deployed with the mandate to separate the warring sides—Krajina Serbs and Croats—and to preserve peace until reaching a settlement of the Krajina-Croatia dispute acceptable to all.

The daily quoted Martic as saying it was absurd to discuss political settlements before economic agreements had been realized. Martic said political talks were only the third stage.

Serb Krajina and Croatia, with the mediation of the international community, agreed almost a year-and-a half ago to resolve the dispute in three stages—delineation of troops, economic issues and political relations.

Martic said Serb Krajina was ready to resume peace talks with Croatia on economic issues and that Krajina had to that end signed an agreement with Croatia on Dec. 2, 1994.

### Babic Wants Talks To Be on 'Equal Footing'

*LD0302220295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2053 GMT 3 Feb 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Knin, Serb Krajina, Feb. 3 (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina Foreign Minister Milan Babic said Friday that Knin had no wish to obstruct political talks with Croatia, but to have them on an equal footing, as two sovereign nations and states.

Babic was speaking with head of the European Union monitoring mission to the former Yugoslavia, Ambassador Albert Turo, said a statement issued by the Serb Krajina foreign ministry.

The statement quoted Babic as saying it was impossible to consider the latest international plan for settling the Knin-Zagreb dispute until Serb Krajina had received firm guarantees that it would remain under U.N. protection for the duration of the talks.

The plan has been devised by a four-member 'Contact Group', set up in Zagreb by the Russian and U.S. ambassadors to Croatia and the deputy co-chairmen of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia and known as Z-4.

Serb Krajina President Milan Martic also told Radio Montenegro on Friday that the republic of Serb Krajina was not turning down the plan, but was refusing to consider it until getting the guarantees.

Croatia is refusing to renew the mandate of the U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] when it expires on March 31. UNPROFOR was deployed in Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina in the spring of 1992, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia.

Under a plan drawn up by U.N., envoy Cyrus Vance, UNPROFOR should be a buffer between the belligerents pending a political resolution to their dispute. However, the republic of Serb Krajina, set up by Serbs in Croatia at the time of Croatia's war of secession, has since UNPROFOR's deployment been the target of four new Croatian offensives.

Asked where he expected help to come from in case of a Croatian Army aggression, Martic said the republic of Serb Krajina wanted peace and a peaceful settlement of all disputes, including that with Croatia, but was prepared for war, should one be forced upon it. He said, however, that in case of need, he expected help to come primarily from 'our brothers in the Srpska republic,' with whom the republic of Serb Krajina signed a military assistance treaty in 1992.

Martic said he expected help also from the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro which had undertaken under the Vance plan to protect the republic of Serb Krajina and its people in case of the peacekeepers' pull-out.

Martic said he had had a number of contacts with Yugoslav officials who had assured him that Yugoslavia would fully honor the undertaking.

### Granic, Slovenia's Thaler Hold 'Useful' Talks

*AU0302163495 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[Report by Ilinka Todorovski from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first meeting of the new Slovene Foreign Minister Thaler with the chief of Croatian diplomacy Granic was interesting, useful, and even cordial, we were told after official talks lasting an hour and a half.

During the Zagreb meeting the ministers drafted a very ambitious timetable of February preparations for the meeting of Prime Ministers Valentic and Drnovsek in March. Diplomatic border commissions will meet on 16 or 17 February, while the package of property and economic issues will be discussed by finance and economic ministers respectively between 13 and 15 February. By the end of the month, the governments in Zagreb and Ljubljana will prepare guidelines for the negotiations on numerous other issues, for example, social care, health, and employment. During this time, the ministers responsible for this segment of the Slovene-Croatian relations will most probably meet, too.

According to the new Slovene Minister Thaler, the solution of controversial issues is also important so that Slovenia and Croatia could prove that they are capable of negotiating and finding a solution and, above all, to satisfy the interests of people on both sides of the border. Today's initiatives for the signing of a border cooperation agreement and opening of the Slovene general consulate in Split and the Croatian general consulate in Maribor were in the spirit of these wishes.

Ministers also discussed problems in the division of the former SFRY assets and repayment of debts, contacts with our neighbors, especially Italy, and integration with Europe.

Croatian Foreign Minister Granic briefed thoroughly his colleague about the peace process in Croatia and possible consequences of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] impending departure. Minister Thaler conveyed the Slovene Government's understanding for Croatia's justified demands for a speedier resolution of the problem of the occupied territories and urged a greater role of the international community in the resolution of the crisis.

### EU Envoys Protest Mostar Situation

*LD0302220895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2117 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 3 (TANJUG)—The European Union [EU] and the Western European Union protested with Croatia on Friday against the situation in Mostar and in the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The protest notes were delivered by French Ambassador to Croatia Jean-Jacques Gaillard and Portuguese Ambassador to Austria Octavia Neta Valeria.

A statement released in Zagreb said Tudjman had given assurances that Croatia would do everything for the implementation of the Washington agreement.

The agreement, signed by Bosnian Muslims and Croats in March 1994 under strong U.S. pressure, envisages for setting up a Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia, its subsequent confederation with Croatia, and the placing of Mostar under EU administration for two years.

The Croatian president was quoted as saying Croatia could not be responsible for individual incidents in the field, and that the survival of the Federation and confederation was the responsibility of all sides.

Muslim-Croat battles have continued in Mostar after the EU took over in July 1994 the administration of this biggest Herzegovina city, devastated in a year of Muslim-Croat fighting.

### Court Annuls Part of Istrian Constitution

*LD0402124795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1038 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 4 (TANJUG)—The Croatian Constitutional Court on Friday annuled part of the Istria county constitution, saying that the latter had interfered with Croatian central power.

The Croatian Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional 18 articles of the Istrian Constitution among which was a provision on the equal use of the Croatian and Italian languages, including the county's bilingual seal.

Istria is a northern Adriatic peninsula which belonged to Italy before World War II and which was subsequently divided between Croatia and Slovenia, with the former getting a bigger part. The Istrian Democratic Alliance Party, which advocates full autonomy for the region, has won Istria's latest election. Istria in 1994 became a full-fledged member of the Assembly of European Regions owing to its regionalistic policy, rendering local authorities very suspicious in the eyes of the Croatian authorities.

Croatia's Constitutional Court also abolished a provision authorizing Istria to collect county taxes independently and a provision recognizing and protecting the Istrian cause as well as civil rights and freedoms.

Istria's first reaction was discontent at Croatia's abolishing most of its Constitution's essential articles protecting the ethnic Italian community. Istrian Assembly Constitutional Committee Chairman Dino Debeljuh said that the Constitutional Court had placed Croatia in an unpleasant position because Croatia had showed a lack of readiness to honor international agreements it had signed, including a memorandum with Italy.

### Bank Plans To Make VJESNIK Profitable

*95BA0112C Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jan 95 p 3*

[Article by Vesna Antonic: "How To Get Rid of Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—The Board of Directors of Privredna Banka Zagreb d.d. [Business Bank, Zagreb, joint-stock company] on Thursday accepted a report on the business operation and new personnel changes at Novi Vjesnik d.d. with the proviso that a program for this year and a program for Vjesnik's financial rescue be prepared for one of the upcoming meetings of the PBZ [Privredna Banka Zagreb] Board of Directors.

Speaking about the reasons for the replacement of Kresimir Fijacko and Davor Perkovic, who had been the editor in chief and managing editor of the newspaper VJESNIK and the managing director of the firm Novi Vjesnik, Ivan Gerovac, director of the investment banking sector, recalled that the enterprise has been operating with great financial difficulties, and in 1993 it incurred a loss of 3.8 million German marks [DM]. That loss was not covered, and obligations to suppliers that had come due went unmet. Losses could not be eliminated in the course of last year even though the paper's circulation increased slightly, and the assessment is that Novi Vjesnik will operate at a loss this year as well. Gerovac said that Davor Perkovic and Kresimir Fijacko were called upon to submit a program of operations and statement of financial condition, that they were put some 20 questions in this connection, beginning with the question about increasing the paper's circulation and ending with the question about relations with the largest creditors, but they did not get answers. He added that the Board of Directors of Novi Vjesnik had accepted Ante Ivkovic's conception of editorial policy and had entrusted running the firm to Ivo Maglica, because experience had shown that Vjesnik's condition made it advisable to make changes in management as well.

Turning to the debts of Novi Vjesnik, Martin Katicic, general director of the PBZ, said that the bank's approach was to enter into agreement with the creditors to write off the interest that had been calculated and for only the principal to be paid.

"Our objective is to see it as the leading political daily in the country, whose main departments would be domestic and foreign policy, the economy, and culture," said Ante Ivkovic, editor in chief of VJESNIK, adding that the workers had been paid for November and that the working atmosphere in the editorial office was very good. "The editorial conception must be in keeping with the interests of the Croatian state. We are raising the level of communication; there must be no articles in VJESNIK that will insult the dignity of any person or stir up religious, national, ethnic, or racial enmity. A design of VJESNIK will be submitted to the Board of Directors by mid-January that will prove that in a year to a year and a half VJESNIK will become a profitable paper," Ivkovic said. He mentioned that this very Saturday VJESNIK will be publishing a 20-page cultural supplement DANICA [MORNING STAR], and a separate economic weekly is also being prepared. He emphasized that a 20-percent increase in the paper's circulation is expected.

Franjo Greguric supported the personnel changes made so far, remarking that in a time when state power is the basis of development, more space must be found in the editorial policy for economic topics. Vjesnik must become a profitable and efficient enterprise, the level of the newspaper must be raised, and it is certain that there must be no low blows, he said.

## Candidates for 5 Feb By-Election in Bitola

*95P20457A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 24 Jan 95 p 7*

[FBIS Editorial Report] On 24 January, the Skopje daily VECER published on page 7 an article listing candidates for the Macedonian (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) parliamentary by-election scheduled for 5 February in the seventh district in Bitola. The list includes: Branirod Mihajlovski of the Alliance for Macedonia, the governing coalition; independent candidates Vladimir Golubovski, Lazar Nikolovski, Nikola Stojkov, Josif Dimitrovski, and Pavle Georgievski; Pando Petkovski of the VMRO-MNDS (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Macedonian National Democratic Alliance); and Ljupco Sekulovski of the Democratic Party of Macedonia. A ninth candidate, Vangel Ristevski of the League of Communists of Macedonia, was disqualified because his party did not meet the deadline for registration as a party according to the new law on political parties. The paper notes that the list is only half as long as it was for the general election in that district in October 1994 at which 13,033 registered voters (plus 3,648 who were allowed to vote on the basis of identity papers) went to the poll in the first round. The chairman of the state electoral commission, Petar Najdenov, notes that none of the parties nor any of the independents has sent a representative to the commission, but that the commission will proceed with its plans for the election.

## Editorial Questions 'Low Profile' of Crvenkovski

*AU0302144395 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 2 Feb 95 p 2*

[Editorial by Zoran Andonovski: "A Prime Minister 'in the Shadows'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Toward the end of December, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] elected a new government, a new-old prime minister who has since been acting as a prime minister of a government in the shade. We very rarely have the opportunity to hear and see him, so that some might give the impression that he is clandestine. As a result of this, recently, some rumors were spread suggesting that there is a disagreement within his party or within the government itself. His appearance at the university two days ago and his appearance at the opening of a car shop were the only occasions on which Branko Crvenkovski decided to appear in public and the media after his repeat election. We only hear his name when he is chairing the sessions of his cabinet. This "low profile" of his has not only been noticed by the pedantic analysts of political life in Macedonia, but also by those who support his cabinet and put their confidence in him at the last elections.

Normally, the first personality in a government is expected to say something about the problems, the events, and the incidents that occur in his country. Normally, Branko Crvenkovski would be expected to have his own opinions and comments on: the incident in the "Hard Rock" Discotheque, the tragedy in the "Silex" Discotheque, the attempts at organizing a university in Tetovo. He can and must reveal his views on the police intervention, on the deportations, on the alleged "deal" between "Kosovo people" and the police. Does Branko Crvenkovski have any comment on some journalists' writings accusing his cabinet of being incompetent? Can he say anything about the workers facing redundancy, about the workers that are protesting in front of the government building? Is it that can not, dare not, or does not wish to say something about the alleged schism in his cabinet and the party he leads? Crvenkovski, the leader of the largest party in the government coalition, could not find the opportunity or the time (perhaps he did not want to) to comment on the attitude of one of the most important coalition partners—the Liberals, who abstained in the vote of confidence in the new government at the very beginning! Is it normal to neglect all this, as if nothing had happened?

Particularly since the government appointed a spokesman, the prime minister has not made a single public statement, proposal, or commentary. The blame is not exclusively his—it seems that the journalists themselves have come to terms with this inertia. It seems improper to molest the head of the Government with microphones and notebooks, asking him to reveal his views and comments—but that should not prevent the prime minister from appearing in public and the media personally, at least from time to time.

Perhaps all this is a consequence of his intensive public presence during the election period. Then, he was accused of creating opportunities for public exposure, and now that he has withdrawn, this may seem right.

The prime minister is in the shadows, and citizens and foreigners (diplomats and journalists) have started wondering where he is, what he is doing, and what is actually going on with him.

Is there a reason for such an attitude? Did he choose this himself? Perhaps the man does not want to be overexposed and thus he is ceding his place to others? Or, as some have probably figured out, by avoiding being present in public at this time of flux, he is protecting himself by pushing forward others, who will probably be blamed for the dissatisfaction of the public. If this is the case, then his political wisdom and ability should sometimes be embellished with his appearance in public, no matter whether he has decided to "save himself" or whether it was a decision made by his party or the government. Whether Branko Crvenkovski likes public exposure or not, it is his personal problem. Being prime minister implies that the public will occassionally hear his direct views on crucial problems, and not have to sense them through the answers and comments of the government spokesman. The young and, we believe, strong prime minister would profit from expressing his own opinion loudly, and he certainly has an opinion....

Let us recall: Branko Crvenkovski used the time before the deadline for the formation of a government to the maximum, during which period he never made a statement. He called a news conference before midnight and he has been quiet ever since. The rarity of public appearances by Prime Minister Crvenkovski has encouraged speculation about problems in the largest of the three government parties—the SDS [Social Democratic Alliance], a party that is headed by Crvenkovski himself. The internal opposition that normally exists in every party was intensified in the SDS after the lineup of the new Crvenkovski cabinet were announced, because many were obviously disappointed, but also because a number of party members were not satisfied with the choice of persons gaining cabinet seats.

## Students' Attitude Toward Albanian University

*95P20401A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 16 Dec 94 p 13*

[Unattributed article: "Students, Academic 'Komites' (Revolutionary units); When Students Take Up Slogans Like 'A Fokker-100 for Shiptars' and 'Shiptars in Chambers,' the Saying 'A People With Such a Youth Need Not Fear for the Future' Is No Longer Valid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Fortified in their opposition to the initiative to open an Albanian-language university, the Macedonian people are, once again, homogeneous. Representatives from the wide spectrum of political parties, ranging from the western Macedonian committees of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], the Democratic Party of Macedonia, headquartered in Tetovo, and extending to the numerous VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization] formations, and further to intellectuals of various profiles, [World War II] veterans, journalists, and ordinary citizens who write letters to the editor every day—all of these people earnestly condemn the subversive attempt to undermine the educational system and the legal order being carried out by extremists and "Ilirida-inspired" Albanian circles.

Less publicized in this entire clamorous defense of the Macedonian state and national interests is the fact that the cause of defenders of the constitutional system has been halted by a group of students from Skopje University. Several hundred young scholars went to the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] on Tuesday [13 December] to express their disagreement and revulsion about the attempt to found an Albanian university, to support the position that the Albanian language not have official status in any institution, and to advocate the use of any means to prevent a minority from doing whatever it chooses in the country.

There is an apparent mystery concerning the identity of the organizer of this protest. According to one version, the phantom call to protest in front of the legislature was written by Albanians with the intention of provoking a clash between students from the two ethnic groups. Allegedly, after the Macedonians had gathered, there was to be a march by Albanian students to the same place, thus the possibility of "full contact" between the two groups would have been hard to avoid. However, since there was not a whisper of an interethnic confrontation, this version loses credibility. The second supposition is that the Union of Students, headed by Mitko Krzovski—who is always agile on the question of ethnic problems—stands behind this organized meeting. This implication, which he denies, is plausible to us.

Just before this protest meeting began, we discussed the identity of the phantom-organizer with some students. Biljana Orovcanin, a philology student, told us that, on the previous day, professors from all the departments informed the students that classes would begin at noon on Tuesday in view of the fact that the meeting would take place in the morning. Moreover, at this same protest meeting, some professors were obviously present. The professors did not look like neutral observers, still less did they attempt to dissuade their students from the noisy attacks and insulting sloganeering. On the contrary.

The dilemma about the meeting's organizer is, in the final analysis, not vital. Anyhow, it is clear that members of the student organization supported the demands of the students, and if it should turn out that the Albanian university actually opens, they would organize a much more powerful and massive protest meeting than the last one. Just what such a meeting would be like, Mr. Krzovski knows best, but after what could be seen and heard on Tuesday, we do not know whether things will please him. Even if a person goes to the trouble to overlook the "Zolta" and "Stolichnaya" [alcoholic beverages] bottles being passed from hand to hand, he will scarcely be able to condone the slogans that were being chanted; such as, for example, "A Fokker-100 for Shiptars," "Avionmpeks for Shiptars," [references to aircraft accidents; Shiptars is derogatory term for Albanians] "Shiptars in chambers," [possibly cells or gas chambers] "Go to Shiptar-land," and so forth. We are familiar with such words from meetings of our own "turbo-nationalists." If not quite in such an adamant and crude form, such concepts could be heard at any time from miscellaneous groups of pensioners, housewives, machinists, farmers, etc. However, when such attitudes begin to be put forward by our scholars, the hope of Macedonia's intellectuals, the most sophisticated element in the nation, then something is wrong not only with the intelligentsia, but with the people who share their world. The suggestion of destroying people who hold contrary views to those of the majority is very hard to understand, particularly when it comes from students, a part of the population universally considered to be the most liberal and freedom-loving.

## MVR Official on Role of Police

*95BA0085A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 2 Dec 94 pp 24-25*

[Interview with Dime Djurev, under secretary for public safety in the Interior Ministry, by F. Sakiri: "The Public Has Confidence in Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Dime Djurev, under secretary for public safety in the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVR], in showing the "ID card" of a Macedonian policeman, thinks that in spite of insufficient material equipment, the Macedonian police are successfully performing their mission and growing more and more into a service for the citizens.*

[Sakiri] Since some calculations have even appeared among the public with respect to the MVR, will you be able to show us the "ID card" of the Macedonian police: the number of employees, the number of policemen "per capita," the average pay of policemen, and their equipment (types of personal weapons, types of communications equipment, types of vehicles, types of additional equipment...).

[Djurev] The media have brought up these questions on many occasions, and in the past the public has been presented with the corresponding information, which some police forces consider secret. Nevertheless, we feel that that information should be make available to the public. The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] is among the European countries that have a relatively rather small number of policemen for the number of inhabitants, and it amounts to somewhere around one policeman per 400 inhabitants. The latest information indicates that the number of policemen is growing in almost all European countries. The ethnic structure of members of the MVR, i.e., the police, with the emphasis on the uniformed portion, mostly consists of Macedonians, which is quite natural, while about 12 percent are members of the ethnic minorities living in Macedonia. In terms of educational structure, 12.8 percent have a high education, and 18.5 percent have a higher education, while 63.5 percent have a secondary education, and only 0.4 percent of the employees have only an elementary education. With respect to the wages of police employees, an element that many people are publicly speculating about, they are around the average wage earned in the Republic of Macedonia, which in my opinion is far from satisfactory for the employees, in view of the complexity of the profession, even taking into account the prorated length of service as one benefit for them. Of the total number of employees, about 15 percent are women, and that percentage has been increasing every year, which means that the police as a profession are also becoming more and more interesting to the gentler sex.

The police force's material equipment, which is a vital precondition for its successful operation, [words missing in original] 7.62 mm, and efforts are being made for their phased replacement by 9mm-caliber CZ 99 pistols. In addition to the uniform and personal weapons, policemen have available a minimal number of other protective devices, and those are usually used by the special unit, namely bulletproof vests, bulletproof shields, helmets, etc. The Ministry has available about 1,000 passenger cars, mostly from Zastava's production line, and averaging over 10 years old. Recently efforts have been made to replace and renovate the motor pool, specifically with Volkswagens. As for heavy vehicles, the MVR has several TAB [expansion not given] vehicles inherited from the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], several old UAZ [expansion not given] and Lada Niva vehicles, and several dozen Land Rover vehicles that have been made available to the special police units. And with respect to communications equipment, the Ministry has extremely obsolete types of radio stations, and even has police departments that do not even have radio stations. In this case as well there is a need to replace the existing communications equipment, and the modernization, which will be done in stages, will involve a more modern radio communications system, Tracking.

[Sakiri] How do you view the police's position in Macedonian society, and do you have any of your own research and views on the population's attitude toward your profession?

[Djurev] In the state organizational system, the police have been set up as an autonomous, independent, and professional body that performs its function on the basis of professionalism and competence and liberation from all sorts of partisan and other influences. Since the Republic of Macedonia, according to the constitution, is defined as a parliamentary, but law-governed and civil state, in which the governing principle is legality and legitimacy in applying the law, performing the function of security actually means fulfilling and protecting human freedoms and rights.

In a parliamentary and democratic state (the kind that we want to build), the basic task of the police is to uncover and prosecute crime and other antisocial phenomena and their perpetrators, through the constant advancement of criminological methods and techniques and employing the latest scientific information. Particular attention is devoted to the nature of the measures undertaken in accordance with the law, while respecting human personality and dignity. Whether the police, in fulfilling their obligations, will act more as an instrument of the state and less as an instrument of the citizens and the democratic development of society, depends on the dynamic and often dramatic social changes, in which latent conflicts can escalate with unforeseeable consequences. The new law on internal affairs and the package of derivative regulations that will be passed after it is adopted in parliament define the police as a state body with the standard instruments for taking action that are present in all countries with a democratic tradition, a body that fulfills its duties in accordance with a generally accepted international code of ethics. Thus, the emphasis is on building a type of police that will increasingly grow into a "service of the citizens," helping to protect rights and interests, especially life, freedom, material goods, and overall security. In regard to the relationship between the police and citizens in West European countries, as well as in most other countries, it is emphasized that regardless of their involvement the police will not achieve greater effectiveness in operation and will not have satisfactory results without cooperation with citizens and the public in preventing crime. Consequently, relations with citizens are of particular significance for the police, but also for building citizens' confidence in the police; for this reason, the police need to provide timely information about the more significant security phenomena and events.

The Ministry has not carried out any study of the relationship between citizens and the police, and I think that it should be done by scientific institutions or independent specialized agencies for public opinion polls, as a result of which, with a professional and objective poll, we will obtain relevant data on citizens' opinion and needs from the MVR and its professional services. It is well known that the first such poll was conducted as part of the "Public Opinion in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia in 1986" project, when citizens' opinion of the militia was researched. A public opinion poll was also carried out by Bri Ma in 1992 in Macedonia on what citizens thought of the system's institutions. Both polls showed that the Macedonian public had confidence in the police, and that the police were among the state institutions toward which a positive attitude among citizens was dominant, and not distrust. It would be good to investigate citizens' opinion of the police continuously, and the Ministry, on the basis of the results obtained and on the basis of other relevant information, will modify its strategy for action as an institution within the system.

[Sakiri] How do you assess the recently more frequent media coverage of the police, mainly because of the cases in which the use of force and weapons by the forces of law and order was questioned?

[Djurev] The public's interest in the work of the police, including the cases in which means of coercion were used, is completely expected and justified, and is a result of the democratic processes that have been initiated in our country, the Ministry's openness to the public, and the absence of "taboo topics" in the Ministry's present activity. This interest can be assessed as the practice of democracy, which is positive, since we are aware that in addition to the legal framework for performing our function, the positions and opinion of citizens and the overall public are a necessary corrective. In enforcing the law, the police resort to the use of minimal force when the legal conditions are met. In connection with the recent unpleasant events, the Ministry took all available steps to document and clarify them, and delivered the entire documentation, as part of the legally specified procedure, to the appropriate judicial bodies for evaluation, whose decision is the only and most relevant one in dealing with these events.

[Sakiri] What is your assessment of the success in carrying out the professional tasks of the police (your sector), especially in view of the unsolved cases of violent crimes in the last few years?

[Djurev] In some police work, i.e., in uncovering and solving the crimes which within their own areas of crime are showing an increase, which is essentially a reflection of the situation in the economy, the decline in the standard of living, unemployment, etc., in spite of the unfavorable conditions in which they have operated, the police have achieved significant results in uncovering criminal acts and undertaking measures against their perpetrators. In the last few years, there has been a considerable increase in the detection of crimes under the heading of economic crime, as well as crimes in the area of illegal commerce, especially narcotics and arms trafficking.

After an enormous increase, in 1993 traditional crime began to show a decrease, which, above all, is due to the enormous detective function of the Public Security Service, i.e., detection which on the average amounts to about two-thirds of the total number of crimes reported under the heading of traditional crime, which constitutes an enviable result in comparison with other police forces in Western countries. Although an average of 80-90 percent of crimes accompanied by violence are solved, the situation is not favorable, since these crimes usually upset the public and cause insecurity among citizens. Thus, in the last five years, in the area of crimes against life and body, in addition to other crimes 210 murders, 177 attempted murders, 41 infanticides, and 24 serious bodily injuries resulting in death have been recorded. Of the total number of murders, 92 percent have been solved, but during this period 17 murders committed by unknown perpetrators were unsolved; the Public Security Service is still devoting a great deal of attention to them and undertaking comprehensive measures and activities to solve these murders.

## Legal Dilemma Over Changing Street Names

*95P20382A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 16 Dec 94 p 2*

[Article by M.R.: "Legal Dilemma About Street Names"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two months have passed since the Constitutional Court issued a resolution invalidating the decision by Skopje's city assembly to rename the streets in Skopje, but in the City Committee for City Planning, Construction, and Traffic they have already "taken under consideration" how to deal with the court's resolution. Should they change the new signs which were set in place on several rechristened streets or not? However, in this case, there should not be any kind of legal dilemma for all citizens and legal entities, considering that the Constitutional Court's resolution is definite and final when it is published in SLUZBEN VESNIK, so the city planners have various ways to manage the situation.

Consequently, it came to pass that the "number one" at the city committee, Violeta Atanasovska, publicly expressed the view that, "as yet, we have not been informed of the resolution of the Constitutional Court," only to profess a few days later that, "the committee will initiate measures to respect the resolution of the court as soon as the experts have carried out a complete study of the situation in conjunction with the renaming of streets."

Regardless of the primary motives for the reserved reception of the city committee and the Skopje city assembly to the Constitutional Court's resolution, with the restoration of the "the old," all indications are that only one single street or boulevard will be affected. To wit, according to unofficial information, of the 200 streets rechristened on paper, the only real change was made with the name of "Boulevard JNA" [Yugoslav People's Army]. Signs with the new name, "Sv. Kliment Ohridski," were erected and new direction signs for traffic were put in place at the entrance points in the adjacent street, "Singelic" which was renamed "Metodi Andonov Cento."

Meanwhile, there is a serious "danger" that the main traffic arteries of Skopje will remain nameless. Considering what we already know, to the extent that the new signs with "Sv. Kliment Ohridski" are taken down, "Boulevard JNA" will remain without any designation because no one has any idea where the old signs have gone. But, this is logical enough, considering that the JNA, around here, no longer exists either.

## LDS 'Striving To Gain Control' of DELO

*AU0602121295 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 2 Feb 95 p 3*

[Report by Igor Krsinar: "Vinko Vasle Is the First To Go"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana—After the club of NOVA REVIJA hosted the DELO chief and responsible editor, Tit Dobersek, and his deputy, Danilo Slivnik, at its traditional evening last Thursday [23 January], the first from a group of DELO's journalists dubbed "the Slivnik company" tended his resignation. Commentator Vinko Vasle, who is for many "the first pen" of Slovene journalism, is leaving DELO at the end of April.

He confirmed the news to us, however, he did not specify why he had decided to leave. Some of DELO's correspondents link his decision to the latest events in this house, when the ruling Slovene politicians started meddling in the paper's editorial policy through a section of the editorial board. The readers were able to detect changes in the editorial policy with the publication of an editorial "Stylistic Exercises" in which Lada Zei characterized the interpellation in the work of Defense Minister Jelko Kacin as an attack on the Slovene Army and, thus, rendered the paper's policy antioppositional.

The new wind blowing in DELO coincides with the property transformation process, which the Agency for Privatization approved after an unusually long time at the end of last year. The process is unfolding under "the watchful eye" of Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek and his party, the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS]. Finally, we should mention a meeting between the representatives of DELO (Tit Dobersek, Danilo Slivnik, and Vinko Vasle) and Dr. Janez Drnovsek and Information Bureau Chief Mile Setinc in spring 1993, when the new prime minister asked the DELO correspondents about the privatization plans and let them know what was in store for them if they would not be "good." Namely, from the very beginning of its rule, the LDS has been striving to gain control of DELO through a group of correspondents gathered around Janko Lorenci, the editor of DELO's Saturday Supplement: So far, this group has attempted three times (unsuccessfully) to depose the paper's management. Let us only recall the article "Learning From the Nazis" in (Lorenci's) Saturday Supplement, in which Janez Stanic "lambasted" the writing about affairs and called the reporting about economic crime "Hitlerjournalism." This subsequently caused a heated polemic among Slovene journalists and led to the disintegration of the Association of Slovene Journalists, which is chaired by Marjan Sedmak, the responsible editor of REPUBLIKA.

After the New Year, "Lorenci's circle" reacted sharply to the 31 December column by Danilo Slivnik entitled "Mistakes in the Year of the Pig," in which he also devoted a few words to Mojca Drcar Murko, the unofficial candidate for foreign minister, until recently DELO's Rome correspondent, and the prime minister's adviser on Slovene-Italian relations. A group of four editors and the president of the DELO journalists' working group demanded that the responsible editor publish an apology to the readers for "the tendentious" writing of Danilo Slivnik, "whose professional correctness and lack of information about the affairs about which he writes should be challenged," as he allegedly "in this case deliberately assumed the role of a propagandist of one of the political options." Tit Dobersek declined to publish such an apology, arguing that it was not acceptable to write a petition against an author-attributed commentary and that, besides, Mojca Drcar Murko was a political persona (Drnovsek's adviser) about whom journalists would write anyway. The signatories withdrew their petition, but Slava Partlic demanded the publication of her article about Slivnik and, upon its rejection, published it in MLADINA. The responsible editor informed the disciplinary committee of her actions.

Vinko Vasle is, thus, the first of "the Slivnik company" who blew his top because of all the political scheming by the correspondents "who are having a love affair with the LDS." His departure means the beginning of the end of a pluralistic concept in this paper and DELO's return to under the auspices of the former party. This has, according to our information, already put together a team "for the political rehabilitation" of this paper. Readers should not be surprised to see the failed candidate for foreign minister, Mojca Drcar Murko, and DELO Marketing Director Jure Apih, who have recently been visiting the president of the state [Milan Kucan] very frequently, on this team.

## Split Within Christian Democratic Party Reported

*95BA0091B Maribor VECER in Serbo-Croatian 28 Dec 94 p 3*

[Article by (ii): "Undemocratic Christian Democrats?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The social wing of the SKD [Christian Democratic Party] is merging with the Christian Socialists; Franc Miklavcic explained the causes of the split between the SKD and its social wing; merged with the Christian Socialists, they should become the new party of the future.*

"At the SKD's October congress, all of the roots that would have allowed us further work and development were cut off," Franc Miklavcic said at yesterday's news conference in Ljubljana, which was also attended by the leadership of the Christian Socialists. Miklavcic, until now, headed the SKD's social wing, which decided at a special meeting on 17 December that it would finally leave the SKD and disband.

According to Miklavcic, who was one of the major founders of the SKD and its vice president, and is now merging along with his sympathizers with the Christian Socialists into a new party, they constantly felt the "friction" between the party and its social wing. The members of the social wing thus unsuccessfully demanded that harsher measures be taken in connection with resolving the church dispute at Razkrizje (it is demanding religious services in Slovene and the attachment of the parish to the Maribor diocese), and firmly opposed the same family supplements for the poor and for wealthier people. In contrast to the party, the social wing opposed the proposal to "freeze" pensions (of the 15 SKD deputies, 14 voted for the freeze), the purpose of Italian citizenship on the coast, and the statement by the Foreign Ministry—headed by Lojze Peterle—that it was a "human right." In contrast to the SKD, the social wing firmly opposed having the public prosecutor's office be an "instrument" for any government, and also did not agree with the party's views regarding local self-government. "We could still have endured all those disagreements somehow," Miklavcic said, "but the SKD's October congress was the last straw, in a manner of speaking." Continued autonomous work by the social wing was allegedly completely prevented; the party president reportedly chose only his closest collaborators ("The social wing would have been just a pawn"). According to Miklavcic, ever since the congress there has no longer been any "internal democracy" in the party. Although some of the media announced that the social wing's departure from the SKD was due to different views of events during World War II, the main reason is said to be that "The SKD has become completely totalitarian." That is what Miklavcic asserted yesterday.

As they stated at yesterday's news conference, the members of the former social wing of the SKD found the most points in common with the Christian Socialists, whose statute is almost identical with the views of the social wing. According to Dr. Matija Kovacic, president of the Christian Socialists, his party will continue to cooperate with Persak's Democrats (they participated jointly in the local elections), and, merged with the social wing into the new party of the future, they will be registered by April.

## Plans of Defense Ministry for 1995

*95BA0091A Maribor VECER in Slovene 29 Dec 94 p 3*

[Unattributed article: "Turning the TO Into the Slovene Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Minister Kacin on this year's work and the plans for 1995; next year will be devoted to implementing the provisions of the Law on Defense and more activity in the international arena.*

With the adoption of the Law on Defense, Slovenia acquired a basic normative structure in the defense area, and consequently next year will be devoted to implementing the provisions of that law, turning the present Territorial Defense [TO] of Slovenia into the Slovene Army, and even greater activity in the international arena, Defense Minister Jelko Kacin emphasized at yesterday's news conference.

At the end of the year, Minister Kacin and his associates assessed this year's work by the Defense Ministry, and presented plans for next year. He emphasized the significance of the adoption of the Law on Defense as the fundamental systemic document, and said that the law adopted in the spring on the basic development programs in the defense area for the 1994-2000 period was already being implemented ahead of schedule. The minister furthermore highlighted the fact that the embargo on arms sales still applied to Slovenia; in spite of the goodwill and support of numerous countries, that means that we cannot buy weapons abroad even for training purposes. Consequently, all activities will be directed toward the lifting of the embargo. That lifting will open up numerous new opportunities for Slovenia, and will also mean official acknowledgment that it is no longer one of the risky Balkan countries.

Slovenia is beginning to construct a defense system that will be comparable with the defense systems of other countries, both in organization and in the equipment and command methods used. The basis for that lies in the Law on Defense, and the Slovene TO is also beginning to be turned into the Slovene Army. The chief of the General Staff, Albin Gutman, said that next year they are to strengthen primarily the air defense and coastal defense systems, and start to assemble international units, as provided in the Partnership for Peace agreement. He announced two large military exercises for next year, namely the Rog '95 exercise, which will be in April, and the Skok '95 exercise, which will essentially be a continuation of this year's exercise. There will also be a big military parade in Slovenia in May in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, and military representatives of the victorious countries will participate in it.

Next year the Defense Ministry is promising lively international activity. As early as the first quarter, Slovenia and the United States are to sign a memorandum on bilateral cooperation in the area of defense, and that will be followed by a visit by a U.S. warship to the Koper port and Slovenia's participation in a joint military exercise of Albanian and U.S. military forces that will take place in Albania. That cooperation, like numerous other cases in which representatives of the Slovene Army will participate in joint military exercises with other countries, is part of the Partnership for Peace program. The signing of that agreement is also one of the most important events of this year. Minister Kacin emphasized the U.S.'s great support for Slovenia's efforts to end the embargo.

State Secretary Boriz Znidaric also said that Slovenia had submitted six candidates for training at the famous U.S. military academy, West Point, and six candidates for training at the U.S. Army's air academy.

Bojan Usenicnik, director of the Republic Administration for Protection and Rescue, described the new organization of the former protection and rescue system, since this year an overall law was also adopted on protection and rescue in the case of natural and other disasters.

## Federal

### Kontic Supports Contact Group, Vance Plans

*LD0302183795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1756 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 3 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic on Friday urged that the crisis in Bosnia be resolved on the basis of the international 'Contact Group' plan and the dispute between the Republic of Serb Krajina and Croatia on the basis of the Vance plan.

A Federal Government statement said Kontic had reiterated Yugoslavia's stand in a meeting with charge d'affaires of the British embassy in Belgrade Ivor Roberts.

The Contact Group has proposed that Bosnia-Herzegovina be a union of the Muslim-Croat Federation, which would have 51 percent of territory, and the Bosnian Serb republic, which would account for the remaining 49 percent.

The Vance Plan calls for the republic of Serb Krajina and Croatia to reach a political solution to their dispute and for the U.N. Protection Force troops to separate the two warring sides until such a solution is found.

U.N. troops were deployed in the spring of 1992 in Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina, proclaimed by the local Serbs in 1991 after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslav Federation.

The official statement said Kontic and Roberts had expressed hope that 1995 would be a year of a political solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. It said Kontic and Roberts had assessed that the exemption of the Bosnian Muslims from the U.N. embargo on arms deliveries to the former Yugoslavia and Croatia's decision to deny hospitality to U.N. troops after their current six-month mandate expired on March 31 would trigger new mistrust and conflicts on a larger scale.

The statement said Kontic 'assessed as positive the great efforts invested by Great Britain for the resolution of the crisis in (the former) Yugoslavia and thanked for the engagement of British troops as part of the U.N. peacekeeping forces.'

Kontic underscored the importance of the exemplary and unbiased engagement of the former U.N. commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, British General Michael Rose, and expressed hope that Rose's successor, British General Rupert Smith, would continue consistently to discharge the important office.

The official statement said Kontic set out that Yugoslavia rightly expected of the U.N. Security Council promptly to lift the sanctions against Yugoslavia because there was absolutely no reason for their continued implementation.

The U.N. Security Council in late May 1992 introduced comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Yugoslavia because of alleged Yugoslav involvement in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sanctions relating to air and ferry links and culture and sports were suspended on Oct. 5 last year, after Yugoslavia upheld the Contact Group plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The government statement said Prime Minister Kontic had said the 'slow and inadequate easing of the sanctions is an inadequate response of the international community to the peace activities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' and that such a response 'encourages militant forces both at home and abroad.'

Kontic said 'the behaviour of the U.N. Sanctions Committee is impermissible.' He said the committee had not yet approved Yugoslavia's imports of Russian natural gas for the heating of schools, hospitals and child care institutions.

### Kontic, British Envoy Discuss Contact Group

*LD0302164595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1337 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 3 Feb (TANJUG)—Dr. Radoje Kontic, the Federal prime minister, today received Ivor Roberts, the British charge d'affaires, with whom he exchanged views on the activities of the Contact Group in peacefully resolving the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the development of Yugoslav-British relations.

A statement by the federal secretariat for information says that the collocutors jointly expressed the hope that 1995 would be a year in which there would be a political solution to the crisis in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

The Federal prime minister assessed positively the efforts of Great Britain in resolving the Yugoslav crisis and expressed his thankfulness for the engagement of British troops in UN peacekeeping forces. [passage omitted]

### BLIC: Jovanovic To Be Replaced as Minister

*AU0502212895 Belgrade BLIC in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Milutinovic New Foreign Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The current Yugoslav ambassador to Greece, Milan Milutinovic, is to become Yugoslav foreign minister, BLIC has learned from well-informed circles.

Vladislav Jovanovic, current foreign minister in Prime Minister Kontic's Federal Government, is to become FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] ambassador to the United Nations in New York.

This changes are to be completed by Zoran Janackovic, current undersecretary in the ministry of foreign affairs, who is to become ambassador to Athens.

All three men belong within the circle of Milosevic's closest associates.

The appointment of Milan Milutinovic could represent a subtle shift in Milosevic's foreign policy, not only because Milutinovic is a considerably different man, but simply because he is a new man. He used to be engaged in party activities in Vracar, then in the Belgrade party committee. He was Serbian education minister, and the executor of the famous expulsion of eight professors from the School of Philosophy.

He also worked as manager of Serbia's National Library, from where he was suddenly thrust into the game following the 8th Congress, and sent off to Athens.

Two years ago, when Kontic's cabinet was formed, Milosevic tried to appoint Milutinovic as foreign minister. Dobrica Cosic, then FRY president, adamantly opposed this however. Cosic's first adviser was at the time Svetozar Stojanovic, one of the eight expelled professors-philosophers.

### Official: International Refugee Aid Insufficient

*LD0402193495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1856 GMT 4 Feb 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 4 (TANJUG)—Serbian commissioner for refugees Bratislava Morina said Saturday that international humanitarian aid to Yugoslavia satisfied only nine percent of all refugee needs. Speaking at a meeting with representatives of the Association of Refugees and the Expelled in Belgrade, Morina said that Yugoslavia provided for the rest of these needs.

About 700,000 people, who fled Croat and Bosnia-Herzegovina, found refuge in Yugoslavia, 350,000 of them are in Belgrade alone. Morina said that despite scarce aid by international humanitarian organizations and difficulties that Yugoslavia encountered because of the comprehensive and mandatory U.N. sanctions, not a single refugee would be expelled.

Morina said that the biggest problems of refugees in Yugoslavia are those concerning citizenship and return to their homes in the Srpska republic and the republic of Serb Krajina.

How to resolve these problems must primarily be agreed on by the Bosnian Serb and Serb Krajina governments and only then can it become the issue of the commissioner for refugees, Morina said.

Serbs in Croatia formed the republic of Serb Krajina in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

"The severance of Yugoslavia's diplomatic relations with the Srpsla republic renders these talks impossible. However, it is possible to make plans and agreements with the Serb Krajina leadership," Morina said.

Morina said that since the summer of 1994, anywhere between 1,000-2,000 refugees have been coming to Yugoslavia from Croatia every month. The return of the expelled would be impeded also because the Croatian Government has accused 1,400 Serbs of war crimes in the regions of the eastern Slavonian town of Vinkovci and the city of Osijek alone and they should therefore enjoy the status of emigres in Yugoslavia, it was heard during the meeting.

### Report of 1994 Tourist Industry Earnings

*LD0602140595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1123 GMT 6 Feb 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 6 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav tourist industry's foreign earnings for the first 11 months of 1994 stood at a modest 27.8 million dollars due to the international sanctions, but were 28 percent higher than for the same period of the preceding year.

According to the Federal Statistics Bureau's figures for 1994, 11.8 million overnight stays by domestic and foreign tourists were recorded, which was an increase of 17 percent on the first 11 months of 1993.

The number of overnight stays in 1994 was nearly 50 percent lower than in the years before the sanctions, and foreign tourists accounted for only 7 percent of the total figure.

The U.N. Security Council introduced mandatory comprehensive sanctions against Yugoslavia in late May 1992, because of alleged Yugoslav involvement in the civil war in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Yugoslav Government's estimates show that the Yugoslav economy suffered at least 45 billion dollars in losses due to the sanctions until August 1994.

### Federal Energy Plan Considered Erroneous

*95BA0112B Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jan 95 pp 25-26*

[Article by Dragan Nedeljkovic: "Shortage of Coal, Petroleum, Gas, and Blackouts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The final figures on the production and consumption of all types of energy in 1994 are still not available, which is quite understandable with the calendar change just ahead, but the Federal Government has an obligation (under the law) to compile and adopt the energy budget for 1995. The Ministry of the

Economy, which has jurisdiction, has prepared that document, and the government will probably adopt it along with the usual economic policy measures in January. The preparation and adoption of the energy budget, one of the key documents of economic policy for the entire state, have become a kind of routine job. Faced with a number of essential obstacles, in the administration they have simply been slogging through the job to arrive at a supposedly serious document; it is marked strictly confidential, but in practice it is almost worthless.

The quality of the energy budget is best indicated by this year's example: The petroleum industry, mining industry, and power industry are "fulfilling," even exceeding, the budget, but half the country is in the dark, nowhere can petroleum products be found at service stations, and even coal is hard to get. When the facts are arrayed like that, it is easy to draw a conclusion that unfortunately is erroneous. The discrepancy between the planned production and consumption of energy, the conflict between the government document and practice, would seem to logically indicate incompetence on the part of the authorities to plan production and foresee the demands (if only that were the case, because then they could be removed and replaced by professionally competent personnel, and the problem would be solved).

It is a question, however, of helplessness. And the helplessness of the professional services has been built up from a number of little pieces that are not available when the mosaic of the energy budget and policy measures are being drawn up. The first and main one is that the state is under an embargo. In spite of the optimism of the politicians, although national attributes are appealed to, and the public is assured that we can go it alone in energy, it is evident to the naked eye, so to speak, that isolation gives rise to a shortage of all types of energy, as well as materials, parts, and equipment without which domestic production capacities are unable to operate. The official figures say that the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] is some 40-percent dependent on imports of primary energy. The dependence is 75 percent in the case of petroleum, 77 percent for natural gas, and no less than 100 percent for coking coal. The authors of the budget have been forced to behave like ostriches burying their heads in the sand—they put down how much petroleum, gas, coal, and hydropower can be produced from domestic sources, and make the needs of consumers equal to that. And that is how they arrive at the "balanced" budget. The result is the situation we have on the energy "market."

Another obstacle to adoption of the energy budget, perhaps not quite so essentially important, is the institutional jurisdiction—the Federal Government adopts the budget by adding together the republic budgets. But an energy budget is not a simple mathematical operation: Adopting it for the country as a whole is not the same as adding up the two federal units. Especially because all the powers, from implementing this budget to prices and the economic position of energy enterprises, lie in republic jurisdiction. Not only are the republics the owners of the energy enterprises, but their ministries have become the distributors of all forms of energy. What this means for the "unified economic space" and overall economic policy of the Federal Government is clear to every economist and lawyer, which makes it all the more strange that no one mentions the problem in spite of the abundance of members of those occupations and the numerous academic titles held by members of the government itself.

The energy industries have particular trouble in drawing up the budget. The shapers of economic policy can foresee the growth of the social product, greater business activity, stable prices, or controlled inflation and similar annual indicators, while those in the energy industries are not so flexible; the budget for a particular year has to follow from the long-range commitment and strategy in the country's energy development. But no such document exists at all. It takes several years to open a mine, to build a power plant, or develop an oil field, even as many as 10 years when the preparations are included, which means that the annual budget should not "plan" any increase of production at all without newly built projects. The energy budget for 1995 was accompanied by an announcement that a strategy for the long-range development of energy was to be drafted by approximately September, but it is completely uncertain whether there will be the will and the strength to do that. And in recent years all investment activity in the energy industries has died out; nothing new has been built, nor is anything in preparation, so it is not difficult to conclude that there will be no increase in domestic production for a long, long time in the future. It will be successful if the present level is maintained, because the mines and oil fields are exhausting their reserves and are not discovering new ones, and equipment in the electric power industry is getting old, and its technical life is coming to an end.

This means at the same time that in the future, it does not matter whether it is 1995 or some year thereafter, but quite certainly for a number of years, when there are no sanctions, and economic activity is bustling, more energy will have to be imported, and, of course, much more will have to be paid for it. The bills for current energy policy (if the government's behavior can be so termed) will come due and will not boil down to only occasional blackouts, filling stations with no gasoline, and gas pipelines with no gas. The example of an oil field can be used figuratively to show what the bill will look like: "Development" of the field has been halted because funds were lacking, which means the annual growth of production of about 100,000 metric tons of petroleum will not be forthcoming, and when the petroleum is imported, it will cost three or four times more. Not even to mention exploration of new deposits, although it is well known that in the fields under exploitation annual depletion is 7-10 percent of reserves, and there is a natural drop in production. The situation is similar with coal mines and the electric power industry; without new investments, the level of production cannot be maintained.

When the Federal Ministry for the Economy foresees under these conditions that coal production in 1995 will be 35.5 million tons, petroleum 1.3 million tons, natural gas 730 million square meters, and electric power 32.6 billion kilowatt-hours [kWh], no one alive knows whether those quantities will actually be produced, much less how much consumers will need and to what extent those quantities will be met. Regardless of the official name given to this state document, it is not an energy budget at all. Especially because the measures for carrying out the budget, which are a condition for its actual fulfillment, are not in the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. Most are in republic jurisdiction, some in the jurisdiction of the United Nations, and some in the hands of God Himself (by which we mean nature, drought, rainfall distribution, and weather conditions).

The point of departure in drawing up the budget should have been the assumption that in 1995 the state will be under sanctions, but nevertheless imported quantities of energy were included on the basis of the humanitarian imports the Committee for the Sanctions was asked to approve. No one knows as yet what will happen with that. The Federal Government, however, is powerless to take steps on the domestic scene, regardless of foreign factors, sanctions, and the discretion of the committee. The republics have jurisdiction over the first of these measures, which is to use energy prices to keep firms operating and to see that economic logic is introduced. And with their moves this year the republics have created a chaos in the price area, they have confused relationships, and they have destroyed their own tariff systems. The Federal Government envisages that the energy industries will have to be furnished approximately $300 million (to import energy, parts, equipment, and so forth) and the same amount of dinars (for overhaul, maintenance, parts). We do not know whether the republics will do this, how they will do it, or when (it makes a big difference whether this is done at the beginning or end of the year). Nor do we know whether the petroleum, mining, and electric power industries have certain other amounts of dollars and dinars they need, because none of them has even seen the proposed budget.

The Federal Government and the competent ministers have been proposing a number of measures for several years, above all incentives and economic measures for substitution, efficient energy use, and conservation, but the republics have never accepted nor tried to carry out any of those measures. We know very well how inefficiently energy is being consumed both in the economy and in general consumption, and the republics seem to be intentionally encouraging outright squandering and wasting of energy. When energy efficiency is measured in terms of social product, per capita, unit output, or any other way, the results are stunning—we consume three to five times more energy than in the advanced world. You might think that we are so rich we do not give a damn, but we know the truth ourselves.

## Serbia

### Marjanovic Talks With Russia's Davydov

*LD0502221495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2207 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgade, Feb. 5 (TANJUG)—Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic and Deputy Russian Prime Minister Oleg Davydov on Sunday agreed it was necessary to strengthen joint political activities aimed at lifting sanctions against Yugoslavia. This would speed up peace in the former Yugoslavia, it was heard during the meeting between Marjanovic and Davydov.

Davydov, who heads a visiting Russian delegation, arrived in Belgrade on Sunday.

Yugoslavia's commitment to peace and peaceful resolution to all conflicts in the former Yugoslavia has been proven and accepted even by hardline advocates of anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav policy, it was also heard at the talks.

Marjanovic was confident that the Russian delegation's visit would be another step in reaffirming friendly relations between the two countries and peoples and in continuing large-scale high-quality contacts between the two economies, the Serbian Information Ministry said in a statement. He recalled that during his visit to Russia last August he had agreed on a number of deals which were now being implemented.

It was confirmed at the talks that contracts would be signed on long-term natural gas supplies to Yugoslavia by the year 2010. Other contracts would be signed on the construction of a gas pipeline network in Yugoslavia, on preventing double taxation, and on the insurance of capital investment projects.

Davydov said Russia was ready to buy wheat in Yugoslavia on the barter basis and also supply fuels for humanitarian purposes. Serbian and Russian ministers opened talks in Belgrade on Sunday concerning the setting up of joint companies in the field of oil industry, agriculture, iron and steel and nonferrous industries, mechanical engineering, and automobile and chemical industries, just as in the domain of capital development projects.

### Seselj Seeks To Unite Opposition, Come to Power

*LD0502221595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2111 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Zajecar, 5 Feb (TANJUG)—Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, said in Zajecar this evening that the Serbian opposition would unite in order to come to power. He said at a news conference that he will meet party leaders Vuk Draskovic of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Zoran Djindjic of the Democratic Party, and Vojislav Kostunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia, at his party's headquarters on Tuesday.

According to the Serbian Radical leader, they will discuss ways of creating a political bloc in order jointly to contest early elections, which Seselj expects later this year. "The authorities will try to surprise us but we are ready to take part in the elections and win a parliamentary majority," Seselj said.

Asked about how he intends to reconcile different party programs, Seselj said: "Now it is important to ease the tensions within the opposition and we are prepared for any kind of a compromise on condition that a consensus is reached regarding the national interest. Our economic and social programs are already similar."

### Survey Shows 'Increased Trust' in TV Reporting

*AU0502134295 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[Interview with Milan Timotic, director of the center of Radio Television of Serbia for research of public opinion of programs, by Milorad Komrakov in Belgrade on 4 February—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Komrakov] The Radio Television of Serbia center for research on public opinion of programs recently conducted an extensive survey in the Republic of Serbia on the popularity of radio and television programs. Dnevnik's guest this evening is Milan Timotic, director of our company's research department. Good evening.

[Timotic] Good evening.

[Komrakov] We are all mostly interested in whether Dnevnik is still the most popular and influential program.

[Timotic] Yes, the public has for years now been convinced that Dnevnik is the most popular program, and this has not been without reason. The data we have available from the recent survey from the end of October 1994 confirms this conviction. This has been the case for years. I would like to use this opportunity—I hope you do not mind—to thank the citizens of Serbia who gave us answers to the questions we asked them. This has, by the way, been the most extensive survey conducted by the center in Serbia. About 18,500 people have been canvassed.

[Komrakov] Let us get down to the data. How many people now watch Dnevnik?

[Timotic] On average per day, in a seven-day cycle, over 3 million people watch Dnevnik. The lower threshold is 2,800,000 and the higher is 3,300,000. Therefore, at the moment we are seen by about 3 million people.

[Komrakov] [Passage omitted] Tell me, one of the important aspects of surveying is probably trust in the program. Do you have any information about whether the viewers trust Dnevnik?

[Timotic] At the moment I do not have the figures, as the results are still being assessed. I will have them in a couple of days. However, preliminary results, that is, the so-called test tables show that there is an increased trust in the reporting of Dnevnik 2.

[Komrakov] That is very important for us.

[Timotic] Very important, and that is why I suggest that we discuss this at greater length on some other occasion, when we have the complete results.

[Komrakov] When you have the complete picture. Thank you for taking part in our program this evening.

## Montenegro

### Marovic: Relations With Serbia, Ruling Party

*AU0402203395 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[Interview with Montenegrin Assembly Chairman Svetozar Marovic by Vera Jankovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Jankovic] The program for the economic recovery of our country is doubtless supported in Montenegro. What do you think of the latest decision by the National Bank of Yugoslavia concerning the latest decisions by the Federal Government, which, to remind the viewers, has adopted the 1995 economic policy?

[Marovic] To fight for the economic program of our government, for Mr. Avramovic, for the monetary and financial reconstruction of our system, and banking changes, means to show the required patriotism and concern for one's people and country, and to show a readiness to overcome differences that exist naturally in every democratic society. In the beginning, we were sorry that the program was not supported by everyone, but the quality and results of the program, I believe, have shown that this now represents strength, a chance, and hope for every one of our citizen.

[Jankovic] What, in your opinion, should be done so that the Federal Assembly deals exclusively with its own legislative activities, as has been the case with the last few sessions, of course with full respect for political differences and tolerance?

[Marovic] Well, I think that it is most important to have a sense of responsibility. I believe that a sense of responsibility should be seen as an obligation by all the deputy groups, by all the elected representatives of the people. The majority group of the Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS] and the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] has been trying to be open to cooperation with everyone. I think that this approach of openness, patience, and benevolent persistence should be the foundation for finding solutions in a creative majority; for an efficient Federal Assembly without quarrels, endless speeches, and unnecessary incidents that needlessly offend the dignity of every citizen as well as elicit unnecessary suspicions in the representative, parliamentary, and democratic bodies and institutions.

[Jankovic] The question of relations between Serbia and Montenegro inevitably arises, as does cooperation between the two ruling parties, I mean the DPS of Montenegro and the SPS. How do you view this issue?

[Marovic] I think that this cooperation is extremely valuable, primarily for the democratic stability of the Federal community in which the equality of citizens, the equality of Federal entities, is observed. We have tried to keep this cooperation between the two majorities, the two strongest political parties in the country, in such a way that it is understanding of all those who do not share our political convictions and goals. We have thus tried to diminish political differences between various political inclinations, because the smaller these differences, the greater the stability of the state, the more certain the safety of the society, and the clearer the perspective of the nation.

[Jankovic] Serbia and Montenegro have with their peaceful policies proved that the complete lifting of the sanctions is something that can be expected. In your opinion, when will they be lifted?

[Marovic] I believe that this process has started. It will probably be subject to and linked to many difficulties, but we sincerely hope that—as the political issues in the previous Yugoslavia, particularly in the republic of Serbian Krajina and the Srpska republic, that is, in Bosnia, are solved—conditions are created both formally and legally for the lifting of the sanctions. The sanctions were imposed against us formally because of some responsibility of ours for the development of the situation in the former Bosnia.

[Jankovic] One final question: Montenegro in the near future?

[Marovic] Montenegro, of course, envisions a future with the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], and in the development of internal democratic relations in the political sense. In the economic sense, it is the creation of conditions for further development of an economically mobile, stable economy in ownership terms, an economy that will encourage entrepreneurial, courageous, and economically successful people. I think that our political and public goals are rather precisely directed toward such developments, and I believe that Montenegro and Yugoslavia will find the strength to adopt such goals and virtues that will benefit all citizens, and the interests of all of us who live with great hope, many problems, but also with the satisfaction that we have the strength and power to endure all this country's difficulties.

[Jankovic] Thank you for the interview.

## Kosovo

### Rugova on Greek Assistance for Serbian Refugees

*AU0302213295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[Telephone report by Mehmet Haziri from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian mass media are launching a large campaign aimed at realizing Belgrade's projects to colonize Kosova, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, told reporters at a news conference held today, stressing that this aims at creating insecurity in Kosova.

The Serbian threat to review the law on arrangement of lands is carried out in the framework of this campaign and is another grave provocation against Albanians who are sensitive about property, President Rugova stressed, expressing the conviction that such a thing will not be realized.

Regarding the statements by Serbian officials that Greece has expressed readiness to help in building houses for Serbian refugees, President Rugova said that he will ask for detailed explanations from official Athens regarding this pronouncement. Greece may build as many as it likes in Serbia, but not in Kosova, President Rugova stated, being very categorical. Even last Friday, Rugova told reporters that he will inform all international relevant institutions about Serbia's colonization projects and aims.

President Rugova briefed reporters on the most characteristic cases of Serbian repression during this week in Kosova. Twenty-two interventions by hundreds of Serbian policemen in Vushtrri, Doberlluk, Mitrovice, Han i Elezit, and several other areas were accompanied by raids, mistreatment, plundering, and arrests of many persons. These are the most brutal forms of massively provoking the Albanian population, President Rugova pointed out, demanding that they be interrupted and that all prisoners, particularly the Albanian policemen, be released.

Rugova greeted the statement of French Minister for European Affairs Alain Lamassoure, that without the solution to the Kosova issue there cannot be a solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

Rugova also greeted reports by special UN envoy Mazowiecki regarding the grave situation in Kosova and violation of human and national rights of Albanians, as well as demonstrations against violence in Kosova, which were organized by Amnesty International in Washington and New York. Rugova assessed these activities as elements revealing that during this week, too, Kosova was at the focus of international concern.

## President Deplores Colonization Plans

*AU0502215795 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian*
*5 Feb 95 pp 1, 3*

[Behxhet Haliti report on news conference given by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, in Pristina on 4 February: "Kosova Cannot Be Pacified by Force"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is thanks to our peaceful resistance and the Albanian movement in Kosova, and not to Serbia's strength, as the Serbian side sometimes maintains, that we have had no open conflict here. People here are very much aware of the need to avoid a conflict that would be tragic for Kosova and the entire region. Kosova is therefore strong, and cannot be pacified by force, as some suppose.

With these words, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, began yesterday's regular news conference, at which he also brought up many other issues concerning Albanians and Kosova.

### Examples of Mass Provocation of Albanians

Repression in Kosova has recently been characterized by a great many police raids. About 70 policemen entered the village of Doberiiuke near Vushtrri [Vucitm], where 23 families were raided and a number of people were mistreated. In Vushtrri, about 300 policemen took over the town for several hours, while police entered the Tamik quarter of Mitrovice, raiding 43 families consisting of 230 family members. People have also been mistreated and subject to searches at Elez Han [Djeneral Jankovic]. These are examples of mass provocation against us and we draw attention to them because they cause people distress. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova observed that, in the course of this systematic repression, there have been many raids on the outskirts of Kosovar towns. There have been 22 cases of police intervention in 17 communes, involving raids mainly on the pretext of searching for weapons, including the mistreatment of Albanian families and the ransacking of household property. In Podujeve, five people recently were sentenced to five months' imprisonment each for refusing to enlist in the Serbian Army, and pressure has continued throughout Kosova against Kosova Democratic League [LDK] activists (in Istog, Kline, and other places), the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, and other humanitarian workers. There have also been cases of looting in the markets of Podujeve, Kacanik, Fushe Kosova, and Skenderaj. President Rugova also demanded the release of all prisoners and detained former policemen.

Continuing yesterday's news conference, President Rugova said that recent days have seen the anti-Albanian campaign being addressed in the Serbian mass media and that is tied to the forcible colonization of Kosova with Serbian refugees and other Serbs, on the basis of laws and decrees of the Serbian Government. In Lipjan, for example, it has been announced that 100 building lots will be granted free in different villages of this commune. One hundred apartments are to be granted in Mitrovice; 270 apartments and 800 building lots in Obiliq; 50 apartments in Peje; 200 apartments and 130 building lots in Vitomirice; and 215 lots in Gjilian. It has also been announced that refugees will also be granted 4 hectares of arable land each. This is an unscrupulous campaign, President Rugova said, and will cause insecurity in Kosova. We point out that this campaign, which could precede the forcible Serbian colonization of Kosova, is a very dangerous matter.

President Rugova went on to mention the Serbian land law that is to be issued and will be redefining property rights extant since 1945. This law will bring new problems. We have had small-scale private property, and also state property that has been taken by citizens of Kosova. This new land law will be a new form of pressure against people and their property, about which they are highly sensitive.

In this campaign, Dr. Rugova went on to say that some sources provided by the Serbian side claim that Greece too is involved in this campaign, and wishes to build various amentities for refugees. We inform Greece that it can build in Serbia but not in Kosova. We will demand a more detailed explanation of this matter from Greece, he said.

President Rugova said that pressure on real estate is one of the harshest and most extreme methods the Serbian regime uses to provoke Albanians.

### Kosova's Independence Affirmed at Home and Abroad

President Rugova went on to say that Kosova remains at the center of international attention. We welcome the statement by Mr. Lamassoure, French minister for European affairs, in which he says that there can be no solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia without a settlement of the Kosova question. We also welcome the report of UN special envoy Tadeusz Mazowiecki, which examines the serious situation in Kosova and the rights of Albanians. We also of course thank Amnesty International for organizing demonstrations in support of Kosova in Washinton and New York. This international organization publicly and vocally supports the cause of Kosova.

The independence of Kosova, Dr. Rugova continued, is being affirmed both at home and abroad. We can say that the independence of Kosova is a matter being broached and placed on the international agenda as a problem. We are for an overall settlement of all the problems of the former Yugoslavia.

Asked by a journalist if there is any official information from Germany about whether, regarding the repatriation of Albanian asylum-seekers, Germany will build facilities for them, and whether there is any possibility of Serbia misusing this German announcement to its own ends, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova replied that we will soon demand an official explanation from Germany, which has expressed a desire to help Albanian refugees. However, we have always asked for aid to come to the state and humanitarian institutions of Kosova. Germany would thus secure for our people a means of subsistence. We do not want these funds to pass through the hands of Serbs because they might be misused. So far, this matter has remained at the level of newspaper articles and we have no other information.

Another question put to President Rugova was what can be expected from a possible new peace conference for an overall settlement of problems in the former Yugoslavia, as proposed by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. Dr. Rugova said that we favor an overall settlement, and support different forms of this solutions. Mr. Juppe's idea is under consideration by many Western countries, while we demand that, if such a conference is organized, it be well prepared and all the federal units of the former Yugoslavia, including Kosova, participate equally.

Asked by a journalist from a Belgrade paper whether demonstrations are also to be expected in Kosova, Rugova said that he had mentioned the demonstrations of Amnesty International in Washington and New York, and that this association had organized them independently from us. Now the LDK and other Albanian associations will hold demonstrations in Western countries.

Asked to comment on the disagreements between the Serbs and Croatia and the Croatian regime over the Z-Four plan, President Rugova said that he hoped that these relations will be normalized and that ways will be found to continue negotiations. The Z-Four plan had not reached him, and he could not say anything more about it, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova concluded.

## Change in Ethnic Structure 'Only Hope' for Serbs

*AU0502134195 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 4 Feb 95*

[Report by Milisav Milic from Pristina; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Milic] The topic of the week in Kosovo and Metohija has been the announced return of 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins to the province. The ambitious decree by the Federal Government on populating Kosovo and Metohija has been greeted with great interest in all regions.

[Desimir Petkovic, Zvecan mayor] We are building a refugee settlement in Mali Zvecan, that is, in the Zvecan municipality, which will have 52 living units. The project was started on 18 November 1994, and the two-month period has been used to work on unfinished projects, so as soon as the weather permits, we will start building the infrastructure.

[Zvonimir Radojevic from Kragujevac] I have come here to talk to the Zvecan mayor about returning. I have lived in Kragujevac with my wife for 17 years. I want to return here, where I was born, and I want to stay here.

[Milic] What is your profession?

[Radojevic] I am a car mechanic. I work on construction machines.

[Milic] Trepca needs workers now, qualified as well as unqualified.

[Branko Stolic, Vucitrn mayor] Sixty-seven apartments are under construction in the Vucitrn municipality, in the district of (Kaljaje) in the center of Vucitrn, and 15 apartments have already been bought by the Foundation for the Development of Serbia. They will be allocated to those interested in coming to live in Vucitrn, as well as those who already live here, and are of vital importance to the Vucitrn economy. Also in the Vucitrn municipality, in Velika Reka, a settlement of 86 houses is under construction for refugees, and it will be finished in May. We expect about 400 new inhabitants in Velika Reka.

[Milic] In Kosovo Polje, they are working of the revitalization of the economy, so that the newly arrived can get jobs.

[Dobrica Lazic, Kosovo Polje mayor] We have linked up the dairy and cow farm, and production should start in both facilities in April of this year.

[Milic] Over the last few decades Kosovo people have built new houses in Smederevo, Kragujevac, Kraljevo, and other towns in Serbia. Now they want to give these houses to the state in exchange for permission to build in Kosovo and Metohija.

[Zoran Vrtikapa, private entrepreneur] I have a house of 200 square meters in Gornji Milanovac, and I am willing to give it to Gornji Milanovac in exchange for a location in Pristina.

[Milic] The feeling here is that the change in the ethnic structure is the only hope for the survival of the Serbian people in this region. The measures by the Federal Government on the return to Kosovo and Metohija are just one more piece of evidence that Yugoslavia and Serbia are exhibiting great interest in stabilizing the southern province. Expectations are that many national institutions participate in the realization of this project.

## Peasants Party Opposes Serb 'Colonization' Plans

*AU0302214495 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[Telephone report by Shaban Arifaj from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Prishtina today, the leadership of the Peasants Party of Kosova [PFK] organized a meeting with the representatives of the party branches. The meeting, presided over by Dr. Ivzi Islami, discussed

Serbian plans to colonize Kosova. Correspondent Shaban Arifaj will inform us about the communique issued from this meeting:

[Arifaj] The meeting stressed that the realization of the new program of Serbia and self-proclaimed Yugoslavia to colonize Kosova would have unforeseen consequences at an interethnic, political, and economic level both in Kosova and the region. The 100,000 Serbs that the Milosevic regime envisages to bring to Kosova represent the most powerful wave of colonizing Kosova in the 20th century. Ideas for Kosova's colonization are directly taken from the infamous elaborations of [Serbian historian] Cubrilovic, while efficiency in the colonization and the eviction of Albanians depends on using the military forces.

After a detailed elaboration of Serbian projects and laws to colonize Kosova, the PFK communique stresses that despite attempts at colonization, Serbia should understand clearly that at the moment when a constitutional situation will be established in Kosova and the new democratic and independent order will function, such projects and laws will be abolished and Serbs will go back where they came from.

The PFK informs the Serbian power that it should bear the entire responsibility for the consequences of such an adventurous and genocidal undertaking. The PFK will oppose the realization of the project with all methods and means that are included in its program and political statement.

At the meeting, the representatives of the PFK branches received concrete tasks to prevent this Serbian action by first stopping the emigration of Albanians, which can be achieved through assisting in the functioning of the Albanian education and strengthening solidarity among families who tend to emigrate for economic reasons.

### Repatriation Program Described as 'Colonization'

*LD0302144095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1210 GMT 3 Feb 95*

[By Djordje Jevtic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Feb. 3 (TANJUG)—Ethnic Albanian separatist leaders in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija have described as 'colonization' the proposed Yugoslav Government repatriation program. Under the program, the Yugoslav Government plans to conclude the construction of 140 flats by the end of the year and to build another 140 for Serbs and Montenegrins returning to the province. Priority would be given to trained personnel.

A paper issued by the separatist Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, BUJKU, said in late January that 'such colonization should be opposed in an organized and comprehensive manner.' BUJKU recently organized a pannel discussion whose participants urged that 'all Albanian factors immediately rally together' to block the implementation of the government plan. A committee whose task is to work out a strategy for fighting against the Serbs' and Montenegrins' return to the province was also set up at the meeting.

A strong separatist ethnic Albanian movement has been active in Kosovo and Metohija for decades. The movement's objective is to secede the province from Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Boycotting dialogue with Yugoslav and Serbian authorities and participation in the political life, ethnic Albanians have set up illegal state bodies and declared an independent so-called 'Republic of Kosovo.' Statistic figures show that over the past three years alone, about 200,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have been forced into leaving their homes through ethnic Albanian pressure, within a strategy of ethnically cleansing the province of all non-Albanian citizens.

Ethnic Albanian separatist propaganda presents all attempts by Serbs and Montenegrins to return to the province as efforts to change the national structure in Kosovo and Metohija, where ethnic Albanians now account for 90 percent of the population. An alleged Yugoslav Government ban on ethnic Albanian emigrants' return to the province is also part of such ethnic Albanian propaganda. The Yugoslav Government has refuted such allegations.

These ethnic Albanians have over the past five years been advised by their separatist leaders to leave their jobs and emigrate to western European countries where they claim to be political refugees. The ethnic Albanian media alert triggered by the Yugoslav Government repatriation program is evidently aimed at maintaining the 'ethnic Albanian dominance' in Kosovo and Metohija accomplished to date. Ethnic Albanian separatists have often boasted to international factors that the province is ethnically 'the most homogeneous' region in Europe and consequently insisted on being allowed to set up their own state.

## Vojvodina

### Prime Minister Perosevic on Minorities' Rights

*LD0502190195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1854 GMT 5 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, Feb 5 (TANJUG)-—Northern Serbian Province of Vojvodina Prime Minister Bosko Perosevic said Sunday that the minorities enjoyed more rights in Vojvodina than in Europe. Perosevic said in a statement to the local radio in the central Serbian town of Kragujevac that under the Vojvodina statute, all the province's minorities 'can exercise their rights on the highest possible level.'

He said that 'there was no reason to seek special autonomy,' because Vojvodina already enjoyed it under the Serbian constitution.

Leader of the most influential ethnic Hungarians' Democratic Union of Vojvodina's Hungarians Party Andros Agoston insists on a three-level autonomy (personal, cultural, local) for his compatriots in Vojvodina.

Agoston has recently seid that documents on this issue are being drafted in the Hungarian capital of Budapest.

Perosevic said that the national minorities could resolve all suggestions about improving their status in Serbia with republican authorities and 'not in some other places.'

Perosevic said that those trying 'to do something outside Serbia's borders by using dictate,' were showing the nature of their party policy.

Perosevic said that provincial authorities were pursuing a policy in keeping with republican documents on national minority rights, which is confirmed by the fact that there had been no excesses or discords in Vojvodina over the past few years.

Vojvodina has a population about two million-strong, with more than 20 national minorities or ethnic groups.

Ethnic Hungarians outnumber other minorities, accounting for 340,946 or 16.94 percent of Vojvodina's population according to the 1991 census.

With 1,151,353 people according to the 1991 census, Serbs are the majority population in Vojvodina, accounting for 57.21 percent of the total population.

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